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PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

June 21, 1985

PREFACE

The emergence in the late 1950s and early 1960s of a number of Socialist regimes in sub-Saharan Africa was followed in the 1970s by the proclamation by seven other sub-Saharan African states of Marxist-Leninist governments. The continued survival of these Afrocommunist regimes and their increasing consolidation of Marxist-Leninist institutions have caused concern to the West because of the possible spread of Afrocommunism in Africa. The links between the Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist parties in Afrocommunist countries are also of concern to the West.

This paper defines socialism and its interpretations by Marx and African Socialists, and Marxism-Leninism and its interpretation by Afrocommunist regimes. This is followed by a discussion of Communist parties in non-Afrocommunist countries and a comparison of African Socialism and Afrocommunism. The political, economic, and ideological steps which led to the consolidation of Marxist-Leninist policies and institutions are then examined for each of the seven Afrocommunist countries--the Congo, Benin, Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia. Discussions on prospects for the emergence of Afrocommunist regimes in Zimbabwe and Namibia and the implications of Afrocommunism for the West, including possibilities in the event of the emergence of new Afrocommunist regimes, are followed by general conclusions and the outlook for the Afrocommunist regimes.

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SUMMARY

Socialism emerged in sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1950s as the first colonized territories gained independence. African Socialist leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sekou Toure in Guinea, and Modibo Keita in Mali, believed that Africa's traditional societies had characteristics compatible with socialism. However, the absence of pre-defined developmental programs in African Socialist ideology led several new regimes in the 1970s to embrace Marxism-Leninism. But since these governments lacked a proletariat social base and interpreted Marxism-Leninism as an ideology that could be adapted to local circumstances and implemented free of Soviet domination, they have become known as Afrocommunist governments.

The Marxist-Leninist orientation of the military rulers in the Congo, Benin, and Madagascar was proclaimed by fiat, partly in reaction to French neocolonialism, but mostly because Marxism-Leninism provided them with the means to consolidate power. In the Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, national liberation movements were led by Marxist-Leninist ideologues who had been influenced by members of the Portuguese Communist Party during their student years in Lisbon. The leading theorist among them was Amilcar Cabral, whose ideas on the application of Marxist-Leninist ideology to Africa provided all three nationalist movements with the foundations of their policies. Ethiopia differs from the other Afrocommunist countries in that it had never been colonized; the Marxist-Leninist path chosen by its military regime was the outgrowth of an internal social upheaval, and a ruling Marxist-Leninist party was established where no party had previously existed. Afrocommunism in the former Portuguese colonies, where Marxist-Leninist ideology was deeply rooted in liberation movements, and in Ethiopia, where the firmly established institutions of the ruling party are widely dispersed, is probably more entrenched than in the Congo, Benin, and Madagascar.

The existing Afrocommunist regimes are well established. Although some of their Marxist-Leninist policies are being modified, having failed to solve difficult economic problems, Marxist-Leninist institutions in all the Afrocommunist countries are being steadily consolidated and would probably remain in place in the event of a change in leadership. In addition, the impact of insurgencies, which threaten the regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, seems to be controlled by substantial military aid to the Marxist-Leninist governments.

It is unlikely that new Afrocommunist regimes will emerge in sub-Saharan Africa. In Zimbabwe, the leftist Mugabe regime, fearful of provoking serious economic problems like those in the Afrocommunist countries, has been hesitant to implement Marxist-Leninist policies, and in Namibia, the Marxist-Leninist-oriented SWAPO organization is unlikely to come to power in the face of South African opposition. Communist parties in Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan lack sufficient influence and support to be consequential, and in South Africa, prospects for the downfall of the powerful apartheid government and the coming to power of the longstanding and influential South African Communist Party are slim.

PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1. INTRODUCTION

The basic appeal of socialism to African leaders is the result of the poor economic conditions in which their countries were left by the colonial powers. Socialist concepts seemed to offer viable and expedient developmental alternatives following independence. The Socialist concepts introduced by Karl Marx, and later modified by Lenin, were even more attractive to some African leaders because they included a blueprint for economic and technological development.

According to Marx, economic production determines the social structure and belief systems of a group of people, with social change occurring as the result of a struggle between social classes. Classes are determined by ownership, or nonownership, of the means of production, the class owning the means of production dominating all other classes, primarily through control of the state. Under capitalism, the controlling class is the bourgeoisie, which Marx hypothesized would eventually be outnumbered by the workers, or proletariat, who would collectively acquire ownership of the means of production. In the Marxian analysis, at this stage the state becomes Socialist, and, as the class structure disappears with equal sharing, the state withers away.

Lenin, whose modifications of Marxism continue to provide the Soviet Union with its ideological backbone, created a system of organizing political power which would provide command of the economy. Marxist-Leninist ideology justifies the Russian Revolution by disregarding the Marxist principle of a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat to be followed by the withering away of the state. In this way, Marxist-Leninist ideologues could espouse Socialist ideals while building a coercive state dominated by a self-appointed elite. This adaptation of Marxist theory appeals to Africa's Marxist-Leninist regimes because in practice its constraints, including an intolerance of social, political, and philosophical rivalries, hold the society together in the midst of social and cultural tensions provoked by radical developmental changes.

a. Development of African Socialism

Most traditional African societies were classless and functioned within a system of communal sharing. Although the colonial powers--France, Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Germany--superimposed their own political and economic systems on these traditional societies, several nationalist leaders in African countries which gained their independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s embraced Socialist concepts. African socialism, as it was labeled, was based on the belief that Africa's traditional societies had characteristics which were compatible with socialism, which maintains that the entire society rather than private individuals should share fairly, if not always equally, in the wealth of a country. These characteristics included communal land ownership, the extended family, elaborate concepts of kinship, the practice of sharing, and an emphasis on cooperation rather than competition. The African Socialists favored the establishment of a one-party system and shared a rejection of the application of the Marxist concept of class conflict in Africa.

In 1957, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah was the first nationalist leader to introduce socialism in sub-Saharan Africa. By the early 1960s, Nkrumahism, as his ideology became known, advocated the idea that the state's power should be used to "Africanize" the leading sectors of the economy. Nkrumah's ideological orientation and his concept of Pan-Africanism, which envisaged the eventual merging of African states into one single state, were accepted by other nationalist leaders in Africa's colonial territories. But with the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 by British-trained officers in the army who opposed Nkrumah's growing ties with the Soviet Union, socialism in Ghana came to an end.

One nationalist leader inspired by Nkrumah was Sekou Toure, who came to power in Guinea when independence was gained from France in 1958. At independence, the French suspended all aid and technical assistance, including investments in the important mining industry. Toure was compelled to construct a completely new administrative framework, using the Democratic Party of Guinea as the institutional basis. Socialism seemed to offer the best alternative, especially since the Soviet Union was willing to provide aid in France's place. But in 1978, the failure of Toure's unstructured Socialist policies and disillusionment with the Soviet Union resulted in a reconciliation with France, steps toward economic liberalization, and a general shift away from Socialist policies.

Another nationalist leader who espoused socialism was Modibo Keita, who came to power in Mali at independence in 1960. By 1968, when the army seized power, many features of a Socialist system were already in place, particularly state companies in charge of industry and foreign and local trade.

One of the most enduring African Socialist regimes evolved in Tanzania under Julius Nyerere, who came to power in 1962. In 1967, Nyerere issued a formal document, which became known as the Arusha Declaration. The document declared Tanzania's commitment to socialism and embraced concepts of peasant farming, democracy under a single party, and self-reliance. Under the new system, socialism would be built on the country's agricultural potential. The single party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), denied political rights to anyone associated with practices of capitalism and feudalism, including those owning shares in any company, holding a directorship in any private enterprise, having two or more salaries, or owning houses for rent. Collective settlements, known as ujamaa (familyhood) villages, were established in rural areas, businesses were nationalized, and government corporations (parastatals) were created. However, Tanzania's Socialist model, dependent on the cooperation of the peasants, has largely been a failure. The peasants, rebelling against forced moves to collective settlements and low farm prices, have withheld their crops from the government. As a result, the Nyerere government is gradually adopting policies that are more characteristic of the capitalist world than the Socialist one.

Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda and Senegal's Leopold Senghor, while basically in agreement with Nyerere's ideas, developed their own names for African socialism. Kaunda, encompassing Socialist ideas in his concept of humanism, emphasized the individual and the need for his good behavior in a Christian sense for socialism to blossom. Senghor, labeling his ideology Negritude,

sought to give African socialism a stronger cultural base and differentiate it from European socialism.

b. Shift Away from African Socialism

In the 1970s, a leftward trend in sub-Saharan Africa became clearly discernible, not only because of the waning interest in the early African approach toward socialism, but also because of the increasing number of African governments espousing orthodox Marxism-Leninism. By 1980, seven sub-Saharan African countries--Angola, Benin, the Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, and Mozambique--were under the rule of self-professed Marxist-Leninist leaderships. Four of them, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, and the Congo, had signed friendship and cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union.

Marxist-Leninist parties also emerged in four other sub-Saharan African countries. The most longstanding and influential Communist party in sub-Saharan Africa is the South African Communist Party (SACP) which was established clandestinely in 1953. Its predecessor, the Communist Party of South Africa, established in 1921 and dissolved in 1950 on the eve of its banning, was the continent's first Marxist-Leninist party. Despite its dominance by whites, the earlier party recognized the revolutionary potential among blacks and sought to establish firm ties with them. As a result, the party became closely allied to the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, ties which the SACP continues to maintain. The SACP's leadership was forced into exile in the 1960s when the South African Government reacted with harsh reprisals to a shift from nonviolent to violent tactics by the ANC with the help of the SACP. Today's proscribed SACP remains committed to Marxist-Leninist ideology and maintains close ties with the Soviet Union. Party members, whose number is difficult to estimate because of the many in exile, include activists who participated in the political upsurge following the Sharpeville shootings in 1960. At present, most senior party leaders as well as many party members work outside the country in the dispersed African and European centers where exiles are concentrated.

The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) traces its origins to 1946. After being implicated in a coup attempt in 1971, the party was banned and remains so at present, with its leadership in exile. A pro-Soviet party, the SCP was at one time the largest Communist party in Africa. The party derives its support from intellectuals, students, certain sympathizers within the armed forces, railway workers, and tenant farmers. In Nigeria, the Socialist Working People's Party of Nigeria (SWPP) held its first Congress in November 1978. A descendant of the banned Socialist Workers and Farmers Party, the pro-Soviet SWPP was unable to meet the conditions, including the establishment of party offices in at least 13 states, to contest the November 1979 elections.

Finally, in Senegal, the pro-Soviet Independence and Labor Party (PIT), with a membership of only 2,000, was the only legally registered Communist party in the country until April 1981 when the National Assembly lifted restrictions on the number of political parties. The growth of a number of small political parties calling themselves Marxist since then has caused the PIT a loss of influence.

Communist parties, especially those in non-Communist countries, are usually closely aligned with and modeled after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, depending primarily on workers for support. In general, Communist parties do not exist or are unable to gain significant influence and popularity in sub-Saharan Africa because of the small size of the working class in most countries. Also, many African leaders fear the spread of Soviet-supported Communist parties in Africa and impose severe restrictions on the formation of these types of parties in their countries. And finally, in the increasing number of countries with one-party governments where the formation of a Communist party is illegal, support is even more difficult to obtain.

2. DEVELOPMENT OF AFROCOMMUNISM

By the late 1960s, the stress on the communal heritage of African society and the rejection of class struggle became unacceptable to some African leaders, who began to opt for a socialism tied to traditional Marxist-Leninist ideas. This African Marxist-Leninist orientation, which became known as Afrocommunism, developed from a number of influences. These include Western European Communist parties, notably in France and Portugal, which reject Soviet interference while remaining committed to international and domestic policies similar to those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Their ideologies are also characterized by avoidance of international bloc alignment.

One kind of Afrocommunist state was born during the struggle against Portuguese colonial rule in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. In these cases, Marxist-Leninist ideology did not originate within a Communist party, but within nationalist movements which had in their leaderships a number of Marxist-Leninist intellectuals. But another kind of Afrocommunism emerged in a number of states where no Communist party or revolutionary movement existed. It was instead the proclamation of a military regime, followed by attempts to convert society to a Marxist-Leninist model. This pattern began in the Congo in 1968 and appeared in Benin in 1974, in Madagascar in 1975, and in Ethiopia in 1976. The common factor in all Afrocommunist states, however, is the striving for the ultimate goal of a Marxist Socialist state.

a. Party Characteristics

African Marxist-Leninist parties are Leninist, revolutionary vanguards which dominate the state. They differ from traditional Marxist-Leninist parties in that their social base does not come from the proletariat. Since there are few workers in Africa, workers have played only a minor role when military or national liberation groups have formed Marxist-Leninist regimes. Instead, these groups rely on a dominant social group of political figures, intellectuals, and teachers, most of whom have worker or peasant origins.

All of the Afrocommunist states share certain characteristics. Their top party leaderships, from both the Politburo and Central Committee, fill all important ministerial positions in their governments. The ministers are responsible to the Politburo rather than to the head of government unless he is also the party chairman. At the level of party structure and organization, all the Afrocommunist parties and party schools receive advice from Soviet

bloc parties. As a result, all the Afrocommunist regimes have developed similar structures in their parties and other Marxist-Leninist institutions. Finally, the supreme organ of all African vanguard parties is the congress, convened on an irregular basis by the party leaderships, whose members are selected from among party members proposed by the leadership. The congress selects the Central Committee, which in turn chooses the Politburo. Ultimately, the Politburo is in the center of the entire power in the Afrocommunist regimes, its membership limited to between 10 and 20 mostly military men.

b. Afrocommunism Versus African Socialism

A number of characteristics set the Afrocommunist regimes apart from the African Socialist ones. First, the Afrocommunist regimes started out with long-range plans for the future, including the institutions they would need to establish in order to reach their goal and the social groups they would support. Thus, the pace of reform was swifter and more systematic than in the African Socialist countries, where change has been achieved more by experimentation than by any concrete plan. (An exception is Tanzania where Nyerere's Arusha Declaration articulated long-range plans.) Second, because the Afrocommunist countries openly accepted the dominance of the state over all sectors, their policies were coherent and made use of the institutions of the state to move society toward socialism. In all the Afrocommunist countries, the emphasis has been on the agricultural institutions, where there has been some success in many of the countries in reviving production since independence. In the African Socialist countries, although their regimes rejected statism, the ineffectiveness of policies relying upon spontaneous mobilization and voluntarism invariably led to state control. (Tanzania is once again an exception in that state control was instituted following the Arusha Declaration.)

Finally, the continuity of ideas and institutions spawned a relatively impersonal process of radicalization in the Afrocommunist countries, decreasing the chances for dependence on a single leader. Therefore, the Marxist-Leninist commitment has continued unchanged in all the Afrocommunist countries despite changes in leadership in some of them, in contrast to the dependency of African Socialist regimes on the personalized ideologies of their leaders.

3. THE AFROCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

a. The Congo, Benin, and Madagascar

There are striking similarities between the Congo, Benin, and Madagascar, despite disparities in their historical evolution and socioeconomic infrastructures. They exhibit similar patterns of political instability, socioeconomic turmoil, urban radicalization, rural stagnation, and political maladministration. And, in all these countries, a Marxist-Leninist orientation was proclaimed by military rulers. In both Benin and Madagascar, the military rulers had no record of Marxist conviction. Also, in all three countries, the establishment of Marxist regimes oriented toward the Soviet Union was, in part, a reaction to French neocolonialism.

Ideologically, the regimes in the Congo, Benin, and Madagascar are characterized by huge cleavages between rhetoric and reality, and by difficulty in directing any kind of socioeconomic development or in eliminating corruption and mismanagement. Madagascar differs somewhat from the other two countries because its society is more stratified socially and because neocolonialism under France in the 1960s was more pervasive and unreconstructed. The eclectic nature of Marxist-Leninist official ideology there is thus even more marked than in the Congo and Benin, and the Soviet impact, in all areas, is almost insignificant.

Another similarity among the countries was the formation by the military leaderships in all three of parties based on the structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The memberships of the Politburos of each party included civilians who were meant, in theory, to lend greater legitimacy to the military-dominated Marxist-Leninist regimes. Significantly, while all three parties continue to maintain friendly ties with the CPSU, none has been converted into a ruling vanguard party.

(1) The Congo

The Congo's option for a Marxist-Leninist ideology was a gradual deepening of a Socialist trend which began in 1963. From the time of independence from France in 1960, trade union and youth movement members were recruited from the young, educated, urban population, which formed a strong left-wing opposition to the pro-French regime of Fulbert Youlou. Deteriorating employment conditions in the major cities caused a general strike and mass demonstrations in Brazzaville in August 1963, culminating in Youlou's resignation. He was replaced by a self-declared Socialist regime under Alphonse Massamba-Debat which established diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet bloc countries.

Yet army and leftist elements became increasingly impatient with the moderation of Massamba-Debat's policies. Following mass demonstrations staged by the organized left in August 1968, the army overthrew the Massamba-Debat regime. Captain Marien Ngouabi, who emerged as the leader of the new military regime, had been educated in Marxist thought and embraced the classical Marxist concept of class struggle. Under him, a new Marxist-Leninist party, the Congolese Workers' Party (PCT), was formed with a 30-member Central Committee and an 8-member Politburo. Nonetheless, the country's economy remained dominated by large French companies. Following Ngouabi's assassination in 1977 by a leftist displeased with the regime's policies, Brigadier General Joachim Yhombi Opango came to power, adopting a moderate political path. Opango established closer ties with the West while continuing to pursue ties with the Soviet bloc countries and China. He was soon overthrown in February 1979 by his First Vice President and Defense Minister, Denis Sassou-Nguesso.

Sassou-Nguesso, a career army officer, was a representative of the left-wing rank and file, with close ties to the radical student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Like Ngouabi, he embraced Marxism-Leninism, stressing the importance of class struggle and he quickly learned to use local antagonisms, sometimes deeper than regional ones, to neutralize potential enemies. In the early 1980s, falling oil revenues and gloomy prospects for

the future of the oil industry caused Sassou-Nguesso to take steps to revive the economy by soliciting Western support and expertise. But these overtures, especially to France, caused increasing opposition from the radical left. In 1982, a series of bomb explosions in several of Brazzaville's public buildings were blamed on this faction.

There are a number of elements within the Congo's ideological power structure among whom Sassou-Nguesso has had to maneuver to either eliminate those who may pose a threat to his position of power or to maintain balance within his regime. One organization which has threatened his power is the Impfondo group, which consists of members of the Bateke people who inhabit the extreme north of the country. This group, aided by pro-Soviet government officials, has united against other northerners in a bid to place more of its members in power. The group's political support comes mostly from the armed forces and security apparatus; it receives material support from East Germany, Algeria, and Cuba.

In the first half of 1983, Sassou-Nguesso sought to reduce support for the Impfondo group from within his regime by eliminating from key positions those with close ties to the Soviet Union. He relieved Minister of the Interior Francois-Xavier Katali, Moscow's key man in the regime, of his duties. Shortly thereafter, Sassou-Nguesso also dismissed the radical Minister of Information, Florent Ntsiba, who is a leader of the Impfondo group. This action began the process of eroding Katali's support from within the PCT's Politburo.

Another perceived threat to Sassou-Nguesso's power is Jean-Pierre Tchicaya-Thystere, the Politburo's official ideologue. A southerner, he was active in rallying southern support for Sassou-Nguesso. But during the August 1984 Party Congress, in a carefully calculated move, Sassou-Nguesso had Tchicaya-Thystere arrested for his alleged involvement in the 1982 bombings. Thicaya-Thystere was subsequently excluded from the party hierarchy.

The group with which Sassou-Nguesso has allied himself most closely in recent years is the pro-Chinese Movement of 22 February (commonly referred to as M-22), which only a decade before had fought the regime in open guerrilla warfare. Sassou-Nguesso rehabilitated many of the organization's top leaders to broaden popular support for the regime and to provide a second radical Marxist-Leninist base in opposition to the pro-Soviet government faction led by Katali. One of M-22's leaders, Camille Bongou, who is also the head of the PCT Permanent Secretariat, is reputedly the number two man in the regime.

In the past 2 years, Sassou-Nguesso has been successful in placing around him in party and government hierarchies those who have similar ideological outlooks. Daniel Abibi, who replaced Florent Ntsiba as Minister of Information in May 1983, provides the President with an ideological alternative to M-22 and thus a second source of support against pro-Soviet hardliners. Abibi's ideology is tinged with radical African nationalism, close to Sassou-Nguesso's own outlook. Sassou-Nguesso also encourages moderates in the government to criticize the stultifying effects on Congolese development of Soviet-style planning and state structure. He undoubtedly

favors the point of view of the moderates, who think the Congo should pursue a Western path toward pragmatism in economic affairs.

During the August 1984 Congress of the PCT, Sassou-Nguesso was unanimously reelected as party president. He effectively won a battle against pro-Soviet hardliners in the party when the Politburo was expanded from 10 to 13 members and the Central Committee from 40 to 50 members, enabling Sassou-Nguesso to place many of his supporters in both bodies. In fact, 60 percent of the Central Committee are now inhabitants of the President's native Cuvette region. Also, a new constitutional reform, which makes the President head of government, formerly a function of the Prime Minister, was endorsed. Finally, pro-Soviet Foreign Minister Pierre Nze M'ba was dismissed and relegated to the PCT Permanent Secretariat, and a pragmatist, Ange-Edouard Pounji, was appointed as Finance Minister.

French influence has remained strong in the country. For example, offshore oil exploitation and much of the country's mining and forestry industries are largely controlled by French companies, and France remains the Congo's major source of external aid. In comparison, Soviet economic investments have been negligible--only about three percent of the Congo's entire trade is conducted with the Soviet Union. The appointment of Pounji to the Ministry of Finance will likely result in a change of economic policies which will accelerate the reorganization of the state sector.

Soviet influence is confined for the most part to the armed forces and security apparatus. A treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the Congo and the Soviet Union in May 1981, but unlike similar treaties signed with other African countries, it does not call for greater military cooperation. The Air Force has MiG-21 and MiG-23 jet fighters, and all heavy weapons are of Soviet bloc origin. Congolese officers are trained in Soviet military academies, and about 100 Soviet officers are stationed in the Congo. Cuban and East German military advisers are also stationed in the Congo, and the internal security forces are directed by Soviet advisers.

Relations between the Congo and China exist mostly in the sphere of infrastructure projects, including a 1984 military agreement providing for the construction under Chinese supervision of a military academy outside of Brazzaville.

From a political viewpoint, Sassou-Nguesso can survive only if he manages to maintain a balance between the pro-Soviet hardliners and the pro-Western pragmatists within the ruling elite. He has kept the Congo on an authentic Marxist-Leninist path, but a number of dichotomies contradict his commitment to socialism. Until recently, the government funded inefficient state farm projects, but did nothing to collectivize the peasantry. Now, with the decline of the oil industry, the emphasis is being placed on peasant agriculture. Economically, most strategic sectors are controlled by private foreign capital. The government also hopes to boost the economy by converting many of the parastatals into joint management companies in which both private Congolese and foreign investors can play a part.

(2) Benin

Since independence in 1960, the political history of Benin, called Dahomey until December 1975, can be divided into two periods. The first, from 1960 to 1972, was characterized by instability, the result of attempts to unite three traditional and ethnically diverse kingdoms under one ruling authority, chronic fiscal difficulties, and France's gradual reduction of subsidies. During this period, Benin experienced six coups d'etat. The second period, from 1972 to the present, has been dominated by the regime of President Mathieu Kerekou and its Socialist orientation.

Prior to the October 1972 coup which brought to power a young group of middle- and low-ranking officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Kerekou, the armed forces had shown no interest in any kind of ideology. Therefore, Kerekou's sudden shift to a Socialist orientation was completely unexpected. In essence, the 1972 coup swept out of power the entire group of civil and military leaders who had dominated the country's politics since independence.

Kerekou's first public speeches decried foreign domination and emphasized the role of the peasantry in the future development of the country. First referred to as Dahomean Socialism and later as Beninois Scientific Socialism, the new regime's ideology consisted of a series of nationalistic decrees, edicts, and prescriptions which were eventually molded into a declaration of Marxism-Leninism in November 1974.

Kerekou moved slowly to implement his ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism in light of Benin's relative resource insufficiency and extreme dependence on France. Thus, he did not withdraw Benin from the French currency zone, avoided a radical policy of mass nationalization, and rejected demands from the civilian left to establish a Marxist-Leninist party. Because Benin possessed few large foreign capital enterprises, immediate steps were not required to transform domestic or external socioeconomic structures.

Instead, Kerekou established the National Council of the Revolution (CNR), which included civilians as well as military officers, and he created elected revolutionary councils in the villages. The new political structure was designed to replace the system of communes and prefectures and to expand centralized control by giving Kerekou the authority to appoint the heads of the country's six provinces and district chiefs. Finally, in November 1974, a 13-member Politburo above the CNR was established at the same time that Kerekou proclaimed Benin's Socialist path of development with a Marxist-Leninist orientation.

The basic policy imperatives of Beninois Socialism, which emerged in 1974, included state centralization of most means of production, the collectivization of farms, and a realignment of Benin's foreign policy toward the Soviet bloc. At the same time, the nationalizations of the oil distribution network and private enterprise were announced. By mid-1975, the insurance industry, transportation, banks, the brewery, and most other sectors of the economy came under state monopoly.

In the first years of his regime, Kerekou used Marxist-Leninist rhetoric to appeal to traditionally radical elements among the unions,

students, and intellectuals in order to gain support and establish the regime's legitimacy. However, challenges to Kerekou's power from radicals within the regime in 1975 began a process of violent unrest and massive union strikes. The regime's brutal dealings with the radicals and strikers isolated it from most of the leftist elements.

The regime's military inner core, while unwilling to relinquish power, recognized the necessity of including civilians in the government in order to further legitimize its ideological path. Kerekou, also anxious to erase the politics of the past, in December 1975 renamed the country and created the Revolutionary Party of the Benin People (PRPB), based on the structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A civilian majority was elected to its Central Committee. Relations with France deteriorated rapidly as the nationalizations reduced French economic influence. Military cooperation between the two countries ceased, and relations eroded further when a group of mostly French mercenaries, accused by Benin of having links with French intelligence, tried to overthrow the Kerekou regime in January 1977.

Most of Benin's Marxist-Leninist ideologues, including Kerekou himself, were actually relatively moderate, and by the early 1980s, the regime had changed course. In an effort to boost the flagging economy, the government reduced the number of parastatals and provincial development agencies, relinquished its import and export monopoly, and began to encourage private business. Negotiations with France, reopened in 1978, had yielded the revival of many of the suspended French subsidies and loans, and the regime openly indicated its desire for Western private investment.

A blow to Benin's economy came with a military coup in neighboring Nigeria in December 1983. An important factor in Benin's economic prosperity was the black-market trade in goods smuggled from Benin into Nigeria, but Nigeria's new military government put an end to this practice. At the same time, in a cabinet reshuffle, Kerekou dismissed a number of Ligue members from important posts in a move to assert his personal authority over the factions within the ruling elite. The subsequent appointment of several new civilian ministers resulted in a minority of military personnel in the government for the first time since 1977.

By 1984, there were signs of growing unrest in the armed forces for both economic and ethnic reasons. A coup attempt in the spring resulted in the reduction in the number of newly elected political commissioners in the National Assembly and an increase in the number of civilian ministers, reinforcing Kerekou's power position within the PRPB. Shortly thereafter, in July 1984, Kerekou was reelected as President of the National Assembly and promptly reshuffled his cabinet. The most notable change was the removal of his dogmatic Minister of Finance, Isidore Amoussou, who was replaced by the more pragmatic Antonio Hospice.

Kerekou's ideological choice was clearly not a carefully nurtured intellectual commitment, but a path to political survival. According to Marxist theory, socialism would legitimize centralized institutionalization which in turn would consolidate the regime's power base. A commitment to

Marxism-Leninism would also appease the civilian left who criticized Benin's subservience to French interests.

Kerekou's successes in the Marxist-Leninist realm have been limited by Benin's small industrial sector and the modest scale of its economy in general. In the agricultural sector, progress toward an ultimate goal of collective production has been cautious, because the government has neither adequate peasant support nor the capacity to organize a network of cooperatives. Traditional left-wing elements--students and trade unionists--are small in number and thus far, controllable. In addition, some private independent businessmen have been able to maintain their activities with no interference from the government.

There is little evidence in the country of a Soviet or Cuban presence or influence. While the government has not renounced its policy of friendship with the Soviet bloc countries, it is clearly displeased with the paucity of Soviet support. Instead, the Kerekou regime continues to cultivate close economic relations with the West, especially France, which is Benin's principal trading partner and major supplier of development aid.

(3) Madagascar

The advent of a Marxist-Leninist orientation in Madagascar in 1975, as in the Congo and Benin, was the result of a new government's efforts to release itself from French domination of its economy and to differentiate itself from previous, failed regimes.

Much of the island's political instability in the years following independence in 1960 was caused by polarity between the minority Merinas of the high plateaus of central Madagascar, whose elites became predominant at the time of independence, and the majority lowland groups in coastal areas known as the cotiers. Philibert Tsiranana, a cotier, came to power at independence at the head of the Democratic Social Party (PSD), which had close ties to the French Socialist Party. French control over the new state was extensive. For example, French officers trained the island's armed forces, French military installations helped to provide for the country's defense, and 80 percent of the country's production facilities were owned by the French. Throughout the 1960s, many top posts continued to be held by French nationals.

Madagascar's economy, closely tied to that of France, was adversely affected by the 1968 strikes in France and the French franc's devaluation in 1969. A number of groups in Madagascar, including the Merinas, university students, urban unemployed, labor unions, and overtaxed peasants, became increasingly critical of the Tsiranana regime's ties with France, forcing Tsiranana's resignation in 1972.

The regime of General Gabriel Ramanantsoa, a Merina, marked the beginning of the transition of control from French hands into Malagasy ones. He had the support of four leftist parties: the Soviet-oriented Party of the Congress of Independence (AKFM), the Federation of the May 13th Movement (KIM), the National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (MONIMA), and the Maoist Power to the Proletariat (MFM). His Foreign Minister, Didier Ratsiraka, began to loosen ties with the French, withdrawing Madagascar from

the French monetary zone and asking the French to evacuate its air and naval bases on the island. He also broke relations with Israel and South Africa and opened new ones with the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and East Germany.

The real thrust of the regime's leftist orientation was toward the democratization of rural life. Interior Minister Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava, a product of Tsiranana's cotier-dominated era, favored a decentralized structure and tried to revive traditional Malagasy communities. He divided the island into 10,498 village communities, fokatany, each of which elected a local fokonolona to make decisions for the community. However, Ramanantsoa did not support this plan, being more in favor of a centralized control. He began to nationalize foreign enterprises, but this served to increase mismanagement and corruption as the Merinas, who have traditionally held the reins of economic power, gained increased control of the administration and the economy. Objections to fokonolona were also voiced by some segments of the cotier population who saw them as a way to further entrench Merina control over the economy and by the Marxist parties who did not view them as adequate to deal with modern development problems.

In January 1975, the division between the Merinas and cotiers erupted into violence as the Mobile Police Group mutinied over the underrepresentation of cotiers in the force. Two factions formed within the government in the aftermath of the mutiny--the left opposition, consisting of Ratsimandrava and Ratsiraka who had the support of the AKFM, MONIMA, and the other leftist parties, and the moderate center of Ramanantsoa and Army Colonel Roland Rabetafika. When members of the Standing Committee of the government's advisory group, the Popular National Council for Development (CNPD) sided with the left opposition, Ramanantsoa was forced to hand over power to Ratsimandrava, who six days later was assassinated.

Ratsiraka, who had been Foreign Minister from 1972 to 1975 and a member of the 18-man military directorate formed after Ratsimandrava's assassination, was invested as head of state in June 1975. A cotier, he was French educated and popular with both the bourgeoisie and the students. All but one of his ministers was civilian. Faced with the task of reviving the deteriorated economy and dealing with a demoralized and fearful peasantry, the new regime adopted a Marxist-Leninist orientation in September 1975. The new policies, contained in the "Red Book" of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution, included the expansion of the fokonolona experiment to carry out agrarian and administrative reforms, the reorganization of the armed forces, the mobilization of youth and women, and a foreign policy of closer relations with the Communist states. Ratsiraka also created the Supreme Revolutionary Council (CSR) to supersede the military directorate and to create the appearance of a return to civilian rule. Its membership included powerful civilian and military elements, who represented significant economic and ethnic interests.

Between 1975 and 1976, the Ratsiraka regime expropriated four giant French trading companies and nationalized the French sugar companies, banks, insurance and shipping companies, the oil refinery, and movie houses. In addition, the American satellite-tracking station was closed. By the end

of 1976, the socialized sector had increased from 15 percent of the economy at the time of the beginning of Ratsiraka's regime to 61 percent.

In 1976, Ratsiraka formed the party of the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA), which immediately joined the Front for Defense of the Revolution (FNDR), a group founded earlier in the year to unite the island's seven parties. AREMA's 90,000 militants quickly formed branches throughout the island, and in June 1977, AREMA won a large majority of seats in the National Assembly. One party, MONIMA, led by Monja Jaona, withdrew from the FNDR following the elections, in which it lost a majority of seats to AREMA. MONIMA then became the strongest political opponent to the Ratsiraka regime.

The regime's relatively moderate program of increased production through state planning and enterprises and the nationalization of private foreign companies did not arouse any significant controversy. The timing and extent of reforms, however, did cause rifts among the elite, who perceived as a threat agrarian reforms designed to give administrative responsibility to local officials. Students, the unemployed, and other radical groups, on the other hand, were impatient with the moderation and slow tempo of the reforms.

By mid-1981, Ratsiraka had built around his regime a 28,000-man military force whose officer corps included 7 out of 21 members of the CSR, two ministers, and the President himself. He had also succeeded in positioning himself at the head of the left-wing parties and eliminated the last organized political resistance to his regime by persuading MONIMA to rejoin the FNDR. Furthermore, Jaona was invested as a member of the CSR. By imposing censorship of the press and banning all organized opposition to the government, Ratsiraka also had muted the conservative elements--the Merina bourgeoisie and the Council of Malagasy Churches. In effect, he had successfully erected a strong barrier between the ruling circles and the general population, the latter finding that the French had been replaced by a new and privileged Malagasy elite.

Ratsiraka had inherited from the previous regime a government rife with corruption and poor marketing policies. By 1982, following a drought and a series of devastating storms, he was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which agreed to grant a loan to the Malagasy regime if Ratsiraka made certain changes. Ratsiraka complied, incorporating into the Cabinet a team of young, French-educated technocrats. The most significant repercussion, however, was the rapprochement with Western governments, which alienated Malagasy radical ideologues. Ratsiraka moved quickly to appease them by removing from his Cabinet economic liberals and conservatives who did not support his Socialist policies. As a result of this October 1983 reshuffle, most of the key ministries came under the control of Ratsiraka's leftist proteges in AREMA. Another partial reshuffle took place in February 1985 which, although it brought about no change in the government's political orientation, was aimed at preventing ministers in key ministries from amassing significant political support by a lengthy stay in the same post.

An important factor in the political realm is the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church in Madagascar, to which two million out of a total population of nine million belong, and the state. The murders of three

clergy and a layworker in the last year have given rise to mutual suspicion between the Church and the government. While the murders may have been isolated incidents, some Church officials interpret them as an attempt by the government to intimidate all the churches in the country which have distanced themselves from the regime's policies. The outspokenness in political matters by all four victims, in addition to the prosperity of the Catholic Church in Madagascar, in sharp contrast to Madagascar's economic crisis, lend credence to this point of view.

Ratsiraka chose a Socialist path of development only after he had consolidated power. However, since 1982, Ratsiraka's flexibility has been narrowed by economic problems, enhanced by widespread corruption. In the countryside, the decentralized development projects are run by the armed forces who recruit workers from local areas. However, many of these projects, lacking local technical and bureaucratic expertise, have become increasingly dependent for their survival on central government planning.

Recently, Ratsiraka has demonstrated an increasing tendency to woo the West, a marked departure from the anti-Western tone of the 1970s and early 1980s. He has tailored his economic policies to satisfy Western creditors, and during a speech in January 1985, he praised major Western philosophers, stating clearly that the writings of Marx, Lenin, Engels, and Mao are not all-inclusive. Also, relations with France in the last few years have improved considerably, primarily because of Madagascar's deteriorating economic situation. During visits to France in 1981 and 1983, Ratsiraka found the Socialist government of Francois Mitterrand more congenial than its predecessor. Although the resulting French aid to Madagascar has been substantial--\$150 million in the form of gifts and loans in 1982 alone--there has been little increase in France's military aid to Madagascar.

The Soviet Union has been quick to take advantage of gaps in French military aid. In March 1985, after the French had failed to provide funds for the replacement of Madagascar's mostly incapacitated air force, the Soviets provided \$400,000 worth of spare parts and a \$3 million loan for the maintenance of Soviet military aircraft. Furthermore, a fourth Antonov An-26 transport plane is to be delivered in the near future. However, the Soviets, who had been constructing radar installations for the surveillance of the Mozambique Channel since January 1984 at Ratsiraka's request, were recently told to disassemble the project.

Ratsiraka's policy of nonalignment has led to a broad range of foreign relations. In 1981, an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation was signed between the Soviet Union and Madagascar. Ratsiraka also accepts military and economic aid from North Korea and China, finding this a useful means of avoiding complete military dependence on the Soviets. In this way, Ratsiraka has been successful in rejecting Soviet demands for the use of military facilities. At present, France is Madagascar's primary trading partner, followed closely by the United States.

b. Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola

The leaderships of the Marxist-Leninist regimes which emerged in the mid-1970s in the former Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and

Angola had all formed during prolonged wars of liberation from Portugal. The African Independence Party of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), were led respectively by Amilcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane, and Agostinho Neto, who had been students together in Lisbon. These nationalist leaders were drawn to the Marxist orientation of the Portuguese Communist Party, which operated illegally and was engaged in an active struggle against the Salazar regime.

The three Portuguese colonies shared several important characteristics. First, while acting separately and independently of each other, the liberation movements in each country pursued the same basic political strategy, including the clearing of liberated zones within which new social and political structures were built. Second, the overthrow of the Portuguese Caetano regime in 1974 and the rapid gaining of independence in the three territories resulted in a mass exodus from all three countries of Portuguese managers, technicians, and workers who had held the majority of jobs in the cities. Their flight virtually paralyzed the economies of the three countries.

Finally, each of the colonies had a relatively small working class. The leading ideologues--Cabral in Guinea-Bissau, Samora Machel in Mozambique, and Neto and Lucio Lara in Angola--all adamantly believed that only one Marxism existed, which, as a science, could adapt to all conditions. They also rejected the notion of an African socialism distinct from the traditional Marxist-Leninist model found in the Soviet Union and China. Therefore, the fact that the working classes did not play an important role in the liberation struggles of the three former colonies, together with their small sizes at the time of independence, created a quandary. According to Marxist theory, it is the working class which gains true political consciousness in the revolutionary struggle. The new regimes sought to rectify this deficiency and legitimize their ideological perspective by converting their liberation movements into vanguard parties, limiting membership to those whose social base was the working class and peasantry and whose ideology was Marxism-Leninism.

In spite of these similarities, the liberation struggle differed in all three countries. In Angola, the MPLA, only one of three rival insurgent groups, controlled little territory outside of the capital, giving it little political experience in the countryside. Moreover, the MPLA never overcame the ethnic, political, and military obstacles it faced during the war of liberation. In Mozambique, FRELIMO had been plagued in the 1960s by internal dissension and was therefore not able to concentrate its efforts on achieving control of a large part of the country until the early 1970s. However, once it was able to organize the liberated zones, it met with success and little competition. The PAIGC, on the other hand, was the most successful of the three movements in achieving national unity, carrying out political mobilization, and establishing new political structures in the liberated areas. At independence, it had the largest degree of control over its territory and had established the most political legitimacy.

Many students from the Portuguese colonies studied in Lisbon during the years of colonization. Most were either white or of mixed race

(mestizos). The latter, though few in number, played important roles in the liberation struggles, especially in Angola, and later in the shaping of ideology. Portuguese whites who chose to become citizens of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau at the time of independence, were mostly Marxists who held many top positions in the new governments. As a result, the newly independent countries had a large number of loyal Marxists in their governing and party structures. Thus, the process of ideological conversion from nationalism to Marxism-Leninism had already occurred inside the parties, as well as throughout the liberated zones which, were already divided into Marxist-Leninist institutions.

(1) Guinea-Bissau

The PAIGC, which was established in 1956 by Amilcar Cabral, received extensive Soviet military support throughout the war of liberation. Although its immediate goal was to achieve political independence, its ultimate goal, as articulated by Cabral, was based on the Socialist ideal of ending the exploitation of man by man. Cabral developed his revolutionary theory based on Guinea-Bissau's colonial status and its economic underdevelopment. According to his analysis, a Socialist society in Guinea-Bissau could not be attained until the country's economic and agricultural sectors become technically advanced. In the interim, a Marxist-Leninist approach to the development of society seemed to Cabral a logical course in a technologically underdeveloped agricultural country.

Cabral, arguing that unique revolutionary conditions existed in Portugal's African colonies, modified orthodox Marxist-Leninist concepts identifying class struggle and private ownership of property as the unifying elements of resistance in a revolutionary struggle. Although classes existed in colonial Africa, Cabral emphasized, colonization itself had caused the more serious cultural oppression, which had occurred as the result of the clash between European and African cultures. Therefore, the colonial experience had provided fertile grounds for a struggle based on cultural resistance and a need for the Africanization of the means of production. Cabral's ideas were readily accepted by Neto and Mondlane, whose own liberation fronts adopted many of the PAIGC's theories.

Although Cabral was assassinated in 1973, his theories remained the PAIGC's official ideology. When Guinea-Bissau became independent in 1974, Luiz Cabral, the brother of the assassinated leader, took over the country's leadership. Like his brother, he avoided the label of Marxism-Leninism, even though the basic structures of the PAIGC were similar to those found in Angola and Mozambique. These structures included a national people's assembly, a council of state commissariats, and party bodies similar in structure to the traditional Soviet Politburo and Central Committee. Mass organizations were also formed, along with the eventual opening of a party training school. Finally, land, which had been communally owned by village inhabitants, was officially nationalized in 1975, although the government planned a slow transfer from communal ownership and cultivation into a system of producer cooperatives. One of the first priorities of the new government was to increase the production of rice, as well as that of the two main export crops, groundnuts and palm kernels, upon which the economy was dependent.

During the war of liberation, the PAIGC had been a mass movement open to all who were prepared to support the struggle, but, with independence the situation changed. In 1977, during the Party's Third Congress, the PAIGC was redefined as a vanguard party. As justification for this decision, its leadership claimed that the working class was too small and underdeveloped to lead the revolution, the farmers could not lead a program which would have to include industrialization, and the bourgeoisie could not be trusted to promote the interests of the masses. Therefore, a small group of well-trained and dedicated ideologues would lead the country to socialism.

By 1980, the economic situation had deteriorated because of drought and the ineffective policies of the Cabral regime. The government had failed to develop a workable strategy to modernize agriculture on a communal basis. Instead, the state-controlled trade network was inadequate to monitor the annual output of rice, and investment in agriculture was minimal. The country's meager resources had been invested in projects such as the Cumere agro-industrial project and the Citroen vehicle assembly plant, both of which proved to have little benefit to the general population. The country had come to rely almost exclusively on economic aid from the West.

In November 1980, Prime Minister Joao Vieira overthrew the Cabral regime. Vieira tried to maintain a radical tone in the beginning of his regime, replacing the national assembly with a revolutionary council and reclassifying the party hierarchy into a Central Committee and Politburo. But as the economy continued to deteriorate, he began to move to a more pragmatic position, facilitating the reentry into the bureaucracy of Portuguese-trained civil servants.

Since 1981, economic conditions have not improved. There have been major shifts in the leadership, an indication of serious ideological disagreements. In May 1982, Vieira reshuffled the government, placing more power in his own hands by taking on the portfolios of defense and internal security. The reshuffle also caused a greater division between pro-Soviet radicals and pragmatic pro-Western elements. One of the casualties of the reshuffle, Minister of Economic Cooperation Vasco Cabral, had used a Soviet approach to development, including massive industrial and agro-industrial schemes, state control over the trading sector, and bureaucratic domination over agriculture. Under his tenure, production dropped sharply in both the economic and agricultural sectors. Since his demotion, more leeway has been given to the private trading sector to stimulate production.

Vieira's gradual shift to the right and option for a pragmatic solution to his country's economic problems have resulted in the relative stability of his regime. A number of young technocrats, trained in Cuba, Brazil, and France, now occupy key economic and financial positions in the government, and Vieira has begun to diversify his military suppliers. There are more than 300 Soviet advisers in the armed forces and the party, and East Germans are active in the police force and telecommunications. The French, breaking the Soviet monopoly in Guinea-Bissau's military for the first time in 1981, began to deliver military vehicles to the country. In 1983, China further curtailed Soviet and Cuban influence in the armed forces by delivering patrol boats to Guinea-Bissau's navy, and in 1984, France decided to offer more aid and military advisers to train the military.

(2) Mozambique

FRELIMO was founded in June 1962 by a group of nationalists led by Eduardo Mondlane. Following Mondlane's assassination in 1969, Samora Machel, head of FRELIMO's guerrilla army, took over the movement. When Mozambique gained its independence in June 1975, power passed to FRELIMO and Machel became President, heading an 11-member Politburo.

FRELIMO's Marxist-Leninist orientation can be divided into three distinct phases. In the first phase, from 1962 until independence in 1975, FRELIMO's leaders, concerned with the development of alternatives to Portuguese colonial structures, pursued pragmatic policies in the liberated areas. The key institution, the communal village, was based on the Chinese model and was designed as a self-contained community with its own social and economic structures.

The second phase lasted from after independence until the beginning of the 1980s, as the now-ruling FRELIMO government embraced Marxist-Leninist ideology and pursued policies based on the Soviet model. This period was marked by the concept of a centrally planned economy and a change in emphasis from the communal village to state farms. The third phase, which began in the early 1980s and continues to the present, has been characterized by a pronounced shift to moderate policies following the failure of Marxist-Leninist policies to revitalize the agricultural and economic sectors.

FRELIMO had succeeded in liberating only the northern provinces of Mozambique by independence, and had therefore been unable to introduce Marxist ideas and structures to large areas of the country before 1975. Recognizing the immediate need for production and political organization, Machel adopted the most expedient methods. Committees of FRELIMO sympathizers called "dynamizing" groups, which organized people in a given neighborhood or enterprise, had been formed before independence. They continued their work in urban areas as well as in the countryside, considered by FRELIMO to be the link between the organized party and the masses. Party cadres participated only to provide the initial incentive to mobilize and organize.

In the countryside, where the Portuguese had not developed a large, modern agricultural sector, expediency prevailed as well. FRELIMO responded to the immediate need after independence for increased food production by reactivating abandoned Portuguese farms as state farms. Despite FRELIMO's commitment to communal villages, no law was issued giving a legal basis to the villages or specifying their political and economic role in the overall system. Unlike the huge state farms, which were located in the most fertile and developed land, the communal villages received little government assistance and were located in poor and geographically isolated areas. The state farm sector, by the end of the 1970s, had become rigidly centralized, while only a minority of the communal villages had a cooperative or were linked to a state farm. At the same time, FRELIMO was unable to provide state farm workers with sufficient consumer goods or with the promised incentives. In addition, inadequate investment of resources in the farms reduced their overall production capability.

This discrepancy between rhetoric and reality mirrored ideological conflicts caused by the transition of FRELIMO's leaders from liberation fighters, who regarded the communal village as the source of their revolution, to the rulers of a regime committed to Marxism-Leninism. The concept of a centrally planned economy, a crucial element of Marxist-Leninist theory, conflicted with the decentralized and largely autonomous nature of the communal villages. The issue of communal village versus centrally controlled state farm became a point of contention between FRELIMO Central Committee members.

Nationalizations in the economy in the first 2 years after independence were essentially a reaction to the sabotage or abandonment of numerous enterprises by the Portuguese. No coherent plan for the economy was adopted until the Third Party Congress in February 1977, when FRELIMO pronounced itself a Marxist-Leninist party. Even so, by the time of the Congress, most of the country's agricultural and economic structures had been shaped into Marxist-Leninist institutions. In addition, in March 1977, Mozambique signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union which included a provision for Soviet military aid.

New guidelines called for a restructuring of the industrial sector away from the Portuguese-inherited production of luxury items for export and toward production of practical goods. In order to gain state control over production facilities, FRELIMO pursued a steady policy of nationalization of major private industries. By 1978, the government had nationalized the oil refinery, the Moatize coal mine, and a major sugarcane plantation, and in September 1979, the government nationalized all land. By 1980, the state controlled most factories, plants, and agro-businesses. One of the most revolutionary of FRELIMO's initiatives was the creation of people's stores based on the remnants of abandoned Portuguese businesses. The government became heavily reliant on external sources, particularly from the Scandinavian countries, to fund development projects.

New statutes defining FRELIMO as a vanguard rather than a mass party during the 1977 Congress had assigned to the party the same duties as those undertaken by the dynamizing groups. Consequently, dynamizing groups were phased out in villages where party cells were formed. In the cities, however, they continued to exist, transformed into neighborhood committees.

FRELIMO's ambitious policies, however, were plagued by a number of problems. Heavy rains and floods turned into drought, forcing the government to import large amounts of wheat to feed the population. Also, the independence war in neighboring Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) spilled over into Mozambique, as the FRELIMO government allowed Zimbabwean guerrillas to operate from bases on Mozambican territory. The resulting counterstrikes by Rhodesian forces destroyed much of Mozambique's infrastructure. Finally, the entire distribution network collapsed under the poor management of the new and inexperienced state bureaucrats.

By 1980, with the end of the war in Rhodesia, FRELIMO was able to turn its attention from external threats to internal economic development. The Machel regime, recognizing the pervasive inefficiency of the centralized bureaucracy, began to modify FRELIMO's Marxist-Leninist policies in favor of

more moderate ones. State control over the economy was relaxed as the private sector was revived. In order to raise agricultural production, prices of agricultural products were increased. In addition, FRELIMO began to actively seek a wider range of foreign investments and middle-level expertise from outside of the country, the result of which was the signing of agreements with a number of foreign companies.

The introduction of new policies to reverse economic decline was accompanied by a housecleaning campaign in which special brigades were created to ferret out civil servants guilty of indiscretion or laziness. The people's stores, under inexperienced and corrupt management, underwent a process of denationalization, either handed over to consumer cooperatives or sold to private owners. Most significantly, in an April 1980 government reshuffle, two senior leadership figures were relieved of their government responsibilities to devote all of their time to the party. This revitalization of the party was undertaken in an effort to strengthen the party as a means for controlling the state apparatus.

No sooner had the government introduced its new and optimistic program than it was faced with a rapidly intensifying insurgency. The Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO); formed in and first supported by Rhodesia and later by South Africa, sought to destabilize the FRELIMO government. RENAMO members included former colonial collaborators, administrators, and soldiers. RENAMO's terrorist tactics aimed at the population began to spread throughout the country in the early 1980s, contributing heavily to the general chaos enveloping the agricultural and economic sectors.

Another destabilizing factor in the early 1980s was South Africa. Mozambique had been providing refuge for members of the outlawed African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, a situation which South Africa found intolerable. In January 1981, South African commandos attacked ANC headquarters in Maputo, Mozambique's capital. None of the weapons provided by the Soviet Union were adequate in repelling the attack.

By 1982, faced with serious economic problems, the escalating RENAMO insurgency, and the threat of South African aggression, Machel appealed to the Soviet Union for economic aid. But, frustrated by the lack of response and the poor quality of Soviet weapons, he also began to seek military and economic aid from the West. A military protocol which was signed between Mozambique and Portugal in April 1982 was soon followed by agreements with other Western nations. Disagreement over this policy shift, together with FRELIMO's increasing commitment to decentralization, culminated in a Cabinet reshuffle in late 1982. Joao dos Santos Ferreira, a strong advocate of local initiatives and peasant aid, was appointed as the new Minister of Agriculture.

During the Fourth Party Congress in April and May 1984, emphasis was placed on decentralization and a more effective use of human and material resources. Preference was to be given to small-scale agricultural projects. FRELIMO's Central Committee was expanded from 57 to 130, opening membership to provincial recruits from outside the state apparatus. However, the small top party and state leadership remained basically untouched, the only change being the addition of one new member to the Politburo. A government reshuffle

strengthened opposition to large-scale projects in the economic ministries and reinforced discipline in the police force and opposition to RENAMO in the security ministries.

The continuing escalation of the insurgency throughout the remainder of the year, including terrorist attacks in all of the Mozambique's provinces, prompted the controversial signing in March 1984 of the Nkomati Accord with South Africa and further appeals to the West for economic and military help. The United States responded in January 1985, announcing the provision to the Machel regime of \$1.1 million in nonlethal military aid, as well as \$40 million in economic aid over 1985.

Soviet ties with FRELIMO have always been based primarily on military aid. Until recently, the Soviet Union and East Germany held a monopoly on the training and equipping of Mozambique's armed forces, with officers and other ranks undergoing instruction at the Soviet-run Nampula Military Academy in the north of the country. Under the terms of the 1977 treaty, there are several hundred Soviet and Cuban military advisers in the country, although Machel has refused to grant the Soviets permanent military bases in Mozambique.

Mozambique's attempts to alleviate its economic problems and eliminate the threat of the South African-supported RENAMO have been key factors in diverting the Machel regime away from its Marxist-Leninist goals. Instead, FRELIMO has been preoccupied with seeking both economic and military solutions with sources other than the Soviet bloc countries.

(3) Angola

The MPLA, founded in 1956, was a conglomeration of a number of Socialist-based organizations which had formed in Luanda in the 1950s. When the MPLA was forced into exile in 1961, its leaders, including Neto and Lara, established headquarters in neighboring Congo-Brazzaville, where they were able to make contacts with Socialist groups in Europe, Africa and Asia.

In the 1960s, three rival nationalist groups existed. The MPLA was urban-oriented and drew its support from the Mbundu ethnic group, which was heavily represented in Luanda and surrounding areas. The leaders of the MPLA were mestizos and Africans who had received a Portuguese education (assimilados). The second nationalist group, the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), led by Holden Roberto, was based in the rural north where it derived its support from the Bakongo. Its entirely black leadership denigrated mestizos and assimilados, as well as the Portuguese. The third group, formed in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi, was the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which had broken off from the FNLA and found support in eastern Angola. By the beginning of the 1970s, UNITA and MPLA guerrillas were engaging in armed confrontations, as the two groups vied for the allegiance of the Ovimbundo of southcentral Angola.

The MPLA, receiving the bulk of its arms from the Soviet Union by 1966, also received Cuban support, including military instruction in the Congo and Cuba. Although the MPLA did not label itself a Marxist-Leninist movement until after independence, its leaders did adopt a Marxist-Leninist program,

calling for planned economic development, the establishment of producers' cooperatives, state control over all foreign trade, and agrarian reform. The MPLA leadership also advocated the eventual creation of a vanguard party and began to prepare by training cadres.

The MPLA had also created a number of Marxist-Leninist institutions in the liberated zones it controlled, mostly in the eastern part of the country. The population was organized into a sophisticated political-military system. Peasants were grouped into small villages of no more than 100 people with an elected action committee, militia, people's plantation, and a people's shop. A labor union was formed to stimulate production, and organizations were formed for women and youth. These structures all became the bases of future mass organizations. The action committees, in particular, formed the foundations of the people's power movement (*poder popular*). The MPLA regarded the action committees as the essence of popular participation in the revolutionary process.

The April 1974 Portuguese coup led to the outbreak of a civil war in Angola as the rival MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA vied for power. The MPLA, though militarily weaker than the other movements, was in a position to win because it had the support of a major ethnic group, the Mbundu, and was already well situated in the capital, Luanda. The extent of the MPLA's superior organization and tactics was demonstrated by the success of MPLA forces during the civil war. Without Soviet or Cuban intervention, they secured the capital, seized the oil fields of the Cabinda enclave, and established a hold over 12 of the 16 provincial capitals, including the ports of Lobito and Benguela in the south. The key to the MPLA's strength was *poder popular*, the network of action committees and militia groups organized throughout the country immediately following the Portuguese coup.

Although the MPLA joined the FNLA and UNITA in forming the Portuguese-sponsored transitional government in January 1975, it continued to fight for absolute control. While all three organizations received military aid from various international sources, South Africa's support of UNITA and the US support of the FNLA finally convinced Cuba and the Soviet Union to come to the aid of the MPLA. Massive Soviet military supplies and large numbers of Cuban troops ensured the MPLA's March 1976 victory and accession to power. A treaty of friendship and cooperation, signed between Angola and the Soviet Union in October 1977, ensured continued Soviet military aid.

The MPLA was committed to the establishment of a centralized, planned economy. However, the hasty departure of the Portuguese, who had monopolized the economy and controlled the commercial farms and estates, had led to a severe shortage of food. Consequently, the new government was forced to divert its attention from the basic party policy of establishing communal villages for the eventual transformation of peasant societies into collective production and living units. Instead, financial and material resources were invested in the mechanization of state farms and cooperatives.

Centralized planning was not attractive to all within the MPLA leadership. Interior Minister Nito Alves, in charge of the organs of *poder popular*, objected to the centralized and restrictive policies proposed by Neto, favoring the more participatory and decentralized nature of *poder*

popular. The conflict came to a head in May 1977, when Alves tried to overthrow Neto. The effects on the MPLA of Neto's reaction to the coup attempt were significant. The mass organizations, provincial administrations, and armed forces underwent a significant purge, as Neto moved to consolidate power. In an even more radical move, Neto converted the MPLA into a vanguard Marxist-Leninist labor party at the First Party Congress in December 1977, renaming it the MPLA-Workers' Party (MPLA-PT), and halting all organizational work within poder popular. The vanguard party limited its membership to militants thoroughly indoctrinated in Marxism-Leninism at cadre training schools. Neto had taken the first step in decreasing mass participation which had been the hallmark of the liberation struggle.

Neto reinforced his position once again in December 1978 with a major government reorganization. After abolishing the offices of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers, he dismissed or reshuffled a large number of senior party officials. After his death in September 1979, power transferred smoothly to Minister of Planning Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who immediately proclaimed his commitment to Neto's policies.

The dos Santos government was faced with two serious problems which were draining the economy and interfering with the regime's Marxist-Leninist course. The first was the growing potency of the continued UNITA armed resistance to the MPLA regime. The second was South African attacks on Angolan territory, the roots of which lay in South Africa's campaign against Namibian South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) rebels who were based in southern Angola. But on a larger scale, South Africa's opposition to the MPLA government and its support for the UNITA insurgency had widened the scope of South African attacks inside Angola, especially after the August 1981 "Operation Protea" in which several thousand South African troops advanced 120 kilometers into Angola, attacking Angolan as well as SWAPO targets. Both situations were forcing the government to divert resources from the restoration of the country's economic and agricultural sectors to the purchase of Soviet arms and the funding of Cuban troops.

The security situation along the Angolan and Namibian borders continued to deteriorate during 1982 and most of 1983, with South African forces occupying large sections of Cunene Province while UNITA expanded its activities. As his regime became increasingly dependent on Soviet and Cuban military support, dos Santos took steps to further consolidate power, concentrating all state powers in the hands of military men who would be directly responsible to him. Regional military councils were created in all areas affected by the fighting.

These problems, combined with declining oil prices, caused an increasing deterioration of Angola's economy. As a result, the MPLA government was forced to adjust its policies and priorities. Perhaps the most significant adjustment was the overture to the West in late 1981, when talks began with the United States on the subjects of the establishment of diplomatic relations and a resolution to the Namibian problem. The Soviet Union responded by granting Angola an unprecedented 10-year, \$2 billion economic assistance package designed to demonstrate Moscow's commitment to Angola and to strengthen pro-Soviet elements within the MPLA-PT.

Despite the Soviet Union's efforts to turn him away from the West, dos Santos refused to be drawn wholeheartedly into the Soviet orbit. Angola, like many of its African neighbors, was anxious to attract badly needed Western economic aid and investments, especially since the Soviet bloc was unable to provide an alternative to Western expertise, technology, and capital. In addition, dos Santos needed Western help in pressuring South Africa to abandon its support for UNITA. Thus, MPLA talks with the United States continued, and in April 1982, Portuguese President Antonio Eanes visited Angola to discuss economic accords with the MPLA. Resistance within the party to Western links continued, although in December 1982 dos Santos dismissed several pro-Soviet officials.

The Soviet Union responded once again in an effort to counter Western influence in Angola when, in fall 1983, shipments of sophisticated Soviet weapons were increased. Cuba, following the Soviet lead, augmented its already significant troop presence in Angola. The Soviets also warned South Africa to end its destabilization policy in southern Africa.

Negotiations for the removal of South African forces and Cuban troops from Angola culminated in February 1984 with the signing by Angola and South Africa of the Lusaka Accord. Significantly, the MPLA government decided to deal with South Africa without consulting either the Soviet Union or Cuba. Furthermore, the negotiations were facilitated by the intervention of American diplomats.

In October 1984, another step was taken by dos Santos to eliminate any threat to his power when he dismissed Minister of External Affairs Paulo Jorge, a pro-Soviet ideologue who had opposed the Lusaka Accord and diplomacy with the West, and who had established almost complete control over Angolan foreign policy decisions. The external affairs portfolio was taken over by dos Santos himself.

The revival of the economy after independence had been stymied by the cumbersome centralized bureaucracy, which had discouraged farmers and had transformed Angola from a food exporter into a major food importer. In early 1984, dos Santos created a nine-member Defense and Security Council to supersede the inefficient government apparatus. The Council assumed responsibility for major policy decisions, and its members were dos Santos loyalists drawn from the 12-member MPLA Politburo. The Council's Planning Minister, Lopo do Nascimento, an ally of dos Santos, has proposed new pragmatic policies aimed at decentralization, particularly in the agricultural sector. Plans are under consideration to give more decision-making power and resources to the provincial governments. Other plans include the restriction of centralized power to key sectors of the economy and large-scale agricultural projects, such as cotton and sugarcane plantations, which require a high level of technology, and the planning of cooperatives in the previously neglected countryside.

The Marxist-Leninist revolution in Angola has been diverted by an economically and politically debilitating insurgency and the destabilization policies of South Africa. The Lusaka Accord and the resulting April 1985 withdrawal of most of South Africa's troops have provided the Angolan Government with a new opportunity to revive the economy. The Accord has also

raised hopes that talks with UNITA, a strong and well-supported movement which has escalated into a serious threat to the MPLA regime, will culminate in some kind of compromise.

Soviet bloc countries remain heavily involved in Angola because of the military needs created by the UNITA insurgency. The Soviet and East European presence in Angola, including approximately 2,000 military technicians, is dwarfed by the Cuban presence. An estimated 25,000 Cuban troops and 6,000 civilians are being deployed in defense positions and in the organization and training of Angola's army battalions.

Economically, however, Angola is largely dependent on the West. As a result of oil exports, which account for about 90 percent of Angola's foreign exchange, Western nations have become Angola's largest trading partners. Also, Portuguese cultural influence is still prevalent, a legacy of the colonial period. Politically, the Marxist-Leninist government is buttressed by the MPLA-PT, which is a strong and influential party with an approximate membership of 30,000 and the support of the 120,000 members of the powerful national trade union syndicate.

c. Ethiopia

The radicalization of Ethiopia's Government took place in several phases. Marxist-Leninist ideas, first propagated by civilian parties which had no official role, were adopted by the Socialist-oriented military regime in 1976 and incorporated into Ethiopia's official ideology when the Soviet Union became Ethiopia's ally and arms provider in mid-1977. The Commission on Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) was established in 1979, and it led, in September 1984, to the formation of the Marxist-Leninist ruling party, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE).

Ethiopia stands out as a unique case among the Afrocommunist countries. The Marxist-Leninist path chosen by Ethiopia's military regime was not the result of a war of national liberation, nor was it a fiat of the leadership. It was, instead, the outgrowth of an internal social upheaval in a country which had never been colonized and which experienced a real revolution. Furthermore, before Ethiopia's military leadership created a ruling Marxist-Leninist party in September 1984, it was the only Afrocommunist state without a political party.

Conditions which led up to a revolution paralleled those which existed in pre-revolutionary Russia, including widespread class conflict. Ethiopia, under Emperor Haile Selassie, had been a feudal society racked by conflicts between peasants and landlords. With the addition in the early 1970s of a devastating famine, growing political discontent within organized labor and the military, and the economic drain of a prolonged separatist conflict in Eritrea Province, the royalist regime could not survive. A military takeover by junior officers and enlisted men in September 1974 brought into power the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), which set out to reshape the entire society and reweave social relations.

The new government was headed by an organization of 8 to 10 men led by Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, who immediately announced Ethiopia's commitment

to major political and social change. Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First) proclaimed in December 1974 that Ethiopia would become a Socialist state with a one-party system, direct government control of most of the economy, and collectivization of agriculture.

By mid-March 1974, PMAC had shrunk from 126 to 47 members with the elimination of moderate and conservative elements who were dissatisfied with the Socialist policies. The first concrete step taken toward socialism was the nationalization in January 1975 of financial institutions, the insurance business, and major industries. But the keystone of the revolution was land reform, including the establishment of peasant associations and peasant collectives. In the urban areas, a proclamation was issued in July 1975 to nationalize urban land and abolish landlordism. Urban dwellers' associations (kebeles), which eventually took over urban administration, were organized in all towns and cities .

In April 1976, Mengistu proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist and announced the formation of the National Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP). The new program emphasized the development of state farms and a commitment to encourage collectivized farming. The program was also designed to neutralize various groups competing to fill the political vacuum by creating an orientation toward centralization in government. PMAC proclaimed in December 1976 that it was reorganizing along Marxist-Leninist lines. Five weeks later, following a power struggle, Mengistu emerged as PMAC Chairman and the country's undisputed leader.

In order to amass popular support for its Marxist-Leninist policies, PMAC allowed a number of civilian leftist groups to exist although they had no political power. But the resistance of one group, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), to military rule led to the period of "Red Terror" from November 1977 to March 1978, during which thousands of people were killed in the capital. In the end, the EPRP was essentially eliminated and government tolerance of civilian leftist groups came to an end. Another NDRP goal, the achievement of national political integration, collapsed as armed resistance to the new regime developed in many of the country's provinces and the activities of separatist movements in Eritrea, Tigray, and Oromo Provinces intensified. Control over these politically destabilizing events required much of the new government's attention, a factor which prevented it from gaining full control in the economic sectors.

In the countryside, the government's primary focus was on aiding the peasant associations. There also existed a state farm sector which came into existence in the immediate aftermath of land reform when PMAC decided not to break up the largest nationalized private commercial estates and foreign-owned plantations which produced export crops. The Peasant Association Decree of December 1975 had abolished private ownership of rural land, but the tenancies it bestowed on some peasants gave them effective control over their own plots. These peasants, no longer forced to pay exorbitant rents, produced less and consumed more of their production. This practice, combined with disruptions to the country's transportation system by insurgent groups, led to severe food shortages in the cities. The reform also resulted in conflict within the peasant associations themselves over redistribution policies and the growth of new class relations among the peasantry. The peasants continued to cultivate

the same plots as before the reform so that some peasants, who had worked for the wealthier landlords prior to the reforms, received more land and had access to more modern agricultural implements.

In order to increase agricultural production and accelerate collectivization, the government introduced the Economic Development Campaign in June 1979. The program placed new upper limits on areas of tenancy and laid the basis for the transition from peasant associations, which encompassed 99 percent of all cultivated land, to producers' cooperatives. The intent of the new campaign was to end individual cultivation of the land on a voluntary basis and bring the collectives under government control. To encourage the peasants to join the producers' cooperatives voluntarily, the program stipulated that the members of the producers' cooperatives could hold all executive positions in the peasant associations. Thus, those peasants who elected to cultivate individually were at a disadvantage. The campaign was resisted by the many peasants who were content with the tenancy system. In the long run, the campaign has been unsuccessful as, in general, land reform has been more successful in meeting PMAC's goals of destroying the power of the landed class and redistributing income in favor of the peasantry than in increasing production.

Because there was no substantial private Ethiopian property to expropriate, urban reform was far less radical than land reform. The owners of those insurance companies and industrial plants that were nationalized received compensation. The retail trade, where much of the Ethiopian capitalist class did exist, was largely untouched. PMAC tried to win popular support in the cities by handing substantive power to the kebeles. These organizations, responsible for housing redistribution and welfare programs, were armed by the government during the so-called Red Terror to fight EPRP supporters and were given the right to administer local jails. But the growing military power of the kebeles became unacceptable to the government, which progressively stripped them of their security functions. By the end of the 1970s, the responsibilities of the kebeles were restricted to urban administration, and by the end of 1984, the membership of the kebeles, which had become increasingly independent of total government control, had expanded to include almost every city inhabitant.

Armed hostilities, culminating in a war between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden, a region of Ethiopia claimed by Somalia, were a major factor in PMAC's determination of priorities. Following the 1974 coup, the United States had continued military and economic aid programs to Ethiopia upon which the Ethiopian Armed Forces were totally dependent. The Ogaden war, combined with the Eritrean insurgency, necessitated PMAC's continued dependence on foreign military aid. After the United States balked at providing additional military aid in mid-1976 because of Ethiopia's violations of human rights, Mengistu terminated all military links with the United States and signed two military support agreements with the Soviet Union in December 1976 and May 1977. Aware of Ethiopia's internal chaos, Somalia invaded the Ogaden in 1977, but with Soviet military aid and Cuban troops, Ethiopia was able to drive the Somalis out of its territory in 1978. In November 1978, a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation was concluded in Moscow. The price for Soviet military assistance was Soviet political influence, the result of which was the first step toward the creation of the ruling Marxist-Leninist party.

COPWE, proclaimed in December 1979, was a broadly based commission for the design and preparation of a vanguard party. It consisted of a 7-member Executive Committee and a 93-member Central Committee. It was clear from the beginning, however, that the potent military leadership had no intention of relinquishing either its independence or its power. Thus, the approximately 1,500 delegates of the COPWE Congress were carefully chosen by Mengistu, who also ensured that military personalities occupied the most authoritative positions of COPWE's hierarchy. For example, 7 members of COPWE's Executive Committee were PMAC members, and 79 of the 123 standing and alternate members of the Central Committee were military people. In addition, almost half of COPWE's general membership came from the armed forces. Finally, although mass organizations like labor unions and peasant associations were well represented in COPWE's Congresses, they occupied no positions of leadership. Movement toward a party seemed to be more a function of Mengistu's commitment to nationalism and the supremacy of his military dictatorship than to Marxist-Leninist ideology.

In the early 1980s, PMAC faced the failure of numerous offensives to gain control of guerrilla-held territory in Eritrea; as the regime became increasingly dependent on Soviet military support, activity toward the formation of the party accelerated, with the formal inauguration of the vanguard party occurring in September 1984. The WPE had a membership of about 30,000, with most of its 13,000 to 14,000 full-time officials having received intensive ideological and organizational training by Soviet bloc instructors. But its 11-member Politburo and 134-member Central Committee were dominated by a strong military element. By the end of 1984, 1.3 million people were serving in various executive bodies of party mass organizations. During the April 1985 party plenary, a resolution called for the intensification of efforts for the founding of a People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

The Mengistu regime has still not succeeded in controlling the peasants, who make up more than 90 percent of the total population and account for more than 90 percent of the country's export earnings. By the end of 1983, the cooperative sector, despite a total membership of 60,000 in 1,275 producers' cooperatives, was only producing 1 percent of the harvest. By January 1985, producers' cooperatives and state farms made up only 6.4 percent of the cultivated land. The problems in the agricultural sector are exacerbated by a severe drought and famine in northern Ethiopia.

One government solution to the drought is a resettlement program under which farmers from the northern highlands are being moved to the fertile lowlands of the southwest. However, the government, while encouraging the organization of producers' cooperatives in the new settlements, is not insisting on the initial organization of collective farms. In another departure from Marxist-Leninist ideology, the government is transferring more resources from collective farms to individual farmers in all the country's provinces. This new program includes a marketing and pricing policy which will give the farmers greater returns.

The Soviet position in Ethiopia is far more secure than in any other Afrocommunist country because of the extent of PMAC's dependency on Soviet military aid. But, like the other Afrocommunist countries, Ethiopia has sought Western economic aid as the result of the Soviet Union's inability and

unwillingness to participate in major economic development projects. In the past year, the West, the United States in particular, has provided the bulk of much needed food aid for the famine victims.

4. PROSPECTS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF AFROCOMMUNIST REGIMES IN ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA

a. Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), under the leadership of Robert Mugabe, came to power in 1980 at the end of a long liberation struggle. The Mugabe government has consistently veered toward a Marxist-Leninist orientation, although it has yet to declare Zimbabwe a Marxist-Leninist state. During ZANU's Second Congress in August 1984, the first since 1964, a resolution called for the installation and maintenance in Zimbabwe of a Socialist state, founded on Marxist-Leninist principles. To achieve this, the Congress, led by Robert Mugabe, decided to transform Zimbabwe into a one-party state. The establishment of a Presidential Commission led to the election of a 15-member Politburo, to which Mugabe nominated 14 of his supporters, and a 90-member Central Committee. In the process, Mugabe successfully eliminated his rivals and obtained total control of the party.

Politically, the Mugabe regime is threatened by Joshua Nkomo's opposition group, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), which has the support of the Ndebele population in Matabeleland. Supporters of ZAPU, which is resisting consolidation with ZANU, are engaged in an insurgency aimed against the Mugabe regime. Mugabe's attempts to seek a reconciliation with ZAPU and to avoid a serious economic decline have resulted in the pursuit of pragmatic, rather than radical, policies. One of the major considerations in the direction of economic policies is the government's dependence on the white population.

When he came to power, Mugabe understood the importance of encouraging as many whites as possible to stay in the country following independence to ease the transition from minority to majority rule. Having witnessed the disastrous effects of the Portuguese mass exodus from Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique, he realized that the whites were vital to Zimbabwe's economy in the absence of black skilled labor. The whites were needed to preserve and rebuild agriculture, maintain administrative continuity, and manage the factories. Further, their continued presence and well-being were seen as essential to attracting foreign investment and aid. Even as black Zimbabweans became more adept at managing their own affairs and the number of whites in the civil service fell from an overwhelming majority to a tiny minority, Zimbabwe's financial stake in the presence of whites remained strong. As a result, Mugabe has held back on the implementation of more radical policies.

Thus, Mugabe has succeeded in avoiding any precise pledge to nationalize industry and land on a vast scale. While there has been a dramatic growth in the number of producer cooperatives in the industrial and agricultural sectors, these collective organizations operate under their own representative body rather than under the control of ZANU. The only step taken toward a Marxist-Leninist institution in the country was the announcement in February 1985 of a plan for the establishment of state farms

in every province. The government, optimistic about the country's agricultural prospects following a significant surplus of food crops during the first half of 1985, has also encouraged peasants to join farming cooperatives. But the chances of maintaining such high production levels are threatened by heavy soil erosion and drought. This fragile situation portends a continuation of Zimbabwe's dependency on South Africa, through which 70 percent of Zimbabwe's imports and exports must be transported.

Mugabe appears to be more in charge of the country than ever, and his ZANU party is expected to retain, and most likely increase, its present majority in the National Assembly in the general election scheduled for June or July 1985. Mugabe's continued leadership and pursuit of pragmatic policies appear to preclude the establishment of an Afrocommunist regime in Zimbabwe in the near future.

b. Namibia

There are two aspects to the political situation in Namibia. The foremost is the armed liberation struggle against South African rule by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). The second aspect is the political mass mobilization of the Namibian population by SWAPO.

Founded in 1960, SWAPO's original aim was to win independence from South Africa by peaceful means, but in 1966, when the International Court of Justice declined to consider South Africa's mandate, SWAPO launched the armed struggle with military support from the Soviet Union. In some ways, SWAPO's liberation struggle resembles those of the PAIGC, MPLA, and FRELIMO in the African Portuguese colonies. The stated goal of SWAPO under the leadership of Sam Nujoma remains independence from South Africa and an end to the exploitation of man by man. In the few semi-liberated regions in the countryside, SWAPO cadres are providing social, medical, and educational services to villagers. But unlike the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, SWAPO's victories have been infrequent and limited in the face of South African military power, resulting in the continued exile of its leadership and the inability of PLAN guerrillas to maintain a significant number of bases within the country. Instead, they are forced to attack from bases in southern Angola.

The political program adopted by SWAPO's Central Committee in 1976 contains a number of specifically Marxist-Leninist prescriptions, including a commitment to restructuring the economy after independence to ensure the ownership by the people of the major means of production and exchange. Statements by Nujoma and other prominent SWAPO leaders indicate that an independent SWAPO government would be similar to Robert Mugabe's ZANU government in Zimbabwe. However, the influence of the church in Namibia's highly Christianized society is the most relevant factor in SWAPO's ideology, which indicates that a future SWAPO government might also be influenced by the Christian concept of humanism embraced by Zambian President Kaunda.

In April 1985, South Africa formed an interim government for Namibia which included a number of parties dominated by the non-Socialist and South African-dominated Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. South Africa clearly hopes

that the establishment of this new government and the possibility of elections in a year will prevent SWAPO from coming to power. But the powers of the interim government are extremely limited since the South African Government continues to retain control of foreign policy and defense. The interim government, which has been rejected by SWAPO and condemned by the United States, flatly contradicts United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, which calls for a cease-fire in Namibia and internationally monitored elections.

Although SWAPO is recognized by all the other southern African countries and the United Nations as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, the emergence of an independent, South African-dominated government and the continuation of SWAPO's armed struggle seem unavoidable.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF AFROCOMMUNISM FOR THE WEST

In recent years, better relations between Afrocommunist and Western countries have been pursued mostly by the United States, France, and Portugal. By agreeing to provide military supplies to one or more of the Afrocommunist regimes, these Western countries hope to diminish the need of the Afrocommunist regimes for Soviet military aid, and in the long run, diminish Soviet influence in general and prevent the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Two major threats are presented by hostility toward the West of existing Afrocommunist regimes and/or the establishment of new pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regimes. The first threat would be the establishment of sizeable Soviet military facilities anywhere on the continent. At present, all the Afrocommunist countries, as well as Socialist ones, continue to deny the Soviets military facilities on a permanent basis with the exception of Ethiopia, which has allowed them to use the Dahlak Islands off its coast. So far, the Soviets have not used the procurement of military facilities as a condition for the supply of military aid in any of the Afrocommunist countries. In light of the dependence of Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia in particular on Soviet military equipment, it is feasible that one or more of these countries could relent in the future.

The second threat concerns the Western world's dependence on southern Africa's strategic minerals. Western nations are almost entirely dependent on imported raw materials such as chrome, platinum, nickel, cobalt, and titanium, which are essential for the production of alloys used in the manufacture of high technology weapons systems. South Africa and Zimbabwe possess a large proportion of the world's reserves of these minerals outside of the Soviet Union. Should Zimbabwe come under the rule of a pro-Soviet, Marxist-Leninist government or South Africa come under the rule of the pro-Soviet SACP, the West would face a two-edged threat to the safe supply of such materials. First, the Soviet Union could use its influence over such regimes to bring about a total interdiction in the flow of vital raw materials to the West as a means of exercising political and economic pressure upon the West. And second, these regimes could sharply increase the price for the West of these resources, a move which would have adverse effects, although far less catastrophic ones than those which followed the increase in oil prices by the oil-producing states.

But history does not support this scenario in Zimbabwe. The existing Afrocommunist regimes have made it clear that they will not tolerate Soviet political pressure nor will they behave as Soviet satellites. The Soviets themselves do not regard sub-Saharan Africa as a strategic priority and have subsequently placed a low priority on the provision of economic aid to Africa. As in the case of Angola, they have even urged Afrocommunist regimes to solicit investments from the West. It is therefore unlikely that the Soviets would create a situation in which they would have to assume economic responsibilities for any Afrocommunist regime. In addition, Mugabe has resisted Soviet attempts to establish close relations, a remnant of his resentment of Soviet support to Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU during the liberation war.

The scenario in South Africa presents a new and different perspective. The only country in sub-Saharan Africa with a strong black work force and an industrial base, South Africa is not economically dependent on outside sources nor is it logical to assume that it would be in the future. It is conceivable that the coming to power of the SACP could precipitate considerable Soviet influence and problems for the West in southern Africa. However, prospects for the downfall of the manipulative and powerful apartheid government in the foreseeable future are slim.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

There is no doubt that Marxism-Leninism is having a far greater impact in Africa than African socialism. But the Afrocommunist regimes, like the African Socialist regimes, are faced with a proliferation of economic problems brought on by a general world recession and the failure of their own policies. The inability of Marxist-Leninist institutions to resolve these failures has led to ideological contradictions, as Afrocommunist leaders have been compelled to reshape their policies. On the one hand, a retreat from centralized planning has been accompanied by appeals for Western investments. And yet, when forced to choose between their dependence on the Soviet bloc for political survival and their dependence on the West for economic development, the Afrocommunist regimes tend to opt for the former. These regimes have been able to make this kind of choice largely because experience has demonstrated to them that Western aid would be forthcoming in any case.

Several parallel trends can be identified in all the Afrocommunist countries. Their regimes have developed political structures that, while not yet completely secure, are being steadily consolidated, but largely at the expense of economic growth and development. An essential component in that consolidation is the continuous and intensive political and military support they receive from the Soviet bloc countries. The ideological escalation in all the countries has moved the ruling elites further left, reinforcing the adversary relationship between increased party control and economic development. The resulting dissension and erosion of political support has, in turn, led to frequent and sometimes drastic purges within both government and party structures.

The endurance of each of the Afrocommunist regimes has been persistent. In each case, the consolidation of a one-party regime, achieved by way of coercive policies and purges, has progressed to the extent that firm and dictatorial control has been established. The future seems to be secure for

all of these regimes as they confront difficult economic problems with pragmatic solutions. Even if the present leaders of these regimes should be overthrown, this does not necessarily imply the demise of the ideology or of the system based on it. Marxism-Leninism in the former Portuguese colonies is now associated with entire movements which have their roots deep in liberation struggles. For this reason, Afrocommunism in these three countries is more firmly entrenched than in Benin, the Congo, and Madagascar. However, in all the Afrocommunist countries, party cadres have vested interests in the continuation of party rule as the result of the proliferation of Marxist-Leninist institutions. With the full backing of the Soviet bloc countries, all of the Afrocommunist states have placed a priority on the creation of structures capable of perpetuating the Marxist-Leninist system. While some of the institutions are still fragile and innumerable problems remain, the element of personalism so characteristic of most African regimes is receding as coherent economic and political systems are emerging.

Insurgencies in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia have caused the regimes in these countries to be more vulnerable than the regimes of the other Afrocommunist countries and more heavily dependent on Soviet bloc military aid. In Angola, where the MPLA government is increasingly threatened by the well-organized UNITA insurgency, extensive Cuban and Soviet military support appears to be checking a UNITA victory. It is unlikely that the MPLA government could survive the attacks of UNITA, which is well supplied with sophisticated military equipment by South Africa, without Cuban troops, and thus it is unlikely that the MPLA government would agree to a Cuban troop withdrawal. The refusal of the MPLA government to consider a coalition government with UNITA is also unlikely to change in the near future as long as the Soviet Union and Cuba continue to support dos Santos.

While insurgencies in Mozambique and Ethiopia pose serious threats to the regimes in both countries, they do not appear to be strong enough to destroy the solidly entrenched Machel and Mengistu regimes. In Mozambique, RENAMO lacks a coordinated strategy both inside Mozambique and between its internal and external elements. While some of RENAMO's attacks have shown evidence of a certain amount of expertise and advance planning, including the blowing up of electric power pylons and bridges, many other attacks aimed primarily at civilian traffic have been conducted by small groups of guerrillas desperate for food. The procurement by the FRELIMO government of Western military aid is a significant enhancement to the already substantial Soviet military aid it continues to receive.

In Ethiopia, the separatist movements in Eritrea and Tigray Provinces have been militarily draining, but neither poses a real threat to the Mengistu regime. Afrocommunism is probably more entrenched in Ethiopia, where the institutions and cadres of the ruling WPE are dispersed all over the country, than in any other Afrocommunist country. Also, Mengistu has proven his tenacity and ability to rise to the top under adverse conditions, and is unlikely to be overthrown in the near future. The leadership of the military-dominated WPE has been hand-chosen by Mengistu and those who pose any kind of threat to his rule are quickly purged.

The existence of Afrocommunism on the African continent does not necessarily mean the creation of a string of Soviet satellites. While

orthodoxy is the hallmark of the Afrocommunist regimes, they are nevertheless trying to integrate the principles of Marxism-Leninism with their own unique historical experience, interpreting Marxist-Leninist ideology as a way of radically reordering their societies through a set of specific institutions. In foreign policy, the choice of Marxism-Leninism is a decision to try to change the established world order rather than to simply find a niche for their countries on its periphery. The regimes are committed to furthering the cause of socialism, but as independent and equal partners with other Socialist countries around the world. Like the Western European Communist parties, African Marxist-Leninist parties argue that communism does not imply enslavement to the Soviet Union, but is an ideology that can be adapted to local circumstances and implemented free of subservience to a foreign power. Thus, Marxism-Leninism in Africa appears to be developing according to the dictates of internal developments rather than to those of external powers.

In the final analysis, the self-defined African Marxist-Leninist regimes are not Socialist utopias nor are they likely to become so. Under the tight control of small, elite regimes and vanguard parties, the populations of the Afrocommunist countries do not participate directly in the decision-making process, nor do the workers control the revolution. In this respect, these regimes do not differ from any other Marxist-Leninist regimes in the world. It is also improbable that any other Marxist-Leninist regimes will emerge in the near future or, if one should, that it would be radically different from any existing Afrocommunist regime.

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PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

September 25, 1985

PREFACE

The emergence in the late 1950s and early 1960s of six Socialist regimes in sub-Saharan Africa was followed in the 1970s by the proclamation by seven other sub-Saharan African states of Marxist-Leninist governments. The continued survival of these Afrocommunist regimes and the institutionalization of Marxist-Leninist ideology have caused concern to the West because of the possible spreading of Afrocommunism in Africa. The links between the Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist parties in these countries intensify these concerns.

This paper focuses on socialism and its interpretations by Marx and African Socialists, and Marxism-Leninism and its interpretation by Afrocommunist regimes. Communist parties in non-Afrocommunist countries and a comparison of African Socialism and Afrocommunism are presented. The political, economic, and ideological steps which led to the consolidation of Marxist-Leninist policies and institutions are then examined for the seven Afrocommunist countries--Congo, Benin, Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia. Prospects for the emergence of Afrocommunist regimes in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia are followed by general conclusions and the outlook for the Afrocommunist regimes. Finally, the paper concludes with implications of Afrocommunism for the West, especially the United States.

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SUMMARY

Socialism emerged in sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1950s as the first colonized territories gained independence. African Socialist leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sekou Toure in Guinea, and Modibo Keita in Mali, believed that Africa's traditional societies had characteristics compatible with socialism. In the 1970s, African Socialist thinking led several new regimes to embrace Marxism-Leninism. They have become known as Afrocommunist governments because they lack class distinctions and interpret Marxism-Leninism as an ideology that could be adapted to local circumstances and implemented free of Soviet domination.

The Marxist-Leninist orientation of the military regimes in Congo, Benin, and Madagascar was proclaimed by fiat, partly in reaction to French neocolonialism, but primarily because it provided the rulers with the means to consolidate power. In the Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, national liberation movements were led by Marxist-Leninist ideologues who had been influenced by members of the Portuguese Communist Party during their student years in Lisbon. The leading theorist among them was Amilcar Cabral, whose ideas on the application of Marxist-Leninist ideology to Africa provided all three nationalist movements with the foundations of their policies. Ethiopia, never having been colonized, experienced the emergence of Marxism-Leninism as an outgrowth of an internal social upheaval, a government overthrow, and the establishment of a ruling Marxist-Leninist party. Afrocommunism in the four countries in which the Marxist-Leninist parties maintain party-to-party relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union--Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, and Mozambique--is probably more entrenched than in Benin, Guinea-Bissau, and Madagascar.

Each of the Afrocommunist countries is characterized by a one-party regime. Although some of their policies, having failed to solve difficult economic problems, are being modified, Marxist-Leninist institutions in all the countries are being consolidated as their leaders place a priority on the creation of structures for the perpetuation of the Marxist-Leninist system. Insurgencies, however, continue to challenge the viability of the regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.

The prospects for the emergence of new Afrocommunist regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are poor. Communist parties in Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan lack sufficient influence and support. In South Africa, prospects for the downfall of the powerful apartheid government and the coming to power of the longstanding South African Communist Party are slim. In Zimbabwe, the leftist Mugabe regime, fearful of exacerbating serious economic problems like those in the Afrocommunist countries, has been hesitant to implement Marxist-Leninist policies. In Namibia, should the Marxist-Leninist-oriented SWAPO organization come to power in the face of South African opposition, it would be severely constrained by Pretoria's influence and the need for Western developmental assistance.

AFROCOMMUNISM AND AFRICAN SOCIALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1. INTRODUCTION

The basic appeal of socialism to African leaders is rooted in the poor economic conditions in which their countries were left by the colonial powers. Socialist concepts seemed to offer viable and expedient developmental alternatives following independence. The Socialist concepts introduced by Karl Marx, and later modified by Lenin, were even more attractive to some African leaders because they included a blueprint for economic and technological development.

According to Marx, economic production determines the social structure and belief systems of a group of people, with social change occurring as the result of a struggle between social classes. Classes are determined by ownership, or nonownership, of the means of production, the class owning the means of production dominating all other classes, primarily through control of the state. Under capitalism, the controlling class is the bourgeoisie, which Marx hypothesized would eventually be outnumbered by the workers, or proletariat, who would collectively acquire ownership of the means of production. In the Marxian analysis, at this stage the state becomes Socialist, and, as the class structure disappears with equal sharing, the state withers away.

Lenin's modifications of Marxism provided the Soviet Union with its current ideological foundation, and created a system of organizing political power which would provide control of the economy. Marxist-Leninist ideology justified the Russian Revolution by disregarding the Marxist principle of a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat to be followed by the withering away of the state. In this way, Marxist-Leninist ideologues could espouse Socialist ideals while building a coercive state dominated by a self-appointed elite. This adaptation of Marxist theory appeals to Africa's Marxist-Leninist regimes because in practice its constraints, including an intolerance of social, political, and philosophical rivalries, hold the society together in the midst of social and cultural tensions provoked by radical developmental changes.

a. Development of African Socialism

Most traditional African societies were, and continue to be, ethnically based, functioning within a system of communal sharing. Although the colonial powers--France, Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Germany--pressed their own political and economic systems on these traditional societies, several nationalist leaders in African countries which gained their independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s embraced Socialist concepts. African socialism, as it was labeled, was based on the belief that Africa's traditional societies had characteristics which were compatible with socialism, which maintains that society rather than private individuals should share fairly in the wealth of a country. These characteristics included communal land ownership, the extended family, elaborate concepts of kinship, the practice of sharing, and an emphasis on cooperation rather than competition. The African Socialists hoped to overcome the omnipresent problem of ethnic diversity which was an obstacle to national unity in every newly independent African state. They therefore favored the establishment of a one-

party system, but shared a rejection of the application of the Marxist concept of class conflict in Africa.

In 1957, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah was the first nationalist leader to introduce socialism in sub-Saharan Africa. His Socialist interpretation was based on that of Western European Socialists who adapted the ideology to the specific economic and political conditions of their countries. By the early 1960s, Nkrumahism, as his ideology became known, advocated the idea that state power should be used to "Africanize" the leading sectors of the economy. Nkrumah's ideological orientation and his concept of Pan-Africanism, which envisaged the merging of African states into one single state, were acceptable to other nationalist leaders in Africa's colonial territories. But with the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 (by British-trained officers in the army who opposed Nkrumah's growing ties with the Soviet Union), socialism in Ghana came to an end.

One nationalist leader inspired by Nkrumah was Sekou Toure, who came to power in Guinea when independence was gained from France in 1958. At independence, the French suspended all aid and technical assistance, including investments in the important mining industry. Toure, compelled to construct a completely new administrative framework, used the Democratic Party of Guinea as the institutional basis. Soviet willingness to provide aid in France's place provided the opportunity for Socialist doctrine to become established. But in 1978, the failure of Toure's unstructured Socialist policies and disillusionment with the Soviet Union resulted in a reconciliation with France, steps toward economic liberalization, and a general shift away from Socialist policies. Following Toure's death in March 1984, an army coup d'etat in April resulted in the establishment of the Military National Recovery Committee (CMRN) under the rule of Lansana Conte. The new regime has continued the trend away from Socialist policies, encouraging growth in the private sector and private investment. The CMRN has also lifted the state surveillance and control characteristic of the Toure regime, although the July 1985 attempted coup d'etat by former Prime Minister Diara Traore may portend a shift back toward tighter security.

Another nationalist leader who espoused socialism was Modibo Keita, who came to power in Mali at independence in 1960. By 1968, when the army seized power, many features of a Socialist system were in place, particularly state companies in charge of industry and foreign and local trade. The new regime, headed by Moussa Traore, committed itself to economic reforms with the goal of reducing centralized control over state companies. However, because the regime was faced with dissent among workers and was unable to attract foreign investors, no significant changes were made until 1981. At that time, a program of economic liberalization was introduced with United Nations and Western assistance. At present, the slowly emerging free market system is replacing Socialist institutions.

One of the most enduring African Socialist regimes evolved in Tanzania under Julius Nyerere, who came to power in 1962. In 1967, Nyerere issued a formal document, which became known as the Arusha Declaration. The document declared Tanzania's commitment to socialism and embraced concepts of collective farming, democracy under a single party, and self-reliance. Under the new system, socialism would be built on the country's agricultural

potential. The single party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), denied political rights to anyone associated with practices of capitalism and feudalism, including those owning shares in any company, holding a directorship in any private enterprise, having two or more salaries, or owning houses for rent. Collective settlements, known as Ujamaa villages, were established in rural areas, businesses were nationalized, and government corporations (parastatals) were created. However, Tanzania's Socialist model, dependent on the cooperation of the peasants, has largely been a failure. The peasants, rebelling against forced moves to collective settlements and low farm prices, have withheld their crops from the government. As a result, the Nyerere government is gradually adopting more capitalist policies which allow for limited producer incentive.

Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda and Senegal's Leopold Senghor, while basically in agreement with Nyerere's ideas, developed their own names for African socialism. Kaunda, encompassing Socialist ideas in his concept of humanism, emphasized the individual and the need for his good behavior in a Christian sense for socialism to blossom. Early attempts to collectivize agriculture failed, and partial nationalizations in the economic sectors have been achieved largely through the establishment of parastatal corporations. Nonetheless, post-independence Zambia has been more characterized by a mixed economy than by a centrally controlled one. In May 1985, the government took steps to denationalize several large companies and return them to private ownership. In general, there has been little change in Kaunda's ideological position during his continuing tenure as Head of State. Senghor, labeling his ideology Negritude, sought to give African socialism a stronger cultural base and differentiate it from European socialism. Intense popular pressure for political reforms precipitated Senghor's resignation in December 1980. His predecessor, Abdou Diouf, has encouraged private and foreign investment, moving away from Socialist policies.

b. Shift Away from African Socialism

In the 1970s, a leftward trend in sub-Saharan Africa became clearly discernible, not only because of the waning interest in the early approaches toward socialism, but also because of the increasing number of African governments espousing orthodox Marxism-Leninism, which seemed to offer a clear-cut alternative to ineffective economic policies and colonial political structures. By 1980, seven sub-Saharan African countries--Angola, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, and Mozambique--were under the rule of self-professed Marxist-Leninist leaderships. Four of them, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, and Congo, signed friendship and cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union and established party-to-party relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

Marxist-Leninist parties emerged in four other sub-Saharan African countries. The most longstanding and influential Communist party in sub-Saharan Africa is the South African Communist Party (SACP) which was established clandestinely in 1953. Its predecessor, the Communist Party of South Africa, established in 1921 and dissolved in 1950 on the eve of its banning, was the continent's first Marxist-Leninist party. Despite its dominance by whites, the earlier party recognized the revolutionary potential among blacks and sought to establish firm ties with them. Consequently, the

party became closely allied to the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, ties which the SACP continues to maintain. The SACP's leadership was forced into exile in the 1960s when the South African Government reacted with harsh reprisals to a shift from nonviolent to violent tactics by the ANC with the help of the SACP. Today the SACP, whose membership remains dominated by whites, remains committed to Marxist-Leninist ideology and maintains close ties with the Soviet Union. Party members, whose number is difficult to estimate because of the many in exile, include activists who participated in the political upsurge following the Sharpeville shootings in 1960. At present, most senior party leaders, as well as many party members, work from outside the country in other African and European countries where exiles are concentrated.

The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) traces its origins to 1946. After being implicated in a coup attempt in 1971, the party was banned and its leadership went into exile. A pro-Soviet party, the SCP was at one time the largest Communist party in Africa. The party derives its support from intellectuals, students, labor unions, sympathizers within the armed forces, railway workers, and tenant farmers. Espousing a radical pro-Arab line, the SCP was highly critical of the Numeiri regime for making threats against Libya. In 1984, the SCP joined the newly formed opposition National Salvation Front, the culmination of a prolonged effort by the SCP to forge alliances with other political groups in Sudan. After the April 1985 military coup d'etat which overthrew the Numeiri regime and brought General Abdel Rahman Suwar El Dahab to power, the SCP was legalized, along with a number of other political parties and labor unions, which joined together to form the Alliance of Forces for National Salvation (AFNS). The AFNS was soon vested with executive functions and is presently accountable to the ruling Transitional Military Council. Although the SCP is playing a growing role in the government, as are other progressive parties, it is unlikely to become a dominant political influence in the foreseeable future, especially in view of the expanding activities of right-wing Muslim groups which cooperated closely with the former regime, and the continued reliance of the country on Western economic aid.

In Nigeria, the Socialist Working People's Party of Nigeria (SWPP) held its first Congress in November 1978. A descendant of the banned Socialist Workers and Farmers Party, the pro-Soviet SWPP was unable to meet the conditions, including the establishment of party offices in at least 13 states, to contest the November 1979 elections. A contributing factor to the SWPP's lack of activity in the last 2 years has been turmoil within Nigeria. The military coup of 31 December 1983 brought into power a government which banned all political parties and political activities, and arrested hundreds of politicians. SWPP leaders, obviously unwilling to risk either themselves or their organization, stopped attending international Communist gatherings or publishing articles in the international Communist press. A second military coup in August 1985 has contributed to the uncertainty of Nigeria's political future. It is therefore likely that the SWPP will remain inactive for some time to come.

Finally, in Senegal, the pro-Soviet Independence and Labor Party (PIT), with a membership of only 2,000, was the only legally registered Communist party in the country until April 1981, when the National Assembly

lifted restrictions on the number of political parties. The growth of a number of small political parties calling themselves Marxist since then has caused the PIT a loss of influence. In the past year, there has been little evidence of PIT activity with the exception of the party's second annual conference, an indication of Diouf's continuing firm control over his Socialist Party and the government.

Communist parties, especially those in non-Communist countries, are usually closely aligned with and modeled after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In general, Communist parties do not exist or are unable to gain significant influence and popularity in sub-Saharan Africa partly because of the small size of the working class in most countries, and partly because of the basically materialistic nature of most African cultures. Also, many African leaders fear the spread of Soviet-supported Communist parties in Africa and impose severe restrictions on the formation of these types of parties in their countries. And finally, in the increasing number of countries with one-party governments where the formation of a Communist party is illegal, support is even more difficult to obtain.

2. DEVELOPMENT OF AFROCOMMUNISM

By the late 1960s, some African leaders began to opt for a socialism tied to traditional Marxist-Leninist ideas as the emphasis on the communal heritage of African society and the rejection of class struggle became less appealing to them. This African Marxist-Leninist orientation, which became known as Afrocommunism, developed from a number of influences. These include Western European Communist parties, notably in France and Portugal, which reject Soviet interference while remaining committed to international and domestic policies similar to those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Their ideologies are also characterized by avoidance of international bloc alignment.

One kind of Afrocommunist state was born during the struggle against Portuguese colonial rule in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. In these cases, Marxist-Leninist ideology did not originate within a Communist party, but within nationalist movements which had in their leaderships a number of Marxist-Leninist intellectuals. But another kind of Afrocommunism emerged in a number of states where no Communist party or revolutionary movement existed. It was instead the proclamation of a military regime, followed by attempts to convert society to a Marxist-Leninist model. This pattern began in Congo (1968) and then appeared in Benin (1974), Madagascar (1975), and Ethiopia (1976).

a. Party Characteristics

African Marxist-Leninist parties are Leninist, revolutionary vanguards which dominate the state. They differ from traditional Marxist-Leninist parties in that their social base does not come from a proletariat. Since there is little industrialization in Africa, workers have played only a minor role when military or national liberation groups have formed Marxist-Leninist regimes. Instead, these groups rely on a dominant social group of political figures, intellectuals, and teachers, most of whom have worker or peasant origins.

These Afrocommunist states do share important characteristics. Their top party leaderships, from both the Politburo and Central Committee, fill all important ministerial positions in their governments. The ministers are responsible to the Politburo rather than to the head of government unless he is also the party chairman. At the level of party structure and organization, all the Afrocommunist parties and party schools receive advice from Soviet bloc parties. As a result, the Afrocommunist regimes have developed similar structures in their parties and other Marxist-Leninist institutions. Finally, the supreme organ of African vanguard parties is the Congress, convened on an irregular basis by the party leaderships, whose members are selected from among party members proposed by the leadership. The Congress selects the Central Committee, which in turn chooses the Politburo. The Politburo, however, with a membership limited to between 10 and 20 mostly military men, is at the center of power in Afrocommunist regimes.

b. Afrocommunism Versus African Socialism

A number of characteristics set the Afrocommunist regimes apart from the African Socialist ones:

- The Afrocommunist regimes started out with long-range plans for the future, including the institutions they would need to establish to reach their goal and the social groups they would support. The pace of reform was swifter and more systematic than in the African Socialist countries, where change has been achieved more by experimentation than by any concrete plan. (An exception is Tanzania where Nyerere's Arusha Declaration articulated long-range plans.)

- Because the Afrocommunist countries openly accepted the dominance of the state, their policies were coherent and made use of the institutions of the state to move society toward socialism. In the African Socialist countries, although their regimes rejected statism, the ineffectiveness of policies relying upon spontaneous mobilization and voluntarism invariably led to state control. (Tanzania is once again an exception in that state control was instituted following the Arusha Declaration.)

- The continuity of ideas and institutions spawned a relatively impersonal process of radicalization in the Afrocommunist countries, decreasing the chances for dependence on a single leader. Therefore, even though policy modifications have been instituted to meet immediate economic needs, the Marxist-Leninist commitment has continued unchanged in all the Afrocommunist countries despite changes in leadership in some of them, in contrast to the dependency of African Socialist regimes on the personalized ideologies of their leaders.

3. THE AFROCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

a. Congo, Benin, and Madagascar

There are striking similarities between the political systems of Congo, Benin, and Madagascar, despite disparities in their historical evolution and socioeconomic infrastructures. They exhibit similar patterns of political instability, socioeconomic turmoil, urban radicalization, rural

stagnation, and political maladministration; and, in all these countries, a Marxist-Leninist orientation was proclaimed by military rulers. In both Benin and Madagascar, the military rulers had no record of Marxist conviction. Also, in all three countries, the establishment of Marxist regimes oriented toward the Soviet Union was, in part, a reaction to French neocolonialism.

Ideologically, the regimes in Congo, Benin, and Madagascar are characterized by huge cleavages between rhetoric and reality, and by difficulty in directing any kind of socioeconomic development or in eliminating corruption and mismanagement. Madagascar differs somewhat from the other two countries because its society is more stratified socially and because neocolonialism under France in the 1960s was more pervasive. The eclectic nature of Marxist-Leninist official ideology in Madagascar is even more marked than in Congo and Benin, and the Soviet impact, in all areas, is almost insignificant.

Another similarity among these countries was the formation by the military leaderships of parties based on the structure of the CPSU. The memberships of the Politburos of each party included civilians who were meant, in theory, to lend greater legitimacy to the military-dominated Marxist-Leninist regimes. Significantly, while all three parties continue to maintain friendly ties with the CPSU, none has been converted into a ruling vanguard party.

(1) Congo

The People's Republic of the Congo moved toward a Marxist-Leninist ideology gradually, beginning in 1963. From the time of independence from France in 1960, trade union and youth movement members were recruited from the young, educated, and urban population, which formed a strong left-wing opposition to the pro-French regime of Fulbert Youlou. Deteriorating employment conditions in the major cities caused a general strike and mass demonstrations in Brazzaville in August 1963, culminating in Youlou's resignation. He was replaced by Alphonse Massamba-Debat, who instituted a Socialist regime and established diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet bloc countries.

Army and leftist elements, however, became impatient with the moderation of Massamba-Debat's policies. Following mass demonstrations staged by the organized left in August 1968, the army, led by Captain Marien Ngouabi, overthrew Massamba-Debat and established a military regime. Ngouabi, educated in Marxist thought, embraced the classical Marxist concept of class struggle and set up a new Marxist-Leninist party, the Congolese Workers' Party (PCT), with a 30-member Central Committee and an 8-member Politburo. Nonetheless, the country's economy remained dominated by large French companies. Following Ngouabi's assassination in 1977 by a leftist displeased with the regime's policies, Joachim Yhombi Opango came to power, adopting a moderate political path. Opango established closer ties with the West while continuing to pursue ties with the Soviet bloc and China. He was soon overthrown in February 1979 by his First Vice President and Defense Minister, Denis Sassou-Nguesso.

Sassou-Nguesso, a career army officer, was a representative of the left-wing rank and file, with close ties to the radical student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Like Ngouabi, he embraced Marxism-Leninism, stressing the importance of class struggle and he quickly learned to use personal and ethnic antagonisms to neutralize potential enemies. In the early 1980s, falling oil revenues and gloomy prospects for the future of the oil industry caused Sassou-Nguesso to take steps to revive the economy by seeking Western support. But these overtures, especially to France, caused increasing opposition from the radical left. In 1982, a series of bomb explosions in several of Brazzaville's public buildings were blamed on this faction. Since then, Sassou-Nguesso has succeeded in keeping the peace through expensive tribally-based patronage, which has offset the recent rise in oil income and brightening prospects for the offshore oil industry. Sassou-Nguesso has been willing to pay this price in order to prevent an alliance between regional politicians and Marxist-Leninist ideologues in the PCT, who oppose the pragmatic group around the President.

There are a number of elements within Congo's ideological power structure among whom Sassou-Nguesso has had to maneuver, resulting in either the replacement of those who pose a threat or the maintenance of a balance. One organization which has threatened his power is the Impfondo group, consisting of members of the Bateke people who inhabit the extreme north of the country. This group, aided by pro-Soviet government officials, has isolated itself from other northerners in a bid to place more of its own members in power. The group's political support comes mostly from the armed forces and security apparatus; it receives material support from East Germany, Algeria, and Cuba.

In the first half of 1983, Sassou-Nguesso sought to reduce support for the Impfondo group by eliminating those in key positions with close Soviet ties. He relieved Minister of the Interior Francois-Xavier Katali, Moscow's key man in the regime, of his duties. Shortly thereafter, Sassou-Nguesso also dismissed the radical Minister of Information, Florent Ntsiba, who is a leader of the Impfondo group. This action began the process of eroding Katali's support from within the PCT's Politburo.

Another perceived threat to Sassou-Nguesso's power is Jean-Pierre Tchicaya-Thystere, the Politburo's official ideologue. A southerner, he was active in rallying southern support for Sassou-Nguesso. But during the August 1984 Party Congress, in a carefully calculated move, Sassou-Nguesso had Tchicaya-Thystere arrested for his alleged involvement in the 1982 bombings. Thicaya-Thystere was excluded subsequently from the party hierarchy.

The group Sassou-Nguesso has allied himself most closely with in recent years is the pro-Chinese Movement of 22 February (M-22). Only a decade before, M-22 fought the regime in open guerrilla warfare. Sassou-Nguesso rehabilitated many of the organization's top leaders to broaden popular support for the regime and to provide a second radical Marxist-Leninist base in opposition to the pro-Soviet government faction led by Katali. One of M-22's leaders, Camille Bongou, also is the head of the PCT Permanent Secretariat and is reputedly the number two man in the regime.

During the past 2 years, Sassou-Nguesso has succeeded in placing around him both the party and government hierarchies with similar ideological outlooks. Daniel Abibi, who replaced Florent Ntsiba as Minister of Information in May 1983, provides the President with an ideological alternative to M-22, and thus a second source of support against pro-Soviet hardliners. Abibi's ideology is tinged with radical African nationalism, close to Sassou-Nguesso's own outlook. Sassou-Nguesso also encourages moderates in the government to criticize the stultifying effects on Congolese development of Soviet-style planning and state structure. He undoubtedly favors the point of view of the moderates, who think Congo should pursue a Western path toward pragmatism in economic affairs.

During the August 1984 Congress of the PCT, Sassou-Nguesso was reelected unanimously as party president. He effectively won a battle against pro-Soviet hardliners in the party when the Politburo was expanded from 10 to 13 members and the Central Committee from 40 to 50 members, enabling Sassou-Nguesso to place additional supporters in both bodies. In fact, 60 percent of the Central Committee are now inhabitants of the President's native Cuvette region. Also, a new constitutional reform, which makes the President Head of Government, formerly a function of the Prime Minister, was endorsed. Finally, pro-Soviet Foreign Minister Pierre Nze M'ba was dismissed and relegated to the PCT Permanent Secretariat, and a pragmatist, Ange-Edouard Poungi, was appointed as Finance Minister.

French influence has remained strong in the country. For example, offshore oil exploitation and much of the country's mining and forestry industries are controlled largely by French companies, and France remains the Congo's major source of external aid. In comparison, Soviet economic investments have been negligible--only about three percent of Congo's entire trade is conducted with the Soviet Union. The appointment of Poungi to the Ministry of Finance likely will result in some changes toward more moderate economic policies.

Soviet influence is, for the most part, limited to the armed forces and security apparatus. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between Congo and the Soviet Union in May 1981, but unlike similar treaties signed with other African countries, it does not call for greater military cooperation. The PCT and the CPSU also maintain party-to-party relations. The Air Force has MiG-21 jet fighters, and all heavy weapons are of Soviet bloc origin. Congolese officers are trained in Soviet military academies, and about 100 Soviet officers are stationed in Congo. Cuban and East German military advisers are also stationed in Congo, and the internal security forces are directed by Soviet advisers.

Relations between Congo and China exist mostly in the sphere of infrastructure projects, including a 1984 military agreement providing for the construction under Chinese supervision of a military academy outside of Brazzaville.

From a political viewpoint, Sassou-Nguesso can survive only if he manages to maintain a balance between the pro-Soviet hardliners and the pro-Western pragmatists within the ruling elite. He has kept Congo on an authentic Marxist-Leninist path, but a number of dichotomies contradict his

commitment to socialism. Until recently, the government funded inefficient state farm projects, but did nothing to collectivize the peasantry. Now, with the uncertainty in the oil industry, the emphasis is being placed on peasant agriculture. Economically, most strategic sectors are controlled by private foreign capital. The government also hopes to boost the economy by converting many of the parastatals into joint management companies in which both private Congolese and foreign investors can play a part.

(2) Benin

Since independence in 1960, the political history of Benin, called Dahomey until December 1975, can be divided into two periods. The first period from 1960 to 1972 was characterized by instability (the result of attempts to unite three traditional and ethnically diverse kingdoms under one ruling authority), chronic fiscal difficulties, and France's gradual reduction of subsidies. During this period, Benin experienced six coups d'etat. The second period from 1972 to the present has been dominated by President Mathieu Kerekou.

A coup in October 1972 swept out of power the entire group of civil and military leaders who had dominated the country's politics since independence. Prior to the coup, which brought to power middle- and low-ranking officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Kerekou, the armed forces had shown no interest in any kind of ideology. Therefore, Kerekou's sudden shift to a Socialist orientation was unexpected.

Kerekou's first public speeches decried foreign domination and emphasized the role of the peasantry in the future development of the country. First referred to as Dahomean Socialism and later as Beninois Scientific Socialism, the new regime's ideology consisted of a series of nationalistic decrees, edicts, and prescriptions which were eventually molded into a declaration of Marxism-Leninism in November 1974.

Kerekou moved slowly to implement his ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism in light of Benin's relative resource insufficiency and strong dependence on France. He did not withdraw Benin from the French currency zone, avoided a radical policy of mass nationalization, and rejected demands from the civilian left to establish a Marxist-Leninist party. Because Benin possessed few large foreign capital enterprises, immediate steps were not required to transform domestic or external socioeconomic structures.

Instead, Kerekou established the National Council of the Revolution (CNR), which included civilians as well as military officers, and he created elected revolutionary councils in the villages. The new political structure was designed to replace the system of communes and prefectures and to expand centralized control by giving Kerekou the authority to appoint the heads of the country's six provinces and district chiefs. Finally, in November 1974, a 13-member Politburo above the CNR was established at the same time that Kerekou proclaimed Benin's Socialist path of development with a Marxist-Leninist orientation.

The basic policy imperatives of Beninois Socialism, which emerged in 1974, included state centralization of most means of production, the

collectivization of farms, and a realignment of Benin's foreign policy toward the Soviet bloc. At the same time, the nationalizations of the oil distribution network and private enterprise were announced. By mid-1975, the insurance industry, transportation, banks, the brewery, and most other sectors of the economy came under state monopoly.

In the first years of his regime, Kerekou used Marxist-Leninist rhetoric to appeal to traditionally radical elements among the unions, students, and intellectuals in order to gain support and establish the regime's legitimacy. However, challenges to Kerekou's power from radicals within the regime in 1975 began a process of violent unrest and massive union strikes. The regime's brutal dealings with the radicals and strikers isolated it from most of the leftist elements.

The regime's military inner core, while unwilling to relinquish power, recognized the necessity of including civilians in the government in order to legitimize further its ideological path. Kerekou, also anxious to erase the politics of the past, in December 1975 renamed the country and created the Revolutionary Party of the Benin People (PRPB), based on the structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A civilian majority was elected to its Central Committee. Relations with France deteriorated rapidly as the nationalizations reduced French economic influence. Military cooperation between the two countries ceased, and relations eroded further when a group of mostly French mercenaries, accused by Benin of having links with French intelligence, tried to overthrow the Kerekou regime in January 1977.

Most of Benin's Marxist-Leninist ideologues, including Kerekou himself, were actually relatively moderate, and by the early 1980s, the regime had changed course. In an effort to boost the flagging economy, the government reduced the number of parastatals and provincial development agencies, relinquished its import and export monopoly, and began to encourage private business. Negotiations with France, reopened in 1978, had yielded the revival of many of the suspended French subsidies and loans, and the regime openly indicated its desire for Western private investment.

In a 1982 Cabinet reshuffle, Kerekou dismissed a number of Ligue members from important posts in a move to assert his personal authority over the factions within the ruling elite. The subsequent appointment of several new civilian ministers resulted in a minority of military personnel in the government for the first time since 1977. One year later, in December 1983, Benin's economy suffered a blow as a result of a military coup in neighboring Nigeria. An important factor in Benin's economic prosperity was the black-market trade in goods smuggled from Benin into Nigeria, but Nigeria's new military government put an end to this trading practice.

By 1984, there were signs of growing unrest in the armed forces for both economic and ethnic reasons. A coup attempt in the spring resulted in the reduction in the number of newly elected political commissioners in the National Assembly and an increase in the number of civilian ministers, reinforcing Kerekou's power position within the PRPB. Shortly thereafter, in July 1984, Kerekou was reelected as President of the National Assembly and promptly reshuffled his Cabinet. The most notable change was the removal of

his radical Minister of Finance, Isidore Amoussou, who was replaced by the more pragmatic Antonio Hospice.

Kerekou's ideological choice was clearly not a carefully nurtured intellectual commitment, but a path to political survival. According to Marxist theory, socialism would legitimize centralized institutionalization which in turn would consolidate the regime's power base. A commitment to Marxism-Leninism would also appease the civilian left who criticized Benin's subservience to French interests.

Kerekou's successes in the Marxist-Leninist realm have been limited by Benin's small industrial sector and the modest scale of its economy in general. In the agricultural sector, progress toward the goal of collective production has been cautious, because the government has neither adequate peasant support nor the capacity to organize a cooperative network. Traditional left-wing elements--students and trade unionists--are small in number and thus far, controllable. In addition, some private independent businessmen have been able to maintain their activities with no interference from the government.

While Soviet, Cuban, and East German military advisers are present in the country, and the government has not renounced its policy of friendship with the Soviet bloc countries, it is clearly displeased with the paucity of Soviet support. Instead, the Kerekou regime continues to cultivate close economic relations with the West, especially France, which is Benin's principal trading partner and major supplier of development aid.

(3) Madagascar

The development of a Marxist-Leninist orientation in Madagascar in 1975, as in Congo and Benin, was motivated in part by the new government's efforts to reduce French domination of the economy and to differentiate itself from previous, failed regimes.

Much of the island's political instability in the years following independence in 1960 was caused by hostility between the minority Merinas of the high plateaus of central Madagascar and the majority lowland groups in coastal areas known as the cotiers. Philibert Tsiranana, a cotier, came to power at independence at the head of the Democratic Social Party (PSD), which had close ties to the French Socialist Party. French control over the new state was extensive. For example, French officers trained the island's armed forces, French military installations helped to provide for the country's defense, and 80 percent of the country's production facilities were owned by the French. Throughout the 1960s, many top posts continued to be held by French nationals.

Madagascar's economic ties with France were undermined by the 1968 strikes in France and the French franc's devaluation in 1969. A number of groups in Madagascar, including the Merinas, university students, urban unemployed, labor unions, and overtaxed peasants, became increasingly critical of the Tsiranana regime's ties with France, forcing Tsiranana's resignation in 1972.

The regime of General Gabriel Ramanantsoa, a Merina, began the transition of control from French hands into Malagasy ones. He had the support of four leftist parties: the Soviet-oriented Party of the Congress of Independence (AKFM), the Federation of the May 13th Movement (KIM), the National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (MONIMA), and the Maoist Power to the Proletariat (MFM). His Foreign Minister, Didier Ratsiraka, loosened ties with the French, withdrawing Madagascar from the French monetary zone and asking the French to evacuate its air and naval bases on the island. He also broke relations with Israel and South Africa and opened new ones with the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and East Germany.

The thrust of the regime's leftist orientation was toward the democratization of rural life. Interior Minister Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava, a product of Tsiranana's cotier-dominated era, favored a decentralized structure and tried to revive traditional Malagasy communities. He divided the island into 10,498 village communities, fokatany, each of which elected a local fokonolona to make decisions for the community. However, Ramanantsoa, favoring centralized control, did not support this plan. He began to nationalize foreign enterprises, but this served to increase mismanagement and corruption as the Merinas, who have traditionally held the reins of economic power, gained increased control of the administration and the economy. Objections to fokonolona were also voiced by segments of the cotier population, who saw them as a way to further entrench Merina control over the economy and by the Marxist parties, who did not view them as adequate to deal with modern development problems.

In January 1975, the division between the Merinas and cotiers erupted into violence as the Mobile Police Group mutinied over the underrepresentation of cotiers in the force. Two factions formed within the government in the aftermath of the mutiny--the left opposition, consisting of Ratsimandrava and Ratsiraka who had the support of the AKFM, MONIMA, and other leftist parties, and the moderate center of Ramanantsoa and Army Colonel Roland Rabetafika. When members of the Standing Committee of the government's advisory group, the Popular National Council for Development (CNPD), sided with the left opposition, Ramanantsoa was forced to hand over power to Ratsimandrava, who six days later was assassinated.

Ratsiraka, who had been Foreign Minister from 1972 to 1975 and a member of the 18-man military directorate formed after Ratsimandrava's assassination, was made head of state in June 1975. A cotier, he was French educated and popular with both the bourgeoisie and the students. All but one of his ministers was civilian. Faced with the task of reviving the deteriorated economy and dealing with a demoralized and fearful peasantry, the new regime adopted a Marxist-Leninist orientation in September 1975. The new policies, contained in the "Red Book" of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution, included the expansion of the fokonolona experiment to carry out agrarian and administrative reforms, the reorganization of the armed forces, the mobilization of youth and women, and a foreign policy of closer relations with the Communist states. Ratsiraka also created the Supreme Revolutionary Council (CSR) to supersede the military directorate and to create the appearance of a return to civilian rule. Its membership included powerful civilian and military elements, who represented significant economic and ethnic interests.

Between 1975 and 1976, the Ratsiraka regime expropriated four large French trading companies and nationalized the French sugar companies, banks, insurance and shipping companies, the oil refinery, and movie houses. In addition, the American satellite-tracking station was closed. By the end of 1976, the socialized sector had increased from 15 percent of the economy at the time of the beginning of Ratsiraka's regime to 61 percent.

In 1976, Ratsiraka formed the party of the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA), which immediately joined the Front for Defense of the Revolution (FNDR), a group founded earlier in the year to unite the island's seven parties. AREMA's 90,000 militants quickly formed branches throughout the island, and in June 1977, AREMA won a large majority of seats in the National Assembly. One party, MONIMA, led by Monja Jaona, withdrew from the FNDR following the elections, having lost a majority of seats to AREMA and becoming the strongest political opposition to the Ratsiraka regime.

The regime's relatively moderate program of increased production through state planning and enterprises and the nationalization of private foreign companies did not arouse any significant controversy. The timing and extent of reforms, however, did cause rifts among the elite, who perceived as a threat agrarian reforms designed to give administrative responsibility to local officials. Students, the unemployed, and other radical groups, on the other hand, were impatient with the moderation and slow tempo of the reforms.

By mid-1981, Ratsiraka had built around his regime a 28,000-man military force whose officer corp included 7 out of 21 members of the CSR, two ministers, and the President himself. He had succeeded also in positioning himself at the head of the left-wing parties and eliminating the last organized political resistance to his regime by persuading MONIMA to rejoin the FNDR. Furthermore, Jaona was invested as a member of the CSR. By imposing censorship of the press and banning organized opposition to the government, Ratsiraka isolated his conservative opponents--the Merina bourgeoisie and the Council of Malagasy Churches. In effect, he successfully erected a strong barrier between the ruling circles and the general population, the latter finding that the French had been replaced by a new and privileged Malagasy elite.

Ratsiraka had inherited from the previous regime a government rife with corruption and poor marketing policies. By 1982, following a drought and a series of devastating storms, he was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which agreed to grant a loan to the Malagasy regime if Ratsiraka made certain changes. Ratsiraka complied, incorporating into the Cabinet a team of young, French-educated technocrats. The most significant repercussion, however, was the rapprochement with Western governments, which alienated Malagasy radical ideologues. Ratsiraka moved quickly to appease them by removing from his Cabinet economic liberals and conservatives who did not support his Socialist policies. As a result of this October 1983 reshuffle, most of the key ministries came under the control of Ratsiraka's leftist proteges in AREMA. Another partial reshuffle took place in February 1985 which, although it brought about no change in the government's political orientation, was aimed at preventing ministers in key ministries from amassing significant political support by remaining in office.

An important political factor is the relationship between the two million-strong Roman Catholic Church and the state. The recent murders of three clergy and a layworker gave rise to mutual suspicion between the Church and the government. Because of their outspokenness in political matters, their deaths are interpreted by some Church officials as an attempt by the government to intimidate those churches in the country which have distanced themselves from the regime's policies. Moreover, the prosperity of the Catholic Church in Madagascar, in sharp contrast to Madagascar's economic crisis, underscores the mutual distrust between Church and state.

Ratsiraka's choice of a Socialist path after he had consolidated power has not reduced his country's problems. Since 1982, Ratsiraka's flexibility has been narrowed by economic problems, complicated by widespread corruption. In the countryside, the decentralized development projects are run by the armed forces who recruit workers from local areas. Many of these projects, however, lack local technical and bureaucratic expertise, and have become dependent for their survival on central government planning.

During the past 2 years, Ratsiraka has demonstrated an increasing tendency to woo the West, a marked departure from the anti-Western tone of the 1970s and early 1980s. He has tailored his economic policies to satisfy Western creditors, and during a speech in January 1985, he praised major Western philosophers, stating clearly that the writings of Marx, Lenin, Engels, and Mao are not all-inclusive. Also, relations with France in the last few years have improved considerably, primarily because of Madagascar's deteriorating economic situation. During visits to France in 1981 and 1983, Ratsiraka found the Socialist government of Francois Mitterrand more congenial than its predecessor. Although French aid to Madagascar has been substantial--\$150 million in the form of gifts and loans in 1982 alone--there has been little increase in France's military aid to Madagascar.

The Soviet Union has been quick to take advantage of gaps in French military aid. In March 1985, after the French failed to provide funds for the maintenance of Madagascar's small and weak air force, the Soviets offered \$400,000 worth of spare parts and a \$3 million loan for the maintenance of Soviet military aircraft. Furthermore, a fourth Antonov An-26 transport plane is to be delivered within the next year. Nonetheless, the Soviets were recently told to disassemble their radar installations used for surveillance of the Mozambique Channel, an indication of the precarious Soviet foothold in Madagascar and a possible closer relationship with the West in the future.

Ratsiraka's policy of nonalignment has led to a broad range of foreign relations. In 1981, an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation was signed between the Soviet Union and Madagascar. Ratsiraka also accepts military and economic aid from North Korea and China, finding this a useful means of avoiding complete military dependence on the Soviets. In this way, Ratsiraka has been successful in rejecting Soviet demands for the use of military facilities. At present, France is Madagascar's primary trading partner, followed closely by the United States.

b. Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola

The Marxist-Leninist regimes which emerged in the mid-1970s in the former Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola formed during prolonged wars of liberation from Portugal. The African Independence Party of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party (MPLA), were led respectively during this time by Amilcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane, and Agostinho Neto, who had been students together in Lisbon. These nationalist leaders were drawn to the Marxist orientation of the Portuguese Communist Party, which operated illegally and was engaged in an active struggle against the Salazar regime.

The three Portuguese colonies shared several important characteristics. First, the liberation movements in each country pursued the same basic political strategy, including the clearing of liberated zones within which new social and political structures were built. Second, the overthrow of the Portuguese Caetano regime in 1974, and the rapid gaining of independence in the three territories resulted in a mass exodus from all three countries of Portuguese managers, technicians, and workers who had held the majority of jobs in the cities, thus paralyzing the economies of the three countries. Finally, each of the colonies had a relatively small working class.

The leading ideologues--Cabral in Guinea-Bissau, Samora Machel and Mondlane in Mozambique, and Neto and Lucio Lara in Angola--each believed that only one Marxism existed, which, as a science, could adapt to all conditions. They also rejected the notion of an African socialism distinct from the traditional Marxist-Leninist model found in the Soviet Union and China. Moreover, the fact that the working classes did not play an important role in the liberation struggles of the three former colonies, together with their small sizes at the time of independence, created a philosophical quandary. According to Marxist theory, it is the working class which gains true political consciousness in the revolutionary struggle. The new regimes sought to rectify this deficiency and legitimize their ideological perspective by converting their liberation movements into vanguard parties, limiting membership to those whose social base was the working class and peasantry and whose ideology was Marxism-Leninism.

In spite of these similarities, the liberation struggle differed in each of the three countries. In Angola, the MPLA, only one of three rival insurgent groups, controlled little outside of the capital and has not overcome basic ethnic, political, and military obstacles faced during the war of liberation. In Mozambique, FRELIMO, despite its tenure in power since the 1960s, continues to be plagued by internal dissension, and remains unable to concentrate its efforts on achieving control of a large part of the country because of strong insurgent opposition from the Mozambique National Resistance Organization (RENAMO). The PAIGC, on the other hand, was the most successful of the three movements in achieving national unity, carrying out political mobilization, and establishing new political structures in the liberated areas. At independence, it had the largest degree of control over its territory and had established the most political legitimacy.

Many students from the Portuguese colonies studied in Lisbon during the years of colonization. Most were either white or of mixed race (mestizos). The latter, though few in number, played important roles in the liberation struggles and later in the shaping of ideology. Many Portuguese whites who chose to become citizens of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau at the time of independence, were Marxists who held many top positions in the new governments. As a result, the newly independent countries had a large number of loyal Marxists in their governing and party structures. Thus, the process of ideological conversion from nationalism to Marxism-Leninism had occurred already inside the parties.

(1) Guinea-Bissau

The PAIGC, which was established in 1956 by Amilcar Cabral, received extensive Soviet military support throughout the 11-year war of liberation. Although its immediate goal was to achieve political independence, its ultimate goal, as articulated by Cabral, was based on the Socialist ideal of ending the exploitation of man by man. Cabral developed his revolutionary theory based on Guinea-Bissau's colonial status and its economic underdevelopment. According to his analysis, a Socialist society in Guinea-Bissau could not be attained until the country's economic and agricultural sectors become technically advanced. In the interim, a Marxist-Leninist approach to the development of society seemed to Cabral a logical course in a technologically underdeveloped agricultural country.

Cabral, arguing that unique revolutionary conditions existed in Portugal's African colonies, modified orthodox Marxist-Leninist concepts identifying class struggle and private ownership of property as the unifying elements of resistance in a revolutionary struggle. Although classes existed in colonial Africa, Cabral emphasized, colonization itself had caused the more serious cultural oppression, which had occurred as the result of the clash between European and African cultures. Therefore, the colonial experience had provided fertile grounds for a struggle based on cultural resistance and a need for the Africanization of the means of production. Cabral's ideas were readily accepted by Neto and Mondlane, whose own liberation fronts adopted many of the PAIGC's theories.

Although Cabral was assassinated in 1973, his theories remained the PAIGC's official ideology. When Guinea-Bissau became independent in 1974, Luiz Cabral, the brother of the assassinated leader, took over the country's leadership. Like his brother, he avoided the label of Marxism-Leninism, even though the basic structures of the PAIGC were similar to those found in Angola and Mozambique. These structures included a National People's Assembly, a Council of State Commissariats, and party bodies similar in structure to the traditional Soviet Politburo and Central Committee. Mass organizations were also formed, along with the eventual opening of a party training school. Finally, land, which had been communally owned by village inhabitants, was officially nationalized in 1975, although the government planned a slow transfer from communal ownership and cultivation into a system of producer cooperatives. One of the first priorities of the new government was to increase the production of rice, as well as that of the two main export crops, groundnuts and palm kernels, upon which the economy was dependent.

During the war of liberation, the PAIGC had been a mass movement open to all who were prepared to support the struggle, but with independence the situation changed. In 1977, during the Party's Third Congress, the PAIGC was redefined as a vanguard party. As justification for this decision, its leadership claimed that the working class was too small and underdeveloped to lead the revolution, the farmers could not lead a program which would have to include industrialization, and the bourgeoisie could not be trusted to promote the interests of the masses. Therefore, a small group of well-trained and dedicated ideologues would lead the country to socialism.

By 1980, the economic situation had deteriorated because of drought and ineffective policies. The government had failed to develop a workable strategy to modernize agriculture on a communal basis. The trade network, used for monitoring the annual output of rice and investments in agriculture, was inadequate. The country's meager resources had been invested in projects such as the Cumere agro-industrial project and the Citroen vehicle assembly plant, both of which proved to have little benefit to the general population. The country had come to rely almost exclusively on economic aid from the West.

In November 1980, Prime Minister Joao Vieira overthrew the Cabral regime. Vieira tried to maintain a radical tone in the beginning of his regime, replacing the National Assembly with a Revolutionary Council and restructuring the party hierarchy into a Central Committee and Politburo. But as the economy continued to deteriorate, he began to move toward a more pragmatic position, facilitating the reentry into the bureaucracy of Portuguese-trained civil servants. Economic conditions, however, have not improved since Vieira came to power.

In May 1982, Vieira reshuffled the government, placing more power in his own hands by taking on the portfolios of defense and internal security. The reshuffle caused greater division between pro-Soviet radicals and pragmatic pro-Western elements. One of the casualties of the reshuffle, Minister of Economic Cooperation Vasco Cabral, had used a Soviet approach to development, including massive industrial and agro-industrial schemes, state control over the trading sector, and bureaucratic domination over agriculture. Under his tenure, production dropped sharply in both the economic and agricultural sectors. Since his demotion, more leeway has been given to the private trading sector to stimulate production.

Vieira's gradual shift to the right and pursuit of a more pragmatic solution to his country's economic problems have resulted in some stability for his regime. A number of young technocrats, trained in Cuba, Brazil, and France, now occupy key economic and financial positions, and Vieira has begun to diversify his military suppliers. There are several hundred Soviet advisers in the Armed Forces and the party, and East Germans are active in the police force and telecommunications. The French, breaking the Soviet monopoly in Guinea-Bissau's military for the first time in 1981, began to deliver military vehicles to the country. In 1983, China further curtailed Soviet and Cuban influence in the Armed Forces by delivering patrol boats to Guinea-Bissau's Navy, and in 1984, France decided to offer more aid and military advisers to train the military.

(2) Mozambique

FRELIMO was founded in June 1962 by a group of nationalists led by Eduardo Mondlane. Following Mondlane's assassination in 1969, Samora Machel, head of FRELIMO's guerrilla army, took over the movement. When Mozambique gained its independence in June 1975, power passed to FRELIMO and Machel became President, heading an 11-member Politburo.

FRELIMO's Marxist-Leninist orientation can be divided into three phases:

- First, from 1962 until independence in 1975, FRELIMO's leaders, concerned with the development of alternatives to Portuguese colonial structures, pursued pragmatic policies in the liberated areas. The key institution, the communal village, was based on the Chinese model and was designed as a self-contained community with its own social and economic structures.

- Second, from after independence until the beginning of the 1980s, the now-ruling FRELIMO government embraced Marxist-Leninist ideology and pursued policies based on the Soviet model. This period was marked by the concept of a centrally planned economy and a change in emphasis from the communal village to state farms.

- Third, from the early 1980s and through to the present, the government's policies are characterized by a pronounced moderate shift following the failure of Marxist-Leninist policies to revitalize the agricultural and economic sectors.

FRELIMO succeeded in establishing regional domination from Portuguese rule by independence, and had therefore been unable to introduce Marxist ideas and structures to large areas of the country before 1975. Recognizing the immediate need for production and political organization, Machel adopted the most expedient methods. Committees of FRELIMO sympathizers called "dynamizing" groups, which organized people in a given neighborhood or enterprise, had been formed before independence. They continued their work in urban areas as well as in the countryside, considered by FRELIMO to be the link between the organized party and the masses. Party cadres participated to provide the initial incentive to mobilize and organize.

In the countryside, where the Portuguese had not developed a large, modern agricultural sector, expediency prevailed as well. FRELIMO responded to the need for immediate increased food production by reactivating abandoned Portuguese farms as state farms. Despite FRELIMO's commitment to communal villages, no law was issued giving a legal basis to the villages or specifying their political and economic role in the overall system. Unlike the huge state farms, which were located in the most fertile and developed land, the communal villages received little government assistance and were located in poor and geographically isolated areas. The state farm sector, by the end of the 1970s, had become rigidly centralized, while only a minority of the communal villages had a cooperative or were linked to a state farm. At the same time, FRELIMO was unable to provide state farm workers with sufficient consumer goods or with the promised incentives. In addition,

inadequate investment of resources in the farms reduced their overall production capability.

This discrepancy between rhetoric and reality mirrored ideological conflicts caused by the transition of FRELIMO's leaders from liberation fighters, who regarded the communal village as the source of their revolution, to the rulers of a regime committed to Marxism-Leninism. The concept of a centrally planned economy, a crucial element of Marxist-Leninist theory, conflicted with the decentralized and largely autonomous nature of the communal villages. The issue of communal village versus centrally controlled state farm became a point of contention among FRELIMO Central Committee members.

Nationalization of the economy in the first two years after independence was essentially a reaction to the sabotage and abandonment of numerous enterprises by the Portuguese. No coherent plan for the economy was adopted until the Third Party Congress in February 1977, when FRELIMO pronounced itself a Marxist-Leninist party. Even so, by the time of the Congress, most of the country's agricultural and economic structures had been shaped into Marxist-Leninist institutions. In addition, in March 1977, Mozambique signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, which included a provision for Soviet military aid, and party-to-party relations were established between FRELIMO and the CPSU.

New guidelines called for a restructuring of the industrial sector away from the Portuguese-inherited production of luxury items for export and toward production of practical goods. In order to gain state control over production facilities, FRELIMO pursued a steady policy of nationalization of large private industries. By 1978, the government had nationalized the oil refinery, the Moatize coal mine, and a major sugarcane plantation, and in September 1979, the government nationalized all land. By 1980, the state controlled most factories, plants, and agro-businesses. One of the most revolutionary of FRELIMO's initiatives was the creation of people's stores based on the remnants of abandoned Portuguese businesses. The government became heavily reliant on external sources, particularly from the Scandinavian countries, to fund development projects.

New statutes defining FRELIMO as a vanguard party rather than a mass party during the 1977 Congress had assigned to the party the same duties as those undertaken by the dynamizing groups. Consequently, dynamizing groups were phased out in villages where party cells were formed. In the cities, however, they continued to exist, transformed into neighborhood committees.

FRELIMO's ambitious policies, however, were hampered by serious problems. Rains, flooding, and then drought forced the government to import large amounts of wheat to feed the population. The war in neighboring Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), which intensified in the late 1970s and finally ended in 1979, spilled over into Mozambique, as the FRELIMO government allowed Zimbabwean guerrillas to operate from bases inside Mozambique. The resulting counterstrikes by Rhodesian forces destroyed much of Mozambique's infrastructure. Finally, the distribution network of food and other goods collapsed under the poor management of the new and inexperienced state bureaucrats.

By 1980, with the formal end of the war in Rhodesia and the establishment of the Republic of Zimbabwe, FRELIMO was able to turn its attention from external threats to internal economic development. The Machel regime, recognizing the pervasive inefficiency of the centralized bureaucracy, began to modify FRELIMO's Marxist-Leninist policies in favor of more moderate ones. State control over the economy was relaxed as the private sector was revived. In order to raise agricultural production, prices of agricultural products were increased. In addition, FRELIMO began to actively seek a wider range of foreign investments and middle-level expertise from outside of the country, the result of which was the signing of agreements with a number of foreign companies.

The introduction of new policies to reverse economic decline was accompanied by a housecleaning campaign in which special brigades were created to ferret out civil servants guilty of indiscretion or laziness. The people's stores, under inexperienced and corrupt management, underwent a process of denationalization, either handed over to consumer cooperatives or sold to private owners. Most significantly, in an April 1980 government reshuffle, two senior leadership figures were relieved of their government responsibilities to devote all of their time to the party. This revitalization of the party was undertaken in an effort to strengthen the party as a means for controlling the state apparatus.

No sooner had the government introduced its new and optimistic program than it was faced with a rapidly intensifying insurgency. RENAMO, formed in and first supported by Rhodesia and later by South Africa, sought to destabilize the FRELIMO government. RENAMO members included former colonial collaborators, administrators, and soldiers. RENAMO's operations spread throughout the country in the early 1980s, contributing heavily to the general chaos enveloping the agricultural and economic sectors. Today, RENAMO represents a distinct threat to the viability of the Machel regime. The prospects of RENAMO eventually coming to power or reaching an accommodation with the FRELIMO government cannot be discounted.

Another destabilizing factor in the early 1980s was South Africa. Mozambique had been providing refuge for members of the outlawed African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, a situation which South Africa found intolerable. In January 1981, South African commandos attacked ANC headquarters in Maputo, Mozambique's capital. None of the defensive weapons provided by the Soviet Union to Mozambique were adequate in repelling the attack.

By 1982, faced with serious economic problems, the escalating RENAMO insurgency, and the threat of South African aggression, Machel appealed to the Soviet Union for economic aid. But, frustrated by the lack of response and the poor quality of Soviet weapons, he also began to seek military and economic aid from the West. A military protocol which was signed between Mozambique and Portugal in April 1982 was soon followed by agreements with other Western nations. Disagreement over this policy shift, together with FRELIMO's increasing commitment to decentralization, culminated in a Cabinet reshuffle in late 1982. Joao dos Santos Ferreira, a strong advocate of local initiatives and peasant aid, was appointed as the new Minister of Agriculture.

During the Fourth Party Congress in April and May 1984, emphasis was placed on decentralization and a more effective use of human and material resources. Preference was to be given to small-scale agricultural projects. FRELIMO's Central Committee was expanded from 57 to 130, opening membership to provincial recruits from outside the state apparatus. However, the small cadre at the head of the party and state structure remained untouched, the only change being the addition of one new member to the Politburo. A government reshuffle strengthened opposition to large-scale projects in the economic ministries and reinforced discipline in the police force and opposition to RENAMO in the security ministries.

The continuing escalation of the insurgency throughout the remainder of the year, including attacks in all of the Mozambique's provinces, prompted the controversial signing in March 1984 of the Nkomati Accord with South Africa and further appeals to the West for economic and military help. The United States responded in January 1985, announcing the provision to the Machel regime of \$1.1 million in nonlethal military aid, as well as \$40 million in economic aid over 1985.

Soviet ties with FRELIMO have been based on military aid. Until recently, the Soviet Union and East Germany held a monopoly on the training and equipping of Mozambique's Armed Forces, with officers and other ranks undergoing instruction at the Soviet-run Nampula Military Academy in the north of the country. Under the terms of the 1977 treaty, there are several hundred Soviet and Cuban military advisers in the country, although Machel has refused to grant the Soviets permanent military basing and access rights in Mozambique.

Mozambique's efforts to solve some of its economic problems and eliminate the threat of RENAMO have been key factors in motivating the Machel regime to seek greater assistance from the West. Consequently, FRELIMO has been seeking both economic and military solutions from sources other than the Soviet bloc countries.

(3) Angola

The MPLA, founded in 1956, was a conglomeration of a number of Socialist-based organizations which had formed in Luanda in the 1950s. When the MPLA was forced into exile in 1961, its leaders, including Neto and Lara, established headquarters in neighboring Congo-Brazzaville, where they were able to make contacts with Socialist groups in Europe, Africa, and Asia.

In the 1960s, three rival nationalist groups existed. The MPLA was urban-oriented and drew its support from the Mbundu ethnic group, which was heavily represented in Luanda and surrounding areas. The leaders of the MPLA were mestizos and Africans who had received a Portuguese education (assimilados). The second nationalist group, the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), founded in 1962 and led by Holden Roberto, was based in the rural north where it derived its support from the Bakongo. Its entirely black leadership denigrated mestizos and assimilados, as well as the Portuguese. The third group, formed in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi, was the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which had broken off from the FNLA and found support in eastern Angola. By the beginning of the 1970s, UNITA and

MPLA guerrillas were engaging in armed confrontations, as the two groups vied for the allegiance of the Ovimbundo of southcentral Angola.

The MPLA, receiving the bulk of its arms from the Soviet Union by 1966, also received Cuban support, including military instruction in Congo and Cuba. Although the MPLA did not label itself a Marxist-Leninist movement until after independence, its leaders did adopt a Marxist-Leninist program, calling for planned economic development, the establishment of producers' cooperatives, state control over all foreign trade, and agrarian reform. The MPLA leadership also advocated the eventual creation of a vanguard party and began to prepare by training cadres.

The MPLA created a number of Marxist-Leninist institutions in the liberated zones it controlled, mostly in the eastern part of the country. The population was organized into a sophisticated political-military system. Peasants were grouped into small villages of no more than 100 people with an elected action committee, militia, people's plantation, and a people's shop. A labor union was formed to stimulate production, and organizations were formed for women and youth. These structures became the bases of future mass organizations. The action committees, in particular, formed the foundations of the people's power movement (poder popular). The MPLA regarded the action committees as the essence of popular participation in the revolutionary process.

The April 1974 Portuguese coup led to the outbreak of a civil war in Angola as the rival MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA vied for power. The MPLA, though militarily weaker than the other movements, was in a position to win because of its support from a major ethnic group, the Mbundu, and was well established in the capital city of Luanda. The extent of the MPLA's superior organization and tactics was demonstrated initially by the success of MPLA forces during the civil war. Without Soviet or Cuban intervention, they secured the capital, seized the oil fields of the Cabinda enclave, and established a hold over 12 of the 16 provincial capitals, including the ports of Lobito and Benguela in the south. The key to the MPLA's strength was poder popular, the network of action committees and militia groups organized throughout the country immediately following the Portuguese coup.

Although the MPLA joined the FNLA and UNITA in forming the Portuguese-sponsored transitional government in January 1975, it continued to fight for absolute control. While all three organizations received military aid from various international sources, South Africa's support of UNITA and the US support of the FNLA finally convinced Cuba and the Soviet Union to come to the aid of the MPLA. Massive Soviet military supplies and large numbers of Cuban troops ensured the MPLA's March 1976 victory and accession to power. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed between Angola and the Soviet Union in October 1977, ensured continued Soviet military aid, and party-to-party relations were established between the MPLA and the CPSU.

The MPLA was committed to the establishment of a centralized, planned economy. However, the hasty departure of the Portuguese, who had monopolized the economy and controlled the commercial farms and estates, had led to a severe shortage of food. Consequently, the new government was forced to divert its attention from the basic party policy of establishing communal

villages for the eventual transformation of peasant societies into collective production and living units. Instead, financial and material resources were invested in the mechanization of state farms and cooperatives.

Centralized planning was not attractive to all members of the MPLA leadership. Interior Minister Nito Alves, in charge of the organs of poder popular, objected to the centralized and restrictive policies proposed by Neto, favoring the more participatory and decentralized nature of poder popular. The conflict came to a head in May 1977, when Alves tried to overthrow Neto. The effects on the MPLA of Neto's reaction to the coup attempt were significant. The mass organizations, provincial administrations, and Armed Forces underwent a significant purge, as Neto moved to consolidate power. In an even more radical move, Neto converted the MPLA into a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party at the First Party Congress in December 1977, renaming it the MPLA-Labor Party, and halting all organizational work within poder popular. The vanguard party limited its membership to militants thoroughly indoctrinated in Marxism-Leninism at cadre training schools. Neto had taken the first step in decreasing mass participation which had been the hallmark of the liberation struggle.

Neto reinforced his position once again in December 1978 with a major government reorganization. After abolishing the offices of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers, he dismissed or reshuffled a large number of senior party officials. After his death in September 1979, power transferred smoothly to Minister of Planning Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who immediately proclaimed his commitment to Neto's policies.

The dos Santos government remains faced with two serious problems which were draining the economy and interfering with the regime's Marxist-Leninist course at the time of Neto's death. The first is the growing potency of the continued UNITA armed resistance to the MPLA regime. The second is South African attacks on Angolan territory, the roots of which lay in South Africa's campaign against the Namibian South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) rebels who operate from bases in southern Angola. But on a larger scale, South Africa's opposition to the MPLA government and its support for the UNITA insurgency had widened the scope of South African attacks inside Angola, especially after the August 1981 "Operation Protea" in which several thousand South African troops advanced 120 kilometers into Angola, attacking Angolan as well as SWAPO targets. Both situations continue to force the government to divert resources from the restoration of the country's economic and agricultural sectors to the purchase of Soviet arms and the funding of Cuban troops.

The security situation along the Angolan and Namibian borders continued to deteriorate during 1982 and most of 1983, with South African forces occupying large sections of Cunene Province while UNITA expanded its activities. As his regime became increasingly dependent on Soviet and Cuban military support, dos Santos took steps to further consolidate power, concentrating all state powers in the hands of military men who would be directly responsible to him. Regional military councils were created in all areas affected by the fighting.

These problems, combined with declining oil prices, caused an increasing deterioration of Angola's economy. As a result, the MPLA government was forced to adjust its policies and priorities. Perhaps the most significant adjustment was the overture to the West in late 1981, when talks began with the United States on the subjects of the establishment of diplomatic relations and a resolution to the Namibian problem. The Soviet Union responded by granting Angola an unprecedented 10-year, \$2 billion economic assistance package designed to demonstrate Moscow's commitment to Angola and to strengthen pro-Soviet elements within the MPLA.

Despite the Soviet Union's efforts to turn him away from the West, dos Santos refused to be drawn wholeheartedly into the Soviet orbit. Angola, like many of its African neighbors, was anxious to attract badly needed Western economic aid and investments, especially since the Soviet bloc was unable to provide an alternative to Western expertise, technology, and capital. In addition, dos Santos needed Western help in pressuring South Africa to abandon its support for UNITA. Thus, MPLA talks with the United States continued, and in April 1982, Portuguese President Antonio Eanes visited Angola to discuss economic accords with the MPLA. Resistance within the party to Western links continued, although in December 1982 dos Santos dismissed several pro-Soviet officials.

The Soviet Union responded once again in an effort to counter Western influence in Angola when, in fall 1983, shipments of sophisticated Soviet weapons were increased. Cuba, following the Soviet lead, augmented its already significant troop presence in Angola. The Soviets also warned South Africa to end its destabilization policy in southern Africa.

Negotiations for the removal of South African forces from southern Angola culminated in February 1984 with the signing by Angola and South Africa of the Lusaka Accord. Significantly, the MPLA government decided to deal with South Africa without consulting either the Soviet Union or Cuba. Furthermore, the negotiations were facilitated by the intervention of American diplomats.

In October 1984, another step was taken by dos Santos to eliminate any threat to his power when he dismissed Minister of External Affairs Paulo Jorge, a pro-Soviet ideologue who had opposed the Lusaka Accord and diplomacy with the West, and who had established almost complete control over Angolan foreign policy decisions. The external affairs portfolio was taken over by dos Santos himself.

The revival of the economy since independence has remained stymied by the UNITA insurgency and the cumbersome centralized bureaucracy, which has discouraged farmers and transformed Angola from a food exporter into a major food importer. In early 1984, dos Santos created a nine-member Defense and Security Council to supercede the inefficient government apparatus. The Council assumed responsibility for major policy decisions, and its members were dos Santos loyalists drawn from the 12-member MPLA Politburo. The Council's Planning Minister, Lopo do Nascimento, an ally of dos Santos, has proposed new pragmatic policies aimed at decentralization, particularly in the agricultural sector. Plans are under consideration to give more decision-making power and resources to the provincial governments. Other plans include the restriction of centralized power to key sectors of the economy and large-

scale agricultural projects, such as cotton and sugarcane plantations, which require a high level of technology, and the planning of cooperatives in the previously neglected countryside.

The development of a viable Marxist-Leninist government in Angola has been undermined seriously by an economically and politically debilitating insurgency and the destabilization policies of South Africa. The Lusaka Accord and the resulting April 1985 withdrawal of South Africa's troops from southern Angola have provided the Angolan Government with a new diplomatic opportunity to deal with the South Africans and a host of significant problems affecting the country's future. The Accord has raised hopes that talks with UNITA, a strong and well-supported movement which has escalated into a serious threat to the MPLA regime, will lead to discussions and national reconciliation.

The Soviet bloc countries remain heavily involved in Angola because of the military needs created by the UNITA insurgency. The Soviet and East European presence in Angola, including approximately 2,000 military technicians, is dwarfed by the Cuban presence. An estimated 25,000 Cuban troops and 6,000 civilians are being deployed in defense positions and in the organization and training of Angola's army battalions.

Economically, however, Angola is largely dependent on the West. As a result of oil exports, which account for about 90 percent of Angola's foreign exchange, Western nations have become Angola's largest trading partners. Also, Portuguese cultural influence is still prevalent, a legacy of the colonial period. Politically, the Marxist-Leninist government is buttressed by the MPLA, which is a strong and influential party with an approximate membership of 30,000 and the support of the 120,000 members of the powerful national trade union syndicate.

c. Ethiopia

The radicalization of Ethiopia's Government took place in several phases. Marxist-Leninist ideas, first propagated by civilian parties which had no official role, were adopted by the Socialist-oriented military regime in 1976 and incorporated into Ethiopia's official ideology when the Soviet Union became Ethiopia's ally and arms provider in mid-1977. The Commission on Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) was established in 1979, and it led, in September 1984, to the formation of the Marxist-Leninist ruling party, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE).

Ethiopia stands out as a unique case among the Afrocommunist countries. The Marxist-Leninist path chosen by Ethiopia's military regime was not the result of a war of national liberation, nor was it a fiat of the leadership. It was, instead, the outgrowth of an internal social upheaval in a country which had never been colonized and which experienced a real revolution. Furthermore, before Ethiopia's military leadership created a ruling Marxist-Leninist party in September 1984, it was the only Afrocommunist state without a political party.

Conditions which led up to a revolution paralleled those which existed in pre-revolutionary Russia, including widespread class conflict. Ethiopia,

under Emperor Haile Selassie, had been a feudal society racked by conflicts between peasants and landlords. With the addition in the early 1970s of a devastating famine, growing political discontent within organized labor and the military, and the economic drain of a prolonged separatist conflict in Eritrea Province, the royalist regime could not survive. A military takeover by junior officers and enlisted men in September 1974 brought into power the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), which set out to reshape the entire society and reweave social relations.

The new government was headed by an organization of 8 to 10 men led by Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, who immediately announced Ethiopia's commitment to major political and social change. The Ethiopia Tikdem Policy (Ethiopia First) proclaimed in December 1974 that Ethiopia would become a Socialist state with a one-party system, direct government control of most of the economy, and collectivization of agriculture.

By mid-March 1974, PMAC had shrunk from 126 to 47 members with the elimination of moderate and conservative elements who were dissatisfied with the Socialist policies. The first concrete step taken toward socialism was the nationalization in January 1975 of financial institutions, the insurance business, and major industries. But the keystone of the revolution was land reform, including the establishment of peasant associations and peasant collectives. In the urban areas, a proclamation was issued in July 1975 to nationalize urban land and abolish landlordism. Urban dwellers' associations (kebeles), which eventually took over urban administration, were organized in all towns and cities .

In April 1976, Mengistu proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist and announced the formation of the National Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP). The new program emphasized the development of state farms and a commitment to encourage collectivized farming. The program was designed also to neutralize various groups competing to fill the political vacuum by creating an orientation toward centralization in government. PMAC proclaimed in December 1976 that it was reorganizing along Marxist-Leninist lines. Five weeks later, following a power struggle, Mengistu emerged as PMAC Chairman and the country's undisputed leader.

In order to amass popular support for its Marxist-Leninist policies, PMAC allowed a number of civilian leftist groups to exist although they had no political power. But the resistance of one group, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), to military rule led to the period of "Red Terror" from November 1977 to March 1978, during which thousands of people were killed in the capital. In the end, the EPRP was essentially eliminated and government tolerance of civilian leftist groups came to an end. Another NDRP goal, the achievement of national political integration, collapsed as armed resistance to the new regime developed in many of the country's provinces and the activities of separatist movements in Eritrea, Tigray, and Oromo Provinces intensified. Control over these politically destabilizing events required much of the new government's attention, a factor which prevented it from gaining full control in the economic sectors.

In the countryside, the government's primary focus was on aiding the peasant associations. There also existed a state farm sector which came into

existence in the immediate aftermath of land reform when PMAC decided not to break up the largest nationalized private commercial estates and foreign-owned plantations which produced export crops. The Peasant Association Decree of December 1975 had abolished private ownership of rural land, but the tenancies it bestowed on some peasants gave them effective control over their own plots. These peasants, no longer forced to pay exorbitant rents, produced less and consumed more of their production. This practice, combined with disruptions to the country's transportation system by insurgent groups, led to severe food shortages in the cities. The reform also resulted in conflict within the peasant associations themselves over redistribution policies and the growth of new class relations among the peasantry. The peasants continued to cultivate the same plots as before the reform so that some peasants, who had worked for the wealthier landlords prior to the reforms, received more land and had access to more modern agricultural implements.

In order to increase agricultural production and accelerate collectivization, the government introduced the Economic Development Campaign in June 1979. The program placed new upper limits on areas of tenancy and laid the basis for the transition from peasant associations, which encompassed 99 percent of all cultivated land, to producers' cooperatives. The intent of the new campaign was to end individual cultivation of the land on a voluntary basis and bring the collectives under government control. To encourage the peasants to join the producers' cooperatives voluntarily, the program stipulated that the members of the producers' cooperatives could hold all executive positions in the peasant associations. Thus, those peasants who elected to cultivate individually were at a disadvantage. The campaign was resisted by the many peasants who were content with the tenancy system. The campaign has been unsuccessful as, in general, land reform has been more successful in meeting PMAC's goals of destroying the power of the landed class and redistributing income in favor of the peasantry than in increasing production.

Because there was no substantial private Ethiopian property to expropriate, urban reform was far less radical than land reform. The owners of those insurance companies and industrial plants that were nationalized received compensation. The retail trade, where much of the Ethiopian capitalist class did exist, was largely untouched. PMAC tried to win popular support in the cities by handing substantive power to the kebeles. These organizations, responsible for housing redistribution and welfare programs, were armed by the government during the so-called Red Terror to fight EPRP supporters and were given the right to administer local jails. But the growing military power of the kebeles became unacceptable to the government, which progressively stripped them of their security functions. By the end of the 1970s, the responsibilities of the kebeles were restricted to urban administration, and by the end of 1984, the membership of the kebeles, which had become increasingly independent of total government control, had expanded to include almost every city inhabitant.

Armed hostilities, culminating in a war between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden, a region of Ethiopia claimed by Somalia, were a major factor in PMAC's determination of priorities. Following the 1974 coup, the United States had continued military and economic aid programs to Ethiopia upon which the Ethiopian Armed Forces were totally dependent. The Ogaden war, combined

with the Eritrean insurgency, necessitated PMAC's continued dependence on foreign military aid. After the United States balked at providing additional military aid in mid-1976 because of Ethiopia's violations of human rights, Mengistu terminated all military links with the United States and signed two military support agreements with the Soviet Union in December 1976 and May 1977. Hoping to take advantage of Ethiopia's internal chaos, Somalia invaded the Ogaden in 1977, but with Soviet military aid and Cuban troops, Ethiopia was able to drive the Somalis out of its territory in 1978. In November 1978, a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded in Moscow. The price for Soviet military assistance was Soviet political influence, the result of which was the first step toward the creation of the ruling Marxist-Leninist party.

COPWE, proclaimed in December 1979, was a broadly based commission for the design and preparation of a vanguard party. It consisted of a 7-member Executive Committee and a 93-member Central Committee. It was clear from the beginning, however, that the potent military leadership had no intention of relinquishing either its independence or its power. Thus, the approximately 1,500 delegates of the COPWE Congress were chosen carefully by Mengistu, who also ensured that military personalities occupied the most authoritative positions of COPWE's hierarchy. For example, 7 members of COPWE's Executive Committee were PMAC members, and 79 of the 123 standing and alternate members of the Central Committee were military people. In addition, almost half of COPWE's general membership came from the Armed Forces. Finally, although mass organizations like labor unions and peasant associations were well represented in COPWE's Congresses, they occupied no positions of leadership. Movement toward a party seemed to be more a function of Mengistu's commitment to nationalism and the supremacy of his military dictatorship than to Marxist-Leninist ideology.

In the early 1980s, PMAC faced the failure of numerous offensives to gain control of guerrilla-held territory in Eritrea. As the regime became increasingly dependent on Soviet military support, activity toward the formation of the party accelerated, with the formal inauguration of the vanguard party occurring in September 1984 and the consequent establishment of party-to-party relations between the WPE and the CPSU. The WPE had a membership of about 30,000, with most of its 13,000 to 14,000 full-time officials having received intensive ideological and organizational training by Soviet bloc instructors. But its 11-member Politburo and 134-member Central Committee were dominated by a strong military element. By the end of 1984, 1.3 million people were serving in various executive bodies of party mass organizations. During the April 1985 party plenary, a resolution called for the intensification of efforts for the founding of a People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

The Mengistu regime still has not succeeded in controlling the peasants, who make up more than 90 percent of the total population and account for more than 90 percent of the country's export earnings. By the end of 1983, the cooperative sector, despite a total membership of 60,000 in 1,275 producers' cooperatives, was only producing 1 percent of the harvest. By January 1985, producers' cooperatives and state farms made up only 6.4 percent of the cultivated land. The problems in the agricultural sector are exacerbated by a severe drought and famine.

One government solution to the drought was a resettlement program under which farmers from the northern highlands were moved to more fertile lands in other parts of the country to the south. However, the primary goal of the program was the removal from Eritrea and Tigray Provinces of many supporters of the insurgencies in those two provinces. In order to achieve this goal and present the resettlement program as attractively as possible, the government, while encouraging the organization of producers' cooperatives in the new settlements, did not insist on the initial organization of collective farms. For the time being, however, the program has been suspended, primarily because of objections within the ruling echelon to its expense. The government is also transferring more resources from collective farms to individual farmers in all the country's provinces. This new program includes a marketing and pricing policy which will give the farmers greater returns.

The forming of the WPE constitution is prompting a growing amount of debate. A number of Politburo members would like to open up the constitution to discussion among the intelligentsia, especially at the university, but Mengistu, who is becoming increasingly intolerant of advice from any source, does not agree. Mengistu's tendency toward a smaller group of confidants and refusal to tolerate opinions other than his own has resulted in the growing instability of the regime, especially with the continuing famine. Dissatisfaction within the Army and Air Force officer corps is reflected in the pace of early retirements, postings, and promotions.

The Soviet position in Ethiopia is far more secure than in any other Afrocommunist country because of the extent of PMAC's dependency on Soviet military aid. But, like the other Afrocommunist countries, Ethiopia has sought Western economic aid as the result of the Soviet Union's inability and unwillingness to participate in major economic development projects. In the past year, the West, the United States in particular, has provided the bulk of much needed food aid for the famine victims.

4. PROSPECTS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF AFROCOMMUNIST REGIMES IN SOUTH AFRICA, ZIMBABWE, AND NAMIBIA

a. South Africa

In South Africa, the SACP and ANC have developed increasingly close relations as the result of their mutual reliance on Soviet support and joint goal of a Socialist society. The SACP considers the ANC its mass organization, a link to the urban working classes from whom the party believes its main strength is derived. The alliance between the SACP and ANC has given rise to the perception on the part of both organizations and outside observers that ANC guerrilla warfare against the apartheid regime is being waged on the party's behalf, as well as on that of the black population. The Soviet Union shares in this perception, contributing to the training of an estimated 3,000 ANC guerrillas in camps outside of South Africa.

But ANC guerrillas face numerous and, at least for the foreseeable future, insurmountable difficulties. In terms of South Africa's military and industrial strength, scattered assaults against police stations and industrial targets by the small and weak guerrilla force have made virtually no impact on

South Africa's economic production. But even more damaging is the inability of the ANC to establish training and staging bases in neighboring black African countries. One of the most significant results of South African military raids into those countries which did provide shelter to the guerrillas is the Nkomati Accord, signed between Mozambique and South Africa, which contains a stipulation banning ANC members from Mozambique. Another outcome of military raids was suppression of ANC activities, notably the transit of arms, by Botswana and Zimbabwe.

The SACP also has the support of the largest legal black group, the United Democratic Front (UDF), which, although it shares many of the goals of the ANC, lacks a coherent policy and steady leadership. The SACP, however, lacks the support of other black nationalist groups. Some blacks in the ANC, who objected to the latter's commitment to multi-racialism and ties to the SACP, formed a breakaway group in 1959, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). But several leadership changes in the past few years have weakened the organization as the ANC grows in stature. The SACP also lacks the support of the two most powerful trade unions, the Federation of South African Trade Unions and the National Union of Mineworkers, which, like the PAC, object to the SACP's emphasis on class rather than race. Likewise, these unions remain wary of the ANC. Two other black nationalist groups which do not support the ANC or SACP are the predominantly Zulu Inkatha movement, led by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, and the militant Azanian People's Organization. Nonetheless, the SACP has acquired the affiliation of a number of important black trade unions.

The SACP, by way of ANC operations, could only present a serious threat to the South African status quo if a large number of blacks and the white working class join its struggle. Although the prospects for a strong and politically influential SACP are negligible in the short term, a definite trend toward the radicalization of an increasing number of blacks is now taking place, especially in the wake of recent refusals on the part of the government to make significant concessions to the blacks. In the future, unrest, already increasing among the majority black population, will probably spread to other population groups, who perceive socialism as the solution to South Africa's apartheid policy. Consequently, the SACP will gain more support among the working classes and become a more formidable political force with which the government will have to deal. Nevertheless, the present weakness and paucity of support for the SACP preclude the establishment of an Afrocommunist regime in South Africa in the foreseeable future.

b. Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), under the leadership of Robert Mugabe, came to power in 1980 at the end of a long liberation struggle. The Mugabe government has consistently veered toward a Marxist-Leninist orientation, although it has yet to declare Zimbabwe a Marxist-Leninist state. During ZANU's Second Congress in August 1984, the first since 1964, a resolution called for the installation and maintenance in Zimbabwe of a Socialist state, founded on Marxist-Leninist principles. To achieve this, the Congress, led by Robert Mugabe, decided to transform Zimbabwe into a one-party state. The establishment of a Presidential Commission led to the election of a 15-member Politburo, to which Mugabe nominated 14 of his supporters, and a

90-member Central Committee. In the process, Mugabe has established his control of the party and should dominate the future of its development.

When he came to power, Mugabe understood the importance of encouraging as many whites as possible to stay in the country following independence to ease the transition from minority to majority rule. Having witnessed the disastrous effects of the Portuguese mass exodus from Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique, he realized that the whites were vital to Zimbabwe's economy in the absence of black skilled labor. The whites were needed to preserve and rebuild agriculture, maintain administrative continuity, and manage the factories. Further, their continued presence and well-being were seen as essential to attracting foreign investment and aid. Even as black Zimbabweans become more adept at managing their own affairs and the number of whites in the civil service falls from an overwhelming majority to a tiny minority, Zimbabwe's financial stake in the presence of whites will remain strong. As a result, Mugabe will probably continue to hold back on the implementation of more radical policies.

Thus, Mugabe has succeeded in avoiding any precise pledge to nationalize industry and land on a vast scale. While there has been a dramatic growth in the number of producer cooperatives in the industrial and agricultural sectors, these collective organizations operate under their own representative body rather than under the control of ZANU. The only step taken toward a Marxist-Leninist institution in the country was the announcement in February 1985 of a plan for the establishment of state farms in every province. The government, optimistic about the country's agricultural prospects following a significant surplus of food crops during the first half of 1985, will probably continue to encourage peasants to join farming cooperatives. But the chances of maintaining such high production levels are threatened by heavy soil erosion and drought. This fragile situation portends a continuation of Zimbabwe's dependency on South Africa, through which 70 percent of Zimbabwe's imports and exports must be transported.

Mugabe appears to be politically secure following ZANU's landslide victory in the July 1985 Parliamentary election. ZANU won 63 seats, sweeping every region except one and ensuring Mugabe a second 5-year term as Prime Minister. However, the election results demonstrate the continuing challenge to Mugabe's declarations of future ZANU one-party rule from two sources--former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's white Republican Front party, which took 15 of the 20 Parliamentary seats reserved for whites, and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), which has the support of the minority Ndebele tribe located in Matabeleland, and which won 15 out of 80 seats reserved for blacks. Mugabe's continued leadership and pursuit of pragmatic policies, while probably leading to the formation of a one-party state, appear to preclude the establishment of an Afrocommunist regime in Zimbabwe in the near future.

c. Namibia

Two important aspects concerning the political situation in Namibia include first, the armed liberation struggle against South African rule by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of the South

West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and second, the political mass mobilization of the Namibian population by SWAPO.

Founded in 1960 and supported by Namibia's largest ethnic group, the Ovambo, SWAPO's original aim was to win independence from South Africa by peaceful means, but in 1966, when the International Court of Justice declined to consider South Africa's mandate, SWAPO launched the armed struggle with military support from the Soviet Union. The stated goal of SWAPO under the leadership of Sam Nujoma remains independence from South Africa and an end to the exploitation of man by man. Unlike the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, SWAPO's victories have been infrequent and limited in the face of South African military power, resulting in the continued exile of its leadership and the inability of PLAN guerrillas to maintain bases within the country. Instead, they are forced to attack from bases in southern Angola.

The political program adopted by SWAPO's Central Committee in 1976 contains a number of specifically Marxist-Leninist prescriptions, including a commitment to restructuring the economy after independence to ensure the ownership by the people of the major means of production and exchange. Statements by Nujoma and other prominent SWAPO leaders indicate that an independent SWAPO government would be similar to Robert Mugabe's ZANU government in Zimbabwe.

In April 1985, South Africa formed an interim government for Namibia which included a number of parties dominated by the non-Socialist and South African-dominated Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. South Africa clearly hopes that the establishment of this new government and the possibility of elections in a year will prevent SWAPO from coming to power. But the powers of the interim government are extremely limited since the South African Government continues to retain control of foreign policy and defense. The interim government, which has been rejected by SWAPO and condemned by the United States, flatly contradicts United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, which calls for a cease-fire in Namibia and internationally monitored elections.

Although SWAPO is recognized by all the other southern African countries and the United Nations as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, its prospects for assuming control of an independent Namibia in the near future without significant South African influence are remote.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

Marxism-Leninism is having a far greater impact in Africa than African socialism. But the Afrocommunist regimes, like the African Socialist regimes, are faced with a proliferation of economic problems brought on by a general world recession and the failure of their own policies. The inability of Marxist-Leninist institutions to resolve these failures has led to ideological contradictions, as Afrocommunist leaders have been compelled to reshape their policies. On the one hand, a retreat from centralized planning has been accompanied by appeals for Western investments. And yet, when forced to choose between their dependence on the Soviet bloc for political survival and their dependence on the West for economic development, the Afrocommunist regimes tend to opt for the former. These regimes have been able to make this

kind of choice largely because experience has demonstrated to them that Western aid would be forthcoming in any case.

Several parallel trends can be identified in each of the Afrocommunist countries. Their regimes have developed political structures that, while not yet completely secure, are being steadily consolidated, but largely at the expense of economic growth and development. An essential component in that consolidation is the continuous and intensive political and military support they receive from the Soviet bloc countries. The escalation of Marxist-Leninist policies in these countries has moved the ruling elites further left, reinforcing the adversary relationship between increased party control and economic development. The resulting dissension and erosion of political support has, in turn, led to frequent and sometimes drastic purges within both government and party structures.

Each of the Afrocommunist countries has experienced the consolidation of a one-party regime, achieved by way of coercive policies and purges, and the development of a highly personalized leadership. Party cadres have developed vested interests in the continuation of party rule as the result of the proliferation of Marxist-Leninist institutions. With the full backing of the Soviet bloc countries, the Afrocommunist states have placed a priority on the creation of structures capable of perpetuating the Marxist-Leninist system. However, many of the institutions are fragile and ill-equipped to deal with the difficult economic problems confronting each of the Afrocommunist regimes. Consequently, all the Afrocommunist leaders have been compelled by the deterioration of economic and agricultural conditions to retreat somewhat from stringent Marxist-Leninist policies, at least for the time being, as they search for more pragmatic solutions.

Insurgencies in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia have caused the regimes in these countries to be more vulnerable than the regimes of the other Afrocommunist countries and more heavily dependent on Soviet bloc military aid. In Angola, where the MPLA government is increasingly threatened by the well-organized UNITA insurgency, extensive Cuban and Soviet military support does not appear to be checking UNITA expansion. It is unlikely that the MPLA government could survive the attacks of UNITA, which is well supplied with sophisticated military equipment by South Africa, without Cuban troops, and thus it is unlikely that the MPLA government will agree to a Cuban troop withdrawal. The refusal of the MPLA government to consider a coalition government with UNITA will probably not change in the near future as long as the Soviet Union and Cuba continue to support dos Santos.

In Mozambique, RENAMO attacks have shown evidence of a certain amount of sophistication and advance planning, including the blowing up of electric power pylons and bridges. The procurement by the FRELIMO government of Western military aid is fairly insignificant, a situation which will probably not change as long as Machel remains committed to Marxist-Leninist ideology. But Machel's September 1985 visit to the United States and talks with President Reagan have resulted in a distinct foreign policy shift. During these talks, Machel emphasized his desire for US private investments within his country's new, liberal foreign investment code, and the reduction of Mozambique's military dependence on the Soviet Union. As long as RENAMO remains a serious threat to the economic and political security of Mozambique,

there will probably be a progressive trend toward capitalist economic policies and away from Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, but there will probably not be significant movement away from the basic political commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology.

In Ethiopia, the authority of the Mengistu regime is declining. The ineffectiveness of government troop deployment against Eritrean and Tigrayan guerrillas over the past 2 years has caused dissatisfaction within the Army. Even more ominous is the WPE's loss of support from all but the most dedicated ideologues in its ruling echelon because of worsening economic problems and the growing tendency of WPE leaders to implement irrelevant rules, such as the expensive Mao-style uniform required of government employees. Although the pervasive security system and difficulty of internal communications will probably preclude a decisive move against the regime in the near future, the combination of economic collapse and apparent irreversible political unpopularity presages a crisis for the regime. Mengistu will undoubtedly take whatever steps are necessary to strengthen his support, first by purging the top Army command and the Ministry of Defense, and then by a more radical restructuring of the political apparatus in order to consolidate power and the security of his regime. Mengistu has already demonstrated his tenacity throughout numerous difficult periods. As long as he remains in power, Afrocommunism will probably become more entrenched in Ethiopia, where the institutions and cadres of the ruling WPE are dispersed all over the country, than in any other country.

The existence of Afrocommunism on the African continent does not necessarily mean the creation of a string of Soviet satellites. While orthodoxy is the hallmark of the Afrocommunist regimes, they are nevertheless trying to integrate the principles of Marxism-Leninism with their own unique historical experience, interpreting Marxist-Leninist ideology as a way of radically reordering their societies through a set of specific institutions. In foreign policy, the choice of Marxism-Leninism is a decision to try to change the established world order rather than to simply find a niche for their countries on its periphery. The regimes are committed to furthering the cause of socialism, but as independent and equal partners with other Socialist countries around the world. Like the Western European Communist parties, African Marxist-Leninist parties argue that communism does not imply enslavement to the Soviet Union, but is an ideology that can be adapted to local circumstances and implemented free of subservience to a foreign power. Thus, Marxism-Leninism in Africa appears to be developing according to the dictates of internal developments rather than to those of external powers.

The self-defined African Marxist-Leninist regimes are not Socialist utopias nor are they likely to become so. Under the tight control of small, elite regimes and vanguard parties, the populations of the Afrocommunist countries do not participate directly in the decision-making process, nor do the workers control the revolution. In this respect, these regimes do not differ from any other Marxist-Leninist regimes in the world. It is also improbable that any other Marxist-Leninist regimes will emerge in the near future or, if one should, that it would be radically different from any existing Afrocommunist regime.

6. IMPLICATIONS OF AFROCOMMUNISM FOR THE WEST

In recent years, better relations between Afrocommunist and Western countries have been pursued mostly by the United States, France, and Portugal. They have agreed to provide military supplies to one or more of the Afrocommunist regimes and, even more significantly, desperately needed economic assistance and investments, which the Soviet Union cannot afford. These Western countries hope to diminish the need of the Afrocommunist regimes for Soviet military aid and in the long run, diminish Soviet influence in general and prevent the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

A major threat, presented by hostility toward the West of existing Afrocommunist regimes and future pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regimes, would be the establishment of sizeable Soviet military facilities or unlimited Soviet access to ports and airports anywhere on the continent. At present, all the Afrocommunist countries, as well as Socialist ones, continue to deny the Soviets military facilities on a permanent basis with the exception of Ethiopia, which has allowed them to use the Dahlak Islands off its coast. And although the Soviets are given occasional permission to use ports and airports in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Madagascar in particular, access is subject to the whims of those countries' leaderships. So far, the Soviets have not used either the procurement of military facilities or free access to port and airport facilities as a condition for the supply of military aid in any of the Afrocommunist countries. In light of the dependence of Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia on Soviet military equipment, it is feasible that one or more of these countries could relent in the future.

A second threat concerns the Western world's reliance on external sources for strategic minerals. Western nations are almost entirely dependent on strategic minerals from central and southern Africa, particularly Zaire, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, such as chromium, platinum, nickel, cobalt, and titanium, which are essential for the production of alloys used in the manufacture of high technology weapons systems. The Soviet Union could use its influence over an Afrocommunist regime in Zimbabwe or South Africa to bring about a total interdiction in the flow of strategic minerals to the West as a means of exercising political and economic pressure upon the West. Or these regimes could sharply increase the price for the West of these resources, a move which would have adverse effects, although far less catastrophic ones than those which followed the increase in oil prices by the oil-producing states.

But history does not support such a scenario in central and southern Africa. The existing Afrocommunist regimes, with the exception of Ethiopia, have made it clear that they will not tolerate undue Soviet political pressure nor will they behave as Soviet satellites. The Soviets themselves do not regard sub-Saharan Africa as a primary strategic priority and have subsequently placed a low priority on the provision of economic aid to Africa. It is therefore unlikely that the Soviets would create a situation in which they would have to assume economic responsibilities for any Afrocommunist regime. In addition, Zimbabwe's Mugabe has resisted Soviet attempts to establish close relations, a remnant of his resentment of Soviet support to Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU during the liberation war. The Soviet Union has even

urged Afrocommunist regimes to solicit investments from the West, as in the case of Angola, so that the West, and the United States in particular, are in a position to exert increasing pressure on the Afrocommunist regimes to abandon their ties with the Soviet Union in return for economic assistance. If Western countries were to use this leverage, those countries most likely to comply are Benin, Guinea-Bissau, and Madagascar, where party-to-party relations with the CPSU do not exist. Angola and Mozambique, under considerable pressure, would probably capitulate, but Ethiopia, whose ties with the Soviet Union have been reinforced by the creation of the ruling WPE, would probably choose to scorn the West.

In the investment sphere, Afrocommunism has impeded Western initiatives. In these countries, where so many structures of the economy have been nationalized, new projects require long lead times, large expenditures for the creation of new infrastructures, and flexibility to deal with political uncertainties and volatile prices, especially for agricultural commodities and metals. However, these considerations become significantly less crucial in the area of oil prospecting. Because the proceeds from oil sales provide ample benefits for both the state and the oil companies, and because the extent of the cash flow insures sufficient funds for reimbursement in the event of nationalizations, the risk to Western oil companies in the Afrocommunist countries, as well as in those countries which might acquire Afrocommunist regimes in the future, is acceptable. Thus, prospects for continued Western oil projects in Afrocommunist countries, such as Angola and Congo, as well as new Western oil investment opportunities in Africa, are favorable.

Despite the relatively impersonal process of radicalization and lack of highly personalized regimes in most Afrocommunist countries, with the notable exception of Ethiopia, there exists the constant possibility of a dramatic foreign policy realignment vis-a-vis East-West ties, particularly in view of the failure of Marxist-Leninist policies to solve serious agricultural and economic problems. This failure has caused the Afrocommunist regimes a loss of prestige within their own populations as well as in Western eyes. In the case of Mozambique, for example, Machel has demonstrated his willingness to talk with Western leaders in recent years, and his September 1985 trip to the United States is an indication of his desire to resist Soviet influence. In the Afrocommunist countries where no party-to-party relations with the CPSU exist--Congo, Madagascar, Benin, and Guinea-Bissau--future dramatic policy reversals are more possible in light of their immediate economic needs.

COMPARATIVE TIME CHART OF AFROCOMMUNIST
AND AFRICAN SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENTS

Note: Events spanning a period of more than one year are indicated by arrows.

[Principle Source: Africa South of the Sahara: 1984-85. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1984.]

1956

ANGOLA The Popular Liberation Front of Angola (NPLA) is founded.

BENIN

CONGO

ETHIOPIA

GHANA

Independence is gained from Britain. Kwame Nkrumah comes to power and introduces his ideas of pan-Africanism and African Socialism, forming the ideology of Nkrumahism.

GUINEA

Independence is gained from France. Sekou Toure comes to power at the head of the only political party, the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG), and opts for the same African Socialist ideology as Ghana's Nkrumah. The new government begins to nationalize industry and looks to the Soviet Union for economic aid following the suspension by France of all aid and technical assistance.

GUINEA-BISSAU The African Independence Party of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) is established by Amilcar Cabral.

1958

1957

1958

1957

1956

MADAGASCAR

MALI

MOZAMBIQUE

SENEGAL

TANZANIA

ZAMBIA

1959

1960

1961

ANGOLA

The MPLA's armed struggle begins when its leaders, Agostinho Neto and Lucio Lara, are forced into exile in Congo-Brazzaville.

BENIN

Independence is gained from France.
Hubert Maga comes to power.

CONGO

Independence is gained from France.
Recruits from the young, educated, urban population form a strong left-wing opposition to the pro-French regime of Fulbert Youlou.

ETHIOPIA

GHANA

GUINEA

A rift in relations with the Soviet Union occurs because of the lack of Soviet economic assistance.

GUINEA-BISSAU

MADAGASCAR

Independence is gained from France.
Philibert Tsiranana, leading the Democratic Social Party (PSD), is elected President. French control over the new state remains extensive.

1959

1960

1961

MALI

Independence is gained from France. Modibo Keita proclaims the country a single-party state which will pursue Socialist policies based on extensive nationalization of the economy. He also establishes relations with the Soviet Union.

MOZAMBIQUE

SENEGAL

Independence is gained from France. Leopold Senghor, the leader of the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS), takes power and bans the activities of the Marxist African Independence Party (PAI). Senghor adopts Socialist policies, labeling his ideology Negritude. The first major reform is the reorganization of the colonial field administration and the replacement in all echelons of the territorial administration of French by Senegalese officials. Under the Rural Animation program, the process of regrouping villages into self-governing rural communes is initiated.

A commercial bank, in which the state holds the majority of shares, is created and assumes control over the peanut trade. Senghor resists pressures to nationalize other sectors of the country's economy, continuing to work closely with the French community.

TANZANIA

Independence is gained from Britain. Julius Nyerere, heading the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), comes to power.

ZAMBIA

1962

ANGOLA

The National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) is founded by Holden Roberto. Neto is elected president of the MPLA.

1963

An MPLA party school begins operating in Kinshasa, Zaire, under the direction of Lara.

1964

Cuban leader Che Guevara meets Neto in Brazzaville and agrees to provide Cuban instructors to train MPLA recruits.

BENIN

Following worker and student riots, Maga is overthrown in a military coup d'etat and is replaced by interim Head of State Christophe Soglo.

Sourou-Migan Apithy is elected as President.

CONGO

A general strike and mass demonstrations caused by deteriorating economic conditions result in Youlou's resignation. Alphonse Massemba-Debat comes to power, declaring his regime Socialist and establishing diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Bloc countries.

The National Movement of the Revolution (MNR) is formed as the sole party, which Massemba-Debat declares Marxist-Leninist.

ETHIOPIA

GHANA

The one-party state is legalized and Ghana officially becomes a Socialist state.

GUINEA

The PDC adopts an economic program to put an end to trafficking and smuggling. State organizations are given control of external trade.

GUINEA-BISSAU

MADAGASCAR

MALI

Keita withdraws from the Franc Zone.

MOZAMBIQUE

The Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) is founded by Eduardo Mondlane.

SENEGAL

Relations with France improve and Senghor encourages continued French private investments and continued use by France of military facilities near the capital, Dakar.

An internal crisis, caused by a power struggle between Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, results in Dia's arrest and imprisonment.

TANZANIA

Nyerere introduces his concept of collective settlements, called Ujamaa, and his interpretation of Socialist ideology. He then resigns from the government to pursue party reform and places Rashidi Kawawa in charge of the government. Kawawa appoints TANU militants to senior government positions, assigns local party leaders whose duties include political mobilization, and Africanizes the civil service.

In a national election, Nyerere wins the Presidency and appoints Kawawa as Vice President.

1962

1963

1964

According to the terms of a revised constitution, the position of the President is strengthened with the elimination of the office of Prime Minister.

In the first step toward transforming the country into a one-party state, the government outlaws the Senegalese National Front, a coalition of several parties.

The National Domain Law gives the state proprietary rights over rural land.

The Rural Settlement Commission is established to plan new, economically self-sufficient settlements. The Commission appoints a Village Settlement Agency.

The Zanzibari revolution leads to the mainland's union with Zanzibar.

An army mutiny, suppressed by British troops, stimulates members of the political elite to demand the legalization of the one-party state.

ZAMBIA

1962

1963

1964

Zambia gains independence from Britain. Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), takes power. His ideology of Humanism incorporates the Ujamaa socialism expounded by Tanzanian President Nyerere.

Several parastatal development companies are established to encourage and control foreign investment, although multinational companies remain dominant and private ownership is accepted in the small-scale manufacturing and trading sector.

1965

1966

1967

ANGOLA

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is founded by Jonas Savimbi.

The MPLA receives most arms from the Soviet Union and begins to send guerrillas to Cuba for military training.

BENIN

Soglo forces Apithy to resign following a series of political crises and assumes power.

Industrial unrest results in a coup d'etat by young officers. Soglo is replaced by Alphonse Alley.

CONGO

ETHIOPIA

GHANA

Nkrumah is ousted by the army and police, who oppose his drift toward the Soviet Union. He is replaced by the National Liberation Council (NLC), under the Chairmanship of Joseph Ankrah.

GUINEA

A government opposition group, the Front for the National Liberation of Guinea (FLNG), begins to organize under the leadership of Guinean exiles in Ivory Coast, Senegal, and France.

GUINEA-BISSAU

1965

1966

1967

MADAGASCAR

MALI

Internal disputes push Keita into dissolving the Sudanese Union Party's Politburo.

MOZAMBIQUE

SENEGAL

Legal opposition to the Senghor regime disappears when the leaders of the last existing opposition party receive positions in the UPS Politburo.

TANZANIA

Nyerere discontinues the failed village settlement program.

The Arusha Declaration proclaims Nyerere's commitment to socialism and embraces concepts of peasant farming, democracy under a single party, and self-reliance. Agricultural development is emphasized over industrialization. The government begins to nationalize banks, as well as food processing, insurance, and export trading companies.

Nyerere again calls on farms to form Ujamaa villages, relying on their voluntary compliance.

ZAMBIA

1965

Kaunda introduces a massive program to collectivize agriculture through a network of farming cooperatives. The Department of Cooperatives is designated to assign organizational responsibilities. Kaunda also decides to develop other approaches to rural development.

1966

1967

A financial crisis leads to a productivity drive and criticism of cooperative farming. Agricultural financing is turned over to a new parastatal organization, the Agricultural Finance Company (AFC).

A massive reorganization of the bureaucracy and the creation of a Ministry of Rural Development, which controls the country's agricultural developmental resources, leads to a sharp decline in cooperative membership.

1968

1969

1970

ANGOLA

MPLA and UNITA guerrillas engage in armed confrontations with each other, vying for the allegiance of the Ovimbundo people of the southcentral regions.

The MPLA begins to organize the population of the semi-liberated zones into small villages built around Marxist-Leninist structures.

BENIN

Following a failed election, Emile-Derlin Zinsou is sworn in as the new President and turns to France for security assistance.

Zinsou is deposed in a military coup d'etat led by Maurice Kousandete. A Military Directorate, headed by Paul-Emile de Souza, assumes power.

The Directorate hands over power to a Presidential Council, comprising Apithy, Mags, and Justin Ahomadegbe.

CONGO

Following mass demonstrations organized by leftist elements, the army overthrows Massemba-Debat. Marien Ngouabi comes to power and establishes a Marxist-Leninist party, the Congolese Workers' Party (PCT), to replace the MNR. The country is renamed the People's Republic of the Congo.

Following an alleged invasion plot supported by members of the gendarmerie, the PCT dissolves the gendarmerie and creates the people's militia as an adjunct to the army. Nationalizations in the infrastructure, public services, and agricultural sectors begin.

ETHIOPIA

GHANA

Ankrah is forced to resign because of individual conflicts within the NLC. Kofi Busia, leading a party composed of middle class and capitalist elements, comes to power. Busia pursues policies of decentralization and devolution of authority.

GUINEA

1968

Following a plot within the army to separate the Labe region from the rest of the country, the army is purged and reorganized.

1969

A large group of Guinean exiles led by Portuguese officers invades the capital, Conakry. The failure of the invasion to overthrow Toure is followed by a reign of terror.

1970

MALI

The National Assembly is dissolved. Both the party Politburo and the National Assembly are replaced by new bodies as the government undertakes purges within the party and the administration.

A group of young officers overthrow the Keita government. A 14-member Military Committee for National Liberation (CMNL) is set up with Moussa Traore as President and Yoro Diakite as Head of Government. The new government commits itself to economic reforms and improves relations with France.

The government suppresses the national trade union body.

GUINEA-BISSAU

MADAGASCAR

MOZAMBIQUE

Mondlane is assassinated. Samora Machel takes over the leadership of FRELIMO.

SENEGAL

1968

Senegalese trade unions, dissatisfied with the slow pace of nationalization and the continuing control by the French of leading sectors of the economy, demand the immediate nationalization of the water and electrical companies and the rapid Africanization of positions in lower and middle management.

1969

Senghor responds to worker and student pressures by stepping up the pace of Africanization. The replacement of French skilled workers, mechanics, foremen, and sales clerks by Senegalese begins.

TANZANIA

The government promises financial and technical assistance resources as rewards to those who move into Ujamaa villages.

ZAMBIA

A series of reforms place the parastatal companies in the center of the country's economic sector. Kaunda announces the partial nationalization of mining companies. Future pay raises are tied to increased productivity.

1970

1971

1972

1973

ANGOLA

BENIN

The collective leadership is deposed by a coup d'etat led by Mathieu Kerekou, who sets up a 12-man military National Revolutionary Council (CNR).

CONGO

The first state farm opens near Brazzaville with the help of Chinese technicians. A strike led by politically influential students results in extensive changes in party and government personnel, including the removal of two left-wing radicals, Ange Diawara and Claude-Ernest Ndalla.

Diawara leads an aborted coup d'etat; a wide-spread purge follows in which the police force is disbanded and a new people's militia is created.

ETHIOPIA

GHANA

The usia regime is overthrown by a military coup d'etat led by Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, who bans party politics and places the country under the rule of the National Redemption Council (NRC). The NRC adopts a moderate political stance between East and West as part of its policy of self-reliance.

GUINEA

Internal political organization is revised. The major emphasis is placed on local revolutionary powers (PRL) functioning as executive bodies at the village level and planning the production and marketing of local commodities.

1971

GUINEA-BISSAU

1972

1973

Cabral is assassinated. The PAIGC comes under the leadership of his brother, Luiz Cabral.

MADAGASCAR

Opposition to the Tsiranana regime by a number of groups culminates in 3 days of violent rioting in the capital and results in Tsiranana's resignation. Gabriel Ramanantsoa takes power and begins the transition of control from France to Madagascar. He also opens relations with the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and East Germany. Leftist policies aimed at the democratization of rural life and nationalization of foreign enterprises are put into place.

Union leaders are arrested. A new union coordinating body is formed. Diakite is removed as Head of Government.

MALI

MOZAMBIQUE

The Administrative Reform abolishes regional assemblies and provides for the establishment of rural communities as the basic units of government in the countryside. These rural communities are to function as the core political units within the decentralized agrarian Socialist society.

SENEGAL

1971

1972

1973

SENEGAL

The government nationalizes important sectors of the economy, including water and electric utilities, the mining companies, and peanut oil and oilcake marketing. The number of parastatal companies is also expanded to stimulate foreign investment in industry, mining, and tourism.

TANZANIA

To counter the increasing centralization of the government, legislation is passed, transferring considerable authority from the national government to local political bodies.

Under Operation Tanzania, exhortation and inducement are employed to force rapid villagization throughout the country.

ZAMBIA

An amendment to the Trade Union and Trade Dispute Ordinance and the Industrial Relations Act makes most strikes illegal.

The cooperative movement collapses. Government programs focus entirely on the extension of private farming, coordinated through the market. The Minister of Rural Development devotes its attention to the improvement of the network of agricultural assistance. Free enterprise, profit, individual ownership, and wealth accumulation, unchanged since independence in the economic sectors, are extended to the rural sector.

Zambia is officially declared a one-party state, permitting only members of UNIP to hold high offices. Senior civil servants, especially those in the parastatal sectors, draw together to the point where a number of positions become interchangeable.

1974

1975

1976

ANGOLA

The MPLA forms a 10-man Politburo and 35-man Central Committee, and organizes a network of action committees and militia groups throughout the country.

The civil war ends in victory for the MPLA. The Law on People's Power is published, formally institutionalizing concepts of mass participation.

A policy of nationalization in the agricultural and industrial sectors is instituted.

BENIN

Kerekou announces that Marxism-Leninism is the official national ideology. The government nationalizes several key companies, as well as banking and insurance services. A complete reorganization of the French administration systems begins.

Political tensions result in a reorganization of the military establishment. The army and gendarmerie are merged to form a national defense force. Kerekou renames the country the People's Republic of Benin, and creates a single party, the Revolutionary Party of the Benin People (PRPB), based on the structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

Nationalizations in the industrial sector erode relations with France, and military cooperation is abandoned. Reorganization begins of the legal system and schools are nationalized.

CONGO

Ngouabi dismisses the PCT Politburo and the government. The Politburo is replaced by a general staff, who form a new government.

1974

ETHIOPIA

Emperor Haile Selassie is overthrown by junior officers and enlisted men who form the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC). The new government, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, announces the policy of Ethiopia Tikdem which proclaims that Ethiopia will become a Socialist state with a one-party system.

1975

Financial institutions, the insurance business, and major industries are nationalized. A proclamation is issued to nationalize urban land and abolish landlordism. Urban dwellers' associations (kebeles) are organized in cities and towns. The Peasant Association Decree abolishes private ownership of rural land; peasant associations and collectives are established in the countryside.

1976

Mengistu proclaims his commitment to Marxism-Leninism and announces the formation of the National Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP), which emphasizes the development of state farms and collectivized farming.

Following a power struggle, Mengistu emerges as PMAC Chairman.

The United States halts the provision of additional military aid to the Mengistu regime. Mengistu terminates all military links with the United States and signs a military support agreement with the Soviet Union.

GHANA

The Acheampong regime revives Busia's policies of decentralization.

Acheampong, in a move to consolidate power, abolishes the NRC's Executive Council and replaces it with the seven-man Supreme Military Council (SMC), composed of military elements.

GUINEA

Toure allows the Soviet Union to use Guinea as a staging facility for Soviet aircraft transporting Cuban troops to Angola.

Diplomatic relations are resumed with France.

GUINEA-BISSAU

Independence is gained from Portugal. Luiz Cabral takes power. A National People's Assembly, a Council of State Commissariats, and a Higher Council and Executive Committee are created. Mass organizations are also formed.

Land begins to be nationalized as the new government undertakes a slow transfer from communal ownership and cultivation to a system of producer cooperatives.

MADAGASCAR

1974

1975

The Mobile Police Group mutinies over underrepresentation of cotiers in the armed forces.

A left opposition, consisting of Ratsimandrava and Didier Ratsiraka, and a moderate center, including Ramanantsoa and Roland Rabetafika, forms in the government. Ramanantsoa is forced to hand over power to Ratsimandrava, who is assassinated 6 days later. An 18-man military directorate is formed and Ratsiraka takes power.

The new regime adopts a Marxist-Leninist orientation. The new policies include the expansion of village communities to carry out agrarian and administrative reforms, the reorganization of the armed forces, and closer relations with Communist states. A Supreme Revolutionary Council (CSR) is created to supercede the military directorate. Four large French trading companies are expropriated and the French sugar companies are nationalized. The American satellite-tracking station is closed.

1976

The Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (ARENA) is formed to provide information and ideological training to the population. ARENA's program calls for administrative and educational decentralization, increased production through state planning, and the nationalization of private foreign concerns.

The government announces the creation of a new party to be called the Democratic Union of the Mali People (UDPM), based on former President Keita's principle of democratic centralism.

MALI

1974

MOZAMBIQUE

As Portuguese settlers flee the country, a transitional government is formed.

1975

Independence is gained from Portugal. FRELIMO leader Machel takes power as President, and Joaquim Chissano, Prime Minister under the transitional government, becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs. Dynamizing groups are created in urban areas to organize people in neighborhoods and enterprises. Nationalizations in the economy begin.

1976

The first post-independence meeting of the FRELIMO Central Committee is held. A process of political restructuring along Marxist-Leninist lines begins.

SENEGAL

Senghor formulates a framework for a three-party system, allowing for a liberal and democratic party, a Socialist party, and a Marxist-Leninist party.

TANZANIA

The Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act reintroduces a degree of voluntarism in the government's effort to create Socialist villages. Any village achieving Ujamaa status entitles it to increased developmental assistance.

Nyerere abolishes local cooperative unions. In their place, he establishes a series of parastatal corporations to meet the needs of the farmers.

The National Assembly passes an Interim Constitution Amendment Bill, which officially incorporates the fundamental principles of socialism into the Constitution and gives legal supremacy to TANU.

ZAMBIA

1977

ANGOLA

A treaty of friendship and cooperation is signed with the Soviet Union and party ties are formalized between the MPLA and the CPSU.

The First Congress of the MPLA formally converts the MPLA into a Marxist-Leninist Workers' Party (MPLA-PT). The state gains control of a significant number of enterprises.

1978

South African troops begin to make periodic incursions across the Namibian border into Angola to attack South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) camps. South African military support to UNITA increases.

1979

Neto dies and is replaced by Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who reiterates the regime's commitment to Marxism-Leninism.

BENIN

Relations with France erode further when a group of mostly French mercenaries try to overthrow the Kerekou regime.

The CNR adopts a Fundamental Law, which decrees new structures of government.

Relations with France improve and many suspended French subsidies and loans are resumed.

Elections are held for a National Revolutionary Assembly, designated the supreme authority of the state. The CNR is disbanded and the government converts into a civilian body.

CONGO

Ngouabi is assassinated. An 11-member Military Committee of the PCT Politburo is created. Joachim Yhombi Opango comes to power and adopts moderate policies, including closer ties with the West.

Opango is overthrown and replaced by self-declared Marxist-Leninist Denis Sassou-Nguesso. The Military Committee is dissolved.

ETHIOPIA

Mengistu signs a second military support agreement with the Soviet Union. Somali troops invade the Ogaden region.

With Soviet military aid and Cuban troop support, Ethiopia drives Somali troops out of the Ogaden. A 20-year treaty of cooperation is signed with the Soviet Union.

The Economic Development Campaign places new upper limits on tenancy in the countryside, and lays the basis for the transition from peasant associations to producers' cooperatives.

The Commission on Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) is created for the design and preparation of a Vanguard Party.

1977

ETHIOPIA

During the "Red Terror"---the result of the resistance of a civilian leftist group, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), to military rule---thousands of people are killed in the capital. The EPRP is eliminated and government tolerance of civilian leftist groups comes to an end.

1978

GHANA

The officer corps of the armed forces removes the increasingly tyrannical Acheampong from the head of the SMC. He is replaced by Frederick Akuffo.

Akuffo legalizes political parties and schedules general elections for a return to civilian rule. Junior officers participate in a coup d'etat which brings Jerry Rawlings to power. Rawlings, presiding over the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), begins a campaign to root out corruption, economic collapse, and political ineptitude.

60

In elections to return the country to civilian rule, Hilla Limann is elected President and Head of Government.

GUINEA

French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing visits Guinea, the crowning moment of the reconciliation between the two countries. During the 11th Congress of the PDG, Toure announces the party's desire for broad cooperation with capitalist as well as Socialist states.

Party structures are reorganized. A 10-member Politburo replaces the former 7-member body, and the Central Committee is increased from 25 to 75 members. New structures are also introduced at regional, sectional, and local levels. A new Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs, and another for small businesses, are created to administer the renewed flow of aid investment in the new private sector.

1979

1977

1978

1979

GUINEA-BISSAU

A party training school is established and the party structure is reorganized in an attempt to improve party work.

MADAGASCAR

AREMA militants form party branches throughout the island. In local government and National Assembly elections, AREMA enjoys overwhelming success over several other parties.

The size of the armed forces is increased.

MALI

Keita's death in detention sparks off demonstrations by radical youth groups against the government. A split develops in the CMLN leadership.

A liberalization in the political sector is undertaken; political prisoners are released.

A UDPM Constituent Congress is held during which a 137-member National Council of the party is chosen.

MOZAMBIQUE

The independence war in Rhodesia spills over into Mozambique as Rhodesian forces attack Zimbabwean guerrilla bases on Mozambican territory. Much of the country's infrastructure is destroyed.

The Third Party Congress of FRELIMO is held. FRELIMO pronounces itself a Marxist-Leninist party and signs a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Party ties between FRELIMO and the CPSU are formalized. New guidelines call for a restructuring of the industrial sector toward production of practical goods. A steady policy of nationalization of major private industries is pursued.

A year-long recruitment to the party is undertaken. The oil refinery, the Moatize coal mine, and a major sugarcane plantation are nationalized.

All land is nationalized.

The Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) is formed in and first supported by Rhodesia with the goal of destabilizing the FRELIMO government. It later receives support from South Africa.

1977

1978

1979

Senior members of the armed forces are purged. A political commissariat in the armed forces is created to enable the party to keep the military under control. The party consolidates, organizing mass organizations for women, workers, and young people.

Dynamizing groups are phased out in villages, where they are replaced by party cells, but continue to exist in the cities, transformed into neighborhood committees.

SENEGAL

Senghor renames his party the Socialist Party (PS).

TANZANIA

Operation Tanzania concludes with 79 percent of the mainland population living in villages.

Nyerere announces that small-scale private industry will be encouraged to raise productivity and encourage local investment.

TANU and the other remaining political party, the Afro-Shirazi Party, merge to form the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM).

ZAMBIA

1980

ANGOLA

The MPLA Central Committee creates a People's Assembly and provincial assemblies.

1981

In Operation Protea, several thousand South African troops invade 75 miles into Angola, attacking Angolan as well as SWAPO targets.

1982

South African forces occupy large areas of Cunene Province. UNITA expands its insurgency activities. South Africa begins to insist on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as part of the overall solution in Namibia.

BENIN

Kerekou is elected President of the Republic by the Assembly. The government welcomes private investment.

The government begins a reform of the 53 inefficient and corrupt parastatal companies, dissolving or merging about half of them.

Kerekou downgrades or removes ministers most closely associated with the extreme left as well as those who are Marxist-Leninist ideologues.

CONGO

A treaty of friendship and cooperation is signed with the Soviet Union, and party ties between the PCT and the CPSU are formalized.

Relations with France improve when Socialist French President Mitterrand visits in 1982. Ties are also developed with other Western countries. A liberalized economic policy opens doors to foreign investment and emphasizes peasant agriculture.

ETHIOPIA

The Yekatit '66 Political School is established to educate party cadres in Marxism-Leninism.

The military component of the massive Red Star Campaign, an attempt by Ethiopian forces to gain control of guerrilla-held territory in Eritrea Province, is launched. The resulting substantial military losses increase Ethiopia's dependence on Soviet military aid.

1980

1981

1982

CHIANA

Rawlings seizes power for the second time as the corruption of the civilian regime increases. Assuming the Chairmanship of a Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), Rawlings adopts leftist policies to democratize political decisionmaking and decentralize power.

City and district councils are replaced by People's Defense Committees (PDC) and Workers' Defense Committees (WDC) to create mass participation at the local level.

GUINEA

GUINEA-BISSAU

Prime Minister Joao Vieira leads a coup d'etat in which the Cabral regime is overthrown. The National Assembly and State Council are abolished and replaced by a new Revolutionary Council of nine members.

An Extraordinary Congress of the PAIGC is held, reaffirming the regime's commitment to socialism. The party hierarchy is changed and reverts to the conventional Marxist-Leninist terminology of a Central Committee and Politburo. Several former opponents of the Cabral regime are brought into the government, along with a number of Portuguese-trained civil servants.

Promised legislative and presidential elections are postponed and a government reshuffle takes place in which the President takes on the portfolios of Defense and National Security. The reshuffle causes a greater division between pro-Soviet radicals and pro-Western elements. The demotion of the pro-Soviet Minister of Economic Cooperation results in the liberalization of the private trading sector.

France, breaking the Soviet monopoly on the military, begins to deliver military vehicles.

MADAGASCAR

Ratsiraka, firmly established at the head of the left-wing parties, imposes censorship of the press and bans all organized opposition to the government. Relations with the new French Socialist Government improve when Ratsiraka travels to France on a state visit.

Following a drought and a series of severe storms, Ratsiraka agrees to policy changes in order to qualify for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan. He incorporates into his Cabinet several French-educated technocrats and reopens relations with several Western governments, alienating Malagasy radical ideologues.

An agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation is signed with the Soviet Union.

1980

1981

1982

MALI

A special Congress of the UDPM is held during which the party approves changes in the administration and state companies. A program of economic liberalization is developed.

MOZAMBIQUE

Machel announces a housekeeping campaign in which special brigades are created to seek out abuses in the bureaucracy. People's stores, which had replaced abandoned Portuguese businesses, are denationalized and either handed over to consumer cooperatives or sold to private owners.

In a government reshuffle, two senior leadership figures are relieved of their government responsibilities to devote all of their time to the party.

Machel begins to modify Marxist-Leninist policies in favor of more moderate ones. State control over the economy is relaxed as the private sector is revived. The government begins to seek a wider range of foreign investments and middle-level expertise from outside the country.

Relations with the United States are frozen with the expulsion of six Americans accused of spying.

South African commandos attack African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa headquarters in the Mozambican capital, Maputo.

Machel begins to seek military and economic aid from the West. A military protocol is signed with Portugal, which is soon followed by agreements with other Western nations.

In a Cabinet reshuffle, the government's increasing commitment to decentralization is demonstrated with the appointment of a strong advocate of local initiatives and peasant aid as the new Minister of Agriculture.

SENEGAL

The government implements reforms to give peasants more control over cooperative decisionmaking.

Senghor resigns. Diouf takes over as President, becomes Secretary General of the PS, and launches into a reorganization of the political system. He lifts restrictions on political activity, allowing for the official registration of a number of Marxist parties. He also adopts a strongly pro-French foreign policy.

TANZANIA

1980

The decline of world copper demand and prices, and the subsequent salary cutbacks, causes a series of mine union strikes and work slowdowns.

1981

A massive strike breaks out in the Copperbelt over low pay, resulting in the third post-independence restructuring of the mining industry. Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) becomes more centralized, serving as a single company for the whole industry.

The expulsion of 17 trade union leaders from UNIP results in serious industrial unrest in the Copperbelt. All miners, along with workers in the banking and education sectors, go on strike in protest of UNIP's attempts to gain greater control over the economy. Kaunda responds by using International Monetary Fund money to increase salaries.

1982

In a series of CCM constitutional amendments, an 18-member Central Committee is elected from among the 172-member National Executive Council (NEC). The NEC is empowered to elect the President and Vice President of the CCM.

ZAMBIA

ANGOLA

1983

The MPLA government creates regional military councils in all areas affected by UNITA activities, and concentrates all state powers in the hands of military men directly responsible to President dos Santos.

1984

The Lusaka Accord is signed between South Africa and Angola for a withdrawal of South African troops from Angola.

1985

South Africa completes its troop withdrawal.

BENIN

A coup attempt results in the reduction in number of newly elected political commissioners in the National Assembly and an increase in the number of civilian ministers. Kerekou is reelected President of the National Assembly.

CONGO

Sassou-Nguesso is reelected PCT President. A military agreement is signed with China.

ETHIOPIA

During the Second Congress of COPWE, Mengistu announces plans for the inauguration of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) in September 1984. COPWE members begin to form party organizations in plants, factories, state farms, offices, peasant associations, army units, and educational institutions.

The Institute for the Study of Nationalities is created to plan autonomous administrative structures for the nationalities along Marxist-Leninist lines.

In a government reshuffle, more power is placed in the hands of Soviet hardliners.

Opposition to PMAC increases in the capital, Addis Ababa, and a large number of residents take to the streets. More than 400 people are arrested. Soon afterward, four American and two Soviet diplomats are expelled from the country, accused of conspiring against the regime.

A seminar attended by COPWE representatives and organizational affairs officials, heads of political sections of sector and force commanders, and provincial representatives is held to make preparations toward party formation through founding meetings. The resulting meetings are carried out in production and distribution organizations, offices, the army, among the peasants, and in all COPWE basis organizations. COPWE groups holding formation meetings become WPE groups.

During a party plenary, a resolution calls for the intensification of efforts for the founding of a People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

The government begins a resettlement program under which farmers from the northern drought-affected regions are moved to more fertile areas. The expensive program is later halted. While encouraging the organization of producers' cooperatives in the new settlements, the government does not insist on the initial organization of collective farms.

To stimulate production, a new program is introduced, which includes a marketing and pricing policy giving the farmers greater returns. The government also transfers more resources from collective farms to individual farmers.

ETHIOPIA

1983

GHANA

University students, initially supporters of Rawlings, engage in violent protests against the government, citing economic grievances, a demand for the return to civilian rule, and objections to ties with Libya and Cuba. Major clashes result between workers and students. The universities are closed and converted into training schools for revolutionary cadres.

GUINEA

During the 12th Congress of the PDG, the Politburo is enlarged to include 19 members and the Central Committee is expanded to 85 members.

1984

The WPE is formally established during a 5-day national congress. An 11-member Politburo and 134-member Central Committee are chosen. Formal relations are established between the WPE and the CPSU.

In a move away from centralized state control, the National Defense Committee, the political arm of the PNDC, is dissolved, and the PDCs and WDCs are replaced by Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, whose officers are directly responsible to district and regional secretaries.

Following Toure's death, the army stages a coup d'etat. The new Military Committee of National Recovery (MCNR), led by President Lansana Conte and Prime Minister Diara Traore, appoints a semi-civilian government to take over all ministries and lifts state surveillance and control. The MCNR initiates large-scale reforms in which France plays a large assistance role.

1985

In a cabinet reshuffle, Traore is removed from the post of Prime Minister. Traore fails in a subsequent attempt to overthrow Conte.

GUINEA-BISSAU

1983

China delivers patrol boats to the Navy.

1984

Under several constitutional changes which strengthen the President's position, Vieira formally assumes the role of Head of Government, the National People's Assembly is reestablished, a 15-member Cabinet is chosen from the members of the Assembly, and the post of Prime Minister is abolished.

France offers additional military aid and advisers.

1985

MADAGASCAR

In order to appease radical ideologues in the government, Ratsiraka removes from his Cabinet economic liberals and conservatives who do not support his Socialist policies, placing most of the key ministries under the control of AREMA leftists.

In a partial government reshuffle, ministers in key ministries are prevented from amassing significant political support.

Relations with the West improve, although the Soviet Union continues to provide most military support.

Ratsiraka attempts to strengthen the bureaucracy and partially offset its authority by decentralizing the government and accelerating the development of village communities.

MALI

1983

1984

1985

MOZAMBIQUE

RENAMO guerrilla activities spread throughout the country, contributing heavily to the general chaos enveloping the agricultural and economic sectors.

During the Fourth Party Congress of FRELIMO, emphasis is placed on decentralization and small-scale agricultural projects. FRELIMO's Central Committee is expanded from 57 to 130, opening membership to provincial recruits outside the state apparatus. A government reshuffle strengthens opposition to large-scale projects in the economic ministries.

The Nkomati Accord is signed with South Africa, and further appeals are made to the West for economic and military aid.

The United States announces the provision to the Machel regime of \$1.1 million in nonlethal military aid and \$40 million in economic aid.

During a visit to the United States, Machel emphasizes his desire for US private investments within the country's new, liberal investment code, and the reduction of Mozambique's military dependence on the Soviet Union.

SENEGAL

Diouf forms a new government, purging the more established party members and assuming greater powers for his own office.

TANZANIA

Deteriorating economic and agricultural conditions lead to the implementation of a structural adjustment program, including a larger commitment of development funds for agriculture and the encouragement of both private and public large-scale farming. Producer prices are raised substantially and cooperative associations are created to mediate between farmers and marketing boards.

Nyerere announces a change in policy, according to which peasants will be permitted to build their own homesteads on land which they can cultivate. He directs that most of the country's nationalized sisal estates are to be handed back to private ownership. He also welcomes the return of private enterprise to industry, transportation, and other sectors of the economy.

As part of the liberalization policy, Prime Minister Salim Ahmed Salim announces his intention of introducing a system of individual responsibility for officials in the economic sector. The Ministry of Agriculture announces that jobs and salary increases of its local employees will depend on the results they obtain on the ground.

ZAMBIA

The government makes a move toward a market-oriented developmental approach by decontrolling wholesale and retail prices and increasing farm production incentives.

The government denationalizes several large companies, returning them to private ownership.

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PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

October 10, 1985

PREFACE

The emergence in the late 1950s and early 1960s of six Socialist regimes in sub-Saharan Africa was followed in the 1970s by the proclamation by seven other sub-Saharan African states of Marxist-Leninist governments. The continued survival of these Afrocommunist regimes and the institutionalization of Marxist-Leninist ideology have caused concern to the West because of the possible spreading of Afrocommunism in Africa. The links between the Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist parties in these countries intensify these concerns.

This paper focuses on socialism and its interpretations by African Socialists, and Marxism-Leninism and its interpretation by Afrocommunist regimes. The political, economic, and ideological steps which led to the consolidation of Marxist-Leninist policies are then examined for the seven Afrocommunist countries--Congo, Benin, Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia. Prospects for the emergence of Afrocommunist regimes in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia are followed by the outlook for the Afrocommunist regimes. Finally, the paper concludes with implications of Afrocommunism for the West, especially the United States.

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SUMMARY

Socialism emerged in sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1950s as the first colonized territories gained independence. African Socialist leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sekou Toure in Guinea, Modibo Keita in Mali, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, and Leopold Senghor in Senegal, believed that Africa's traditional societies had characteristics compatible with socialism. In the 1970s, African Socialist thinking led several new regimes to embrace Marxism-Leninism. They have become known as Afrocommunist governments because they lack class distinctions and interpret Marxism-Leninism as an ideology that could be adapted to local circumstances and implemented free of Soviet domination.







The Marxist-Leninist orientation of the military regimes in Congo, Benin, and Madagascar was proclaimed by fiat, partly in reaction to French neocolonialism, but primarily because it provided the rulers with the means to consolidate power. In the Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, national liberation movements were led by Marxist-Leninist ideologues who had been influenced by members of the Portuguese Communist Party during their student years in Lisbon. The leading theorist among them was Amilcar Cabral, whose ideas on the application of Marxist-Leninist ideology to Africa provided all three nationalist movements with the foundations of their policies. Ethiopia, never having been colonized, experienced the emergence of Marxism-Leninism as an outgrowth of an internal social upheaval, a government overthrow, and the establishment of a ruling Marxist-Leninist party. Afrocommunism in the four countries in which the Marxist-Leninist parties maintain party-to-party relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union--Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, and Mozambique--is probably more entrenched than in Benin, Guinea-Bissau, and Madagascar.

Each of the Afrocommunist countries is characterized by a one-party regime. Although some of their policies, having failed to solve difficult economic problems, are being modified, Marxist-Leninist institutions in all the countries are being consolidated as their leaders place a priority on the creation of structures for the perpetuation of the Marxist-Leninist system. Insurgencies, however, continue to challenge the viability of the regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.

The prospects for the emergence of new Afrocommunist regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are poor. Communist parties in Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan lack sufficient influence and support. In South Africa, prospects for the downfall of the powerful apartheid government and the coming to power of the longstanding South African Communist Party are slim. In Zimbabwe, the leftist Mugabe regime, fearful of exacerbating serious economic problems like those in the Afrocommunist countries, has been hesitant to implement Marxist-Leninist policies. In Namibia, should the Marxist-Leninist-oriented SWAPO organization come to power in the face of South African opposition, it would be severely constrained by Pretoria's influence and the need for Western developmental assistance.

AFROCOMMUNISM AND AFRICAN SOCIALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



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|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  | Established Afrocommunist Regime (Angola, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique) |  | Ruling Marxist-Leninist party which has taken over government functions (Ethiopia) |
|  | Afrocommunist country in which Marxist-Leninist party maintains party-to-party relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique) |  | African Socialist Regime (Tanzania, Zambia) |
| | |  | Existence of Communist party in non-Afrocommunist country (Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan) |
| | |  | Possible future Afrocommunist Regime (Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe) |

PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1. INTRODUCTION

The basic appeal of socialism to African leaders is rooted in the poor economic conditions in which their countries were left by the colonial powers. Socialist concepts seemed to offer viable and expedient developmental alternatives following independence. The Socialist concepts introduced by Karl Marx, and later modified by Lenin, were even more attractive to some African leaders because they included a blueprint for economic and technological development.

Most traditional African societies were, and continue to be, ethnically based, functioning within a system of communal sharing. Although the colonial powers--France, Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Germany--pressed their own political and economic systems on these traditional societies, several nationalist leaders in African countries which gained their independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s--Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sekou Toure in Guinea, Modibo Keita in Mali, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, and Leopold Senghor in Senegal--embraced Socialist concepts.

African socialism, as it was labeled, was based on the belief that Africa's traditional societies had characteristics which were compatible with socialism, which maintains that society rather than private individuals should share fairly in the wealth of a country. These characteristics included communal land ownership, the extended family, elaborate concepts of kinship, the practice of sharing, and an emphasis on cooperation rather than competition. The African Socialists hoped to overcome the omnipresent problem of ethnic diversity which was an obstacle to national unity in every newly independent African state. They therefore favored the establishment of a one-party system, but shared a rejection of the application of the Marxist concept of class conflict in Africa.

2. DEVELOPMENT OF AFROCOMMUNISM

African socialism, however, failed to provide adequate mechanisms to stem economic deterioration anywhere on the African continent. Therefore, it did not survive in Ghana and has been modified, sometimes radically, to include a more mixed economy approach in Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, and Senegal. In the 1970s, a leftward trend in sub-Saharan Africa became clearly discernible, not only because of the waning interest in the early approaches toward socialism, but also because of the increasing number of African governments espousing orthodox Marxism-Leninism, which seemed to offer a clear-cut alternative to ineffective economic policies and colonial political structures. By 1980, seven sub-Saharan African countries--Angola, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, and Mozambique--were under the rule of self-professed Marxist-Leninist leaderships which, because of their adaptations to African conditions, became known as Afrocommunist regimes. Four of them, Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, signed friendship and cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union and established party-to-party relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In addition, Marxist-Leninist parties emerged in four other sub-Saharan African countries--South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria, and Senegal.

While Marxism-Leninism is having a far greater impact in Africa than African socialism, the Afrocommunist regimes, like the African Socialist regimes, are faced with a proliferation of economic problems brought on by a general world

recession and the failure of their own policies. The inability of Marxist-Leninist institutions to resolve these failures has led to ideological contradictions, as Afrocommunist leaders have been compelled to reshape their policies. On the one hand, a retreat from centralized planning has been accompanied by appeals for Western investments. And yet, when forced to choose between their dependence on the Soviet bloc for political survival and their dependence on the West for economic development, the Afrocommunist regimes tend to opt for the former. These regimes have been able to make this kind of choice largely because experience has demonstrated to them that Western aid would be forthcoming in any case.

Several parallel trends can be identified in each of the Afrocommunist countries. First, their regimes have developed political structures that, while not yet completely secure, are being steadily consolidated, but largely at the expense of economic growth and development. An essential component in that consolidation is the continuous and intensive political and military support they receive from the Soviet bloc countries. The escalation of Marxist-Leninist policies in these countries has moved the ruling elites further left, reinforcing the adversary relationship between increased party control and economic development. The resulting dissension and erosion of political support has, in turn, led to frequent and sometimes drastic purges within both government and party structures.

Second, each of the Afrocommunist countries has experienced the consolidation of a one-party regime, achieved by way of coercive policies and purges. Party cadres have developed vested interests in the continuation of party rule as the result of the proliferation of Marxist-Leninist institutions. With the full backing of the Soviet bloc countries, the Afrocommunist states have placed a priority on the creation of structures capable of perpetuating the Marxist-Leninist system. However, many of the institutions are fragile and ill-equipped to deal with the difficult economic problems confronting each of the Afrocommunist regimes. Consequently, all the Afrocommunist leaders have been compelled by the deterioration of economic and agricultural conditions to retreat somewhat from stringent Marxist-Leninist policies, at least for the time being, as they search for more pragmatic solutions.

Third, African Marxist-Leninist parties are revolutionary vanguards which dominate the state. They differ from traditional Marxist-Leninist parties in that their social base does not come from a proletariat. Since there is little industrialization in Africa, workers have played only a minor role when military or national liberation groups have formed Marxist-Leninist regimes. Instead, these groups rely on a dominant social group of political figures, intellectuals, and teachers, most of whom have worker or peasant origins.

And finally, structurally, the top party leaderships of the Afrocommunist countries, from both the Politburo and Central Committee, fill all important ministerial positions in their governments. The ministers are responsible to the Politburo rather than to the head of government unless he is also the party chairman. At the level of party structure and organization, all the Afrocommunist parties and party schools receive advice from Soviet bloc parties. As a result, the Afrocommunist regimes have developed similar structures in their parties and other Marxist-Leninist institutions.

3. THE AFROCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

One kind of Afrocommunist state was born during the struggle against Portuguese colonial rule in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. In these cases, Marxist-Leninist ideology did not originate within a Communist party, but within nationalist movements which had in their leaderships a number of Marxist-Leninist intellectuals. But another kind of Afrocommunism emerged in a number of states where no Communist party or revolutionary movement existed. It was instead the proclamation of a military regime, followed by attempts to convert society to a Marxist-Leninist model. This pattern began in Congo (1968) and then appeared in Benin (1974), Madagascar (1975), and Ethiopia (1976).

a. Congo, Benin, and Madagascar

There are striking similarities between the political systems of Congo, Benin, and Madagascar, despite disparities in their historical evolution and socioeconomic infrastructures. They exhibit similar patterns of political instability, socioeconomic turmoil, urban radicalization, rural stagnation, and political maladministration; and, in all these countries, a Marxist-Leninist orientation was proclaimed by military rulers. In both Benin and Madagascar, the military rulers had no record of Marxist conviction. Also, in all three countries, the establishment of Marxist regimes oriented toward the Soviet Union was, in part, a reaction to French neocolonialism.

Ideologically, the regimes in Congo, Benin, and Madagascar are characterized by huge cleavages between rhetoric and reality, and by difficulty in directing any kind of socioeconomic development or in eliminating corruption and mismanagement. Madagascar differs somewhat from the other two countries because its society is more stratified socially and because neocolonialism under France in the 1960s was more pervasive. The eclectic nature of Marxist-Leninist official ideology in Madagascar is even more marked than in Congo and Benin, and the Soviet impact, in all areas, is almost insignificant.

Another similarity among these countries was the formation by the military leaderships of parties based on the structure of the CPSU. The memberships of the Politburos of each party included civilians who were meant, in theory, to lend greater legitimacy to the military-dominated Marxist-Leninist regimes. Significantly, while all three parties continue to maintain friendly ties with the CPSU, none has been converted into a ruling vanguard party.

French influence has remained strong in all three countries. For example, in Congo, offshore oil exploitation and much of the country's mining and forestry industries are controlled largely by French companies, and France is a major trading partner of all three countries. In comparison, Soviet economic investments have been negligible--for example, only about three percent of Congo's entire trade is conducted with the Soviet Union.

For the most part, Soviet influence is limited to the armed forces and security apparatus of the three countries and has been most pervasive in Congo. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between Congo and the Soviet Union in May 1981, but unlike similar treaties signed with other African countries, it does not call for greater military cooperation. Soviet officers are present in Congo, where Soviet advisers direct the country's internal security forces, and Soviet, Cuban and East German military advisers are stationed in Benin and Congo. In Madagascar, the Soviet Union has been quick to

take advantage of gaps in French military aid, offering spare parts and loans for the country's small and weak air force. But the Soviet Union was recently told by the Malagasy Government to disassemble its radar installations used for surveillance of the Mozambique Channel, an indication of the precarious Soviet foothold in Madagascar.

From a political viewpoint, in Congo, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who has led the Marxist-Leninist government since February 1979, will survive only if he manages to maintain a balance between the pro-Soviet hardliners and the pro-Western pragmatists within the ruling elite. He has kept Congo on an authentic Marxist-Leninist path, but a number of dichotomies contradict his commitment to socialism. Until recently, the government funded inefficient state farm projects, but did nothing to collectivize the peasantry. Now, with the uncertainty in the oil industry, emphasis is being placed on peasant agriculture. Economically, most strategic sectors are controlled by private foreign capital. The government also hopes to boost the economy by converting many of the parastatals into joint management companies in which both private Congolese and foreign investors can play a part.

In Benin, Mathieu Kerekou, who unexpectedly shifted to a Socialist orientation when he came to power in October 1972, has maintained relative stability in the country. Kerekou's successes in the Marxist-Leninist realm have been limited by Benin's small industrial sector and the modest scale of its economy in general. In the agricultural sector, progress toward the goal of collective production has been cautious because the government has neither adequate peasant support nor the capacity to organize a cooperative network. In addition, some private independent businessmen have been able to maintain their activities with no interference from the government. But economic malaise and resulting student strikes, which began in April 1985 with a university uprising in Cotonou, as well as the formation of an anti-Kerekou faction in the army, may threaten the government with a serious challenge. So far, however, traditional left-wing elements--students and trade unionists--are small in number and controllable. As long as Kerekou continues to alter some Marxist-Leninist policies, as he has by reducing the number of parastatal corporations and seeking Western private investment, prospects for economic improvement and Kerekou's survival are good.

In Madagascar, Didier Ratsiraka's choice of a Socialist path after he had consolidated power has not reduced his country's problems. Since 1982, Ratsiraka's flexibility has been narrowed by economic problems, complicated by widespread corruption. In the countryside, the decentralized development projects are run by the armed forces, who recruit workers from local areas. Many of these projects, however, lack local technical and bureaucratic expertise and have become dependent for their survival on central government planning. Ratsiraka's policy of nonalignment has led to a broad range of foreign relations. During the past 2 years, Ratsiraka has demonstrated an increasing tendency to woo the West, a marked departure from the anti-Western tone of the 1970s and early 1980s, and he has tailored his economic policies to satisfy Western creditors.

Ratsiraka's 10-year tenure as Madagascar's president has been reinforced by his success in eliminating all organized political resistance to his regime. He has erected a strong barrier between the ruling circles and the general population, replacing the French with a new and privileged Malagasy elite. Ratsiraka has also demonstrated his skillful manipulation of East and West for

military and economic aid, continuing to reject Soviet demands for the use of military facilities. And, while Marxist-Leninist policies have been modified in view of the country's economic problems, Afrocommunism, which has provided Ratsiraka with the means to consolidate power, is unlikely to be abandoned; Ratsiraka will probably remain in power for the foreseeable future.

b. Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola

The Marxist-Leninist regimes which emerged in the mid-1970s in the former Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola formed during prolonged wars of liberation from Portugal. The African Independence Party of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party (MPLA) were led respectively during this time by Amilcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane, and Agostinho Neto, who had been students together in Lisbon. These nationalist leaders were drawn to the Marxist orientation of the Portuguese Communist Party, which operated illegally and was engaged in an active struggle against the Salazar regime.

The leading ideologues--Cabral in Guinea-Bissau, Samora Machel and Mondlane in Mozambique, and Neto and Lucio Lara in Angola--each believed that only one Marxism existed, which, as a science, could adapt to all conditions. They also rejected the notion of an African socialism distinct from the traditional Marxist-Leninist model found in the Soviet Union and China. However, the fact that the working classes did not play an important role in the liberation struggles of the three former colonies, together with their small sizes at the time of independence, created a philosophical quandary. Thus, the new regimes sought to rectify this deficiency and legitimize their ideological perspective by converting their liberation movements into vanguard parties, limiting membership to those whose social base was the working class and peasantry and whose ideology was Marxism-Leninism.

In Guinea-Bissau, Amilcar Cabral was assassinated in 1973, a year before independence. His brother, Luiz Cabral, took over the country's leadership and continued to institute Marxist-Leninist policies. But drought, ineffective economic policies, and the failure of the government to modernize agriculture on a communal basis led to the November 1980 overthrow of the Cabral regime by Prime Minister Joao Vieira, who tried to maintain a radical tone. But as the economy continued to deteriorate, Vieira began to move toward a more pragmatic position. His continuing gradual shift to the right is resulting in some stability for his regime.

In Mozambique, following Mondlane's assassination in 1969, Machel took over the FRELIMO leadership and became President when independence was gained in June 1975. FRELIMO's ambitious policies, aimed at restructuring the industrial sector and gaining agricultural self-sufficiency, have been hampered by serious problems, including extreme weather conditions, the independence war in neighboring Rhodesia, the collapse of the distribution network, and the rapidly intensifying Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) insurgency. Machel's September 1985 visit to the United States and talks with President Reagan have resulted in a distinct foreign policy shift. During these talks, Machel emphasized his desire for US private investments within his country's new, liberal foreign investment code, and the reduction of Mozambique's military dependence on the Soviet Union. As long as RENAMO remains a serious threat to the economic and political security of Mozambique, there will probably be a

progressive trend toward capitalist economic policies and away from Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, but there will probably not be significant movement away from the basic political commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology.

In Angola, the development of a viable Marxist-Leninist government has been undermined economically and politically by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgency and the destabilization policies of South Africa. These security problems, combined with declining oil prices, have caused an increasing deterioration of Angola's economy, leading to the country's economic dependence on the West. Nonetheless, the MPLA government remains militarily dependent on the Soviet bloc countries. Although extensive Cuban and Soviet military support does not appear to be checking UNITA expansion, it is unlikely that the MPLA government could survive without Cuban troops, and thus it is unlikely that the MPLA government will agree to a Cuban troop withdrawal. The refusal of the MPLA government to consider a coalition government with UNITA will probably not change in the near future as long as the Soviet Union and Cuba continue to support dos Santos. The Lusaka Accord, signed in February 1984 between Angola and South Africa, has raised hopes that talks with South African-supported UNITA will lead to discussions and national reconciliation.

c. Ethiopia

Ethiopia stands out as a unique case among the Afrocommunist countries. The Marxist-Leninist path chosen by Ethiopia's military regime was the result of an internal social upheaval in a country which had never been colonized and which experienced a real revolution. Furthermore, before Ethiopia's military leadership created a ruling Marxist-Leninist party in September 1984, it was the only Afrocommunist state without a political party.

The radicalization of Ethiopia's Government, under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam, took place in several phases. Marxist-Leninist ideas, first propagated by civilian parties which had no official role, were adopted by the Socialist-oriented military regime in 1976 and incorporated into Ethiopia's official ideology when the Soviet Union became Ethiopia's ally and arms provider in mid-1977. The Commission on Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) was established in 1979, and it led, in September 1984, to the formation of the Marxist-Leninist ruling party, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE), and the dispersal all over the country of WPE institutions and cadres.

The Mengistu regime is confronted with a number of economically and politically debilitating problems which have resulted in its declining authority. Nationalizations in the industrial sector and agricultural collectivization policies have caused economic deterioration and food shortages. Coupled with severe drought and famine, these worsening economic problems are causing the WPE a loss of support from all but the most dedicated ideologues in its ruling echelon. In addition, the ineffectiveness of government troop deployment against Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgents over the past 2 years has caused dissatisfaction within the Army.

The Soviet position in Ethiopia is far more secure than in any other Afrocommunist country because of the extent of the government's dependency on Soviet military aid and Mengistu's own personal commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology. But, like the other Afrocommunist countries, Ethiopia has sought Western economic aid as the result of the Soviet Union's inability and unwillingness to participate in major development projects. In the past year,

the West, and the United States in particular, has provided the bulk of much needed food aid for the famine victims.

Although the pervasive security system and difficulty of internal communications will probably preclude a decisive move against the regime in the near future, the combination of economic collapse and apparently irreversible political unpopularity presages a crisis for the regime. Mengistu will undoubtedly take whatever steps are necessary to strengthen his support, first by purging the top Army command and the Ministry of Defense, and then by a more radical restructuring of the political apparatus in order to consolidate power and the security of his regime. Mengistu has already demonstrated his tenacity throughout numerous difficult periods. As long as he remains in power, Afrocommunism will probably become more entrenched in Ethiopia than in any other country.

4. PROSPECTS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF AFROCOMMUNIST REGIMES IN SOUTH AFRICA, ZIMBABWE, AND NAMIBIA

a. South Africa

In South Africa, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the African National Congress (ANC) have developed increasingly close relations as the result of their mutual reliance on Soviet support and joint goal of a Socialist society. The SACP considers the ANC its mass organization, a link to the urban working classes from whom the party believes its main strength is derived. But ANC guerrillas face numerous and, at least for the foreseeable future, insurmountable difficulties. In terms of South Africa's military and industrial strength, scattered assaults against police stations and industrial targets by the small and weak guerrilla force have made virtually no impact on South Africa's economic production. But even more damaging is the inability of the ANC to establish training and staging bases in neighboring black African countries.

The SACP also has the support of the largest legal black group, the United Democratic Front (UDF). But even though the UDF shares many of the goals of the ANC, it lacks a coherent policy and steady leadership. On the other hand, the SACP lacks the support of other black nationalist groups, including the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the two most powerful trade unions, the predominantly Zulu Inkatha movement, led by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, and the militant Azanian People's Organization, which all object to the SACP's emphasis on class rather than race. Nonetheless, the SACP has acquired the affiliation of a number of important black trade unions.

The SACP, by way of ANC operations, could only present a serious threat to the South African status quo if a large number of blacks and the white working class join its struggle. Although the prospects for a strong and politically influential SACP are negligible in the short term, a definite trend toward the radicalization of an increasing number of blacks is now taking place, especially in the wake of recent refusals on the part of the government to make significant concessions to the blacks. In the future, unrest, already increasing among the majority black population, will probably spread to other population groups, who perceive socialism as the solution to South Africa's apartheid policy. Consequently, the SACP will gain more support among the working classes and become a more formidable political force with which the government will have to deal. Nevertheless, the present weakness and paucity of

support for the SACP preclude the establishment of an Afrocommunist regime in South Africa in the foreseeable future.

b. Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), under the leadership of Robert Mugabe, came to power in 1980 at the end of a long liberation struggle. The Mugabe government has consistently veered toward a Marxist-Leninist orientation, although it has yet to declare Zimbabwe a Marxist-Leninist state. During ZANU's Second Congress in August 1984, the first since 1964, a resolution called for the installation and maintenance in Zimbabwe of a Socialist state, founded on Marxist-Leninist principles. To achieve this, the Congress, led by Mugabe, decided to transform Zimbabwe into a one-party state. The establishment of a Presidential Commission led to the election of a 15-member Politburo, to which Mugabe nominated 14 of his supporters, and a 90-member Central Committee. In the process, Mugabe has established his control of the party and should dominate the future of its development.

When he came to power, Mugabe understood the importance of encouraging as many whites as possible to stay in the country following independence to ease the transition from minority to majority rule. Even as black Zimbabweans become more adept at managing their own affairs and the number of whites in the civil service falls from an overwhelming majority to a tiny minority, Zimbabwe's financial stake in the presence of whites will remain strong. As a result, Mugabe will probably continue to hold back on the implementation of more radical policies.

Mugabe appears to be politically secure following ZANU's landslide victory in the July 1985 Parliamentary election. ZANU won 63 seats, sweeping every region except one and ensuring Mugabe a second 5-year term as Prime Minister. However, the election results demonstrate the continuing challenge to Mugabe's declarations of future ZANU one-party rule from two sources--former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's white Republican Front party, which took 15 of the 20 Parliamentary seats reserved for whites, and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), which has the support of the minority Ndebele tribe located in Matabeleland, and which won 15 out of 80 seats reserved for blacks. Mugabe's continued leadership and pursuit of pragmatic policies, while probably leading to the formation of a one-party state, appear to preclude the establishment of an Afrocommunist regime in Zimbabwe in the near future.

c. Namibia

Two important aspects concerning the political situation in Namibia include first, the armed liberation struggle against South African rule by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and second, the political mass mobilization of the Namibian population by SWAPO.

Founded in 1960 and supported by Namibia's largest ethnic group, the Ovambo, SWAPO's victories have been infrequent and limited in the face of South African military power, resulting in the continued exile of its leadership and the inability of PLAN guerrillas to maintain bases within the country. Instead, they are forced to attack from bases in southern Angola. The political program adopted by SWAPO's Central Committee in 1976 contains a number of specifically Marxist-Leninist prescriptions, and statements by the organization's leader, Sam

Nujoma, and other prominent SWAPO leaders indicate that an independent SWAPO government would be similar to Robert Mugabe's ZANU government in Zimbabwe.

In April 1985, South Africa formed an interim government for Namibia which included a number of parties dominated by the non-Socialist and South African-dominated Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. The powers of the interim government, which has been rejected by SWAPO, are extremely limited since the South African Government continues to retain control of foreign policy and defense. Although SWAPO is recognized by all the other southern African countries and the United Nations as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, its prospects for assuming control of an independent Namibia in the near future without significant South African influence are remote.

5. OUTLOOK

The existence of Afrocommunism on the African continent does not necessarily mean the creation of a string of Soviet satellites. While orthodoxy is the hallmark of the Afrocommunist regimes, they are nevertheless trying to integrate the principles of Marxism-Leninism with their own unique historical experience, interpreting Marxist-Leninist ideology as a way of radically reordering their societies through a set of specific institutions. In foreign policy, the choice by Afrocommunist leaders of Marxism-Leninism is a decision to try to change the established world order rather than to simply find a niche for their countries on its periphery. The regimes are committed to furthering the cause of socialism, but as independent and equal partners with other Socialist countries around the world. Like the West European Communist parties, African Marxist-Leninist parties argue that communism does not imply enslavement to the Soviet Union, but is an ideology that can be adapted to local circumstances and implemented free of subservience to a foreign power. Thus, Marxism-Leninism in Africa will probably develop according to the dictates of internal developments rather than to those of external powers.

The self-defined African Marxist-Leninist regimes are not Socialist utopias nor are they likely to become so. Under the tight control of small, elite regimes and vanguard parties, the populations of the Afrocommunist countries do not participate directly in the decisionmaking process, nor do the workers control the revolution. In this respect, these regimes do not differ from any other Marxist-Leninist regimes in the world. In general, Communist parties do not exist or are unable to gain significant influence and popularity in sub-Saharan Africa partly because of the small size of the working class in most countries, and partly because of the basically materialistic nature of most African cultures. It is therefore improbable that any other Marxist-Leninist regimes will emerge in the near future or, if one should, that it would be radically different from any existing Afrocommunist regime.

6. IMPLICATIONS OF AFROCOMMUNISM FOR THE WEST

In recent years, better relations between Afrocommunist and Western countries have been pursued mostly by the United States, France, and Portugal. They have agreed to provide military supplies to one or more of the Afrocommunist regimes and, even more significantly, desperately needed economic assistance and investments, which the Soviet Union cannot afford. These Western countries hope to diminish the need of the Afrocommunist regimes for Soviet military aid and in the long run, diminish Soviet influence in general and

prevent the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

A major threat, presented by hostility toward the West of existing Afrocommunist regimes and future pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regimes, would be the establishment of sizeable Soviet military facilities or unlimited Soviet access to ports and airports anywhere on the continent. At present, all the Afrocommunist countries as well as Socialist ones continue to deny the Soviets military facilities on a permanent basis, with the exception of Ethiopia which has allowed them to use the Dahlak Islands off its coast. And although the Soviets are given occasional permission to use ports and airports in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Madagascar in particular, access is subject to the whims of those countries' leaderships. So far, the Soviets have not used either the procurement of military facilities or free access to port and airport facilities as a condition for the supply of military aid in any of the Afrocommunist countries. In light of the dependence of Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia on Soviet military equipment, it is feasible that one or more of these countries could relent in the future.

A second threat concerns the Western world's reliance on external sources for strategic minerals. Western nations are almost entirely dependent on strategic minerals from central and southern Africa, particularly Zaire, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, such as chromium, platinum, nickel, cobalt, and titanium, which are essential for the production of alloys used in the manufacture of high technology weapons systems. The Soviet Union could use its influence over an Afrocommunist regime in Zimbabwe or South Africa to bring about a total interdiction in the flow of strategic minerals to the West as a means of exercising political and economic pressure upon the West. Or these regimes could sharply increase the price for the West of these resources, a move which would have adverse effects, although far less catastrophic ones than those which followed the increase in oil prices by the oil-producing states.

But history does not support such a scenario in central and southern Africa. The existing Afrocommunist regimes, with the exception of Ethiopia, have made it clear that they will not tolerate undue Soviet political pressure nor will they behave as Soviet satellites. The Soviets themselves do not regard sub-Saharan Africa as a primary strategic priority and have subsequently placed a low priority on the provision of economic aid to Africa. It is therefore unlikely that the Soviets would create a situation in which they would have to assume economic responsibilities for any Afrocommunist regime. In addition, Zimbabwe's Mugabe has resisted Soviet attempts to establish close relations, a remnant of his resentment of Soviet support to Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU during the liberation war. Western countries, and the United States in particular, are in a position to exert increasing pressure on the Afrocommunist regimes to abandon their ties with the Soviet Union in return for economic assistance. If Western countries were to use this leverage, those countries most likely to comply are Benin, Guinea-Bissau, and Madagascar, where party-to-party relations with the CPSU do not exist. Angola and Mozambique, under considerable pressure, would probably capitulate, but Ethiopia, whose ties with the Soviet Union have been reinforced by the creation of the ruling WPE, would probably choose to scorn the West.

In the investment sphere, Afrocommunism has impeded Western initiatives. In these countries, where so many structures of the economy have been nationalized, new projects require long lead times, large expenditures for the creation of new infrastructures, and flexibility to deal with political uncertainties and

volatile prices, especially for agricultural commodities and metals. However, these considerations become significantly less crucial in the area of oil prospecting. Because the proceeds from oil sales provide ample benefits for both the state and the oil companies, and because the extent of the cash flow insures sufficient funds for reimbursement in the event of nationalizations, the risk to Western oil companies in the Afrocommunist countries, as well as in those countries which might acquire Afrocommunist regimes in the future, is acceptable. Thus, prospects for continued Western oil projects in Afrocommunist countries, such as Angola and Congo, as well as new Western oil investment opportunities in Africa, are favorable.

Despite the relatively impersonal process of radicalization and lack of highly personalized regimes in most Afrocommunist countries, with the notable exception of Ethiopia, there exists the constant possibility of a dramatic foreign policy realignment vis-a-vis East-West ties, particularly in view of the failure of Marxist-Leninist policies to solve serious agricultural and economic problems. This failure has caused the Afrocommunist regimes a loss of prestige within their own populations as well as in Western eyes. In the case of Mozambique, for example, Machel has demonstrated his willingness to talk with Western leaders in recent years, and his September 1985 trip to the United States is an indication of his desire to resist Soviet influence. In the Afrocommunist countries where no party-to-party relations with the CPSU exist--Congo, Madagascar, Benin, and Guinea-Bissau--future dramatic policy reversals are more possible in light of their immediate economic needs.

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